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**A Raised Consciousness:
Franz Sigel and German Ethnic Identity in the Civil War**

How could the German-American community make so much of Franz Sigel during the American Civil War when he was so obviously marginally competent as a military leader? The answer may be revealed by examining Sigel within the context not of military or even political history but of the construction of ethnic group identity. Though historians have linked the Civil War to the process of assimilation, few have identified the war as a catalyst for elevating ethnic consciousness among ethnic groups in America. This is not to imply, however, that assimilation and emphasis of ethnic identity are or were mutually exclusive processes. Indeed, there is a great deal of significant literature attempting to integrate these concepts, most of which demonstrates the subtlety with which they interact.

The neglect by historians, however, in seeing the war as a catalyst for raising an ethnic consciousness stems in part from the widely held view that fighting to preserve the Union and actual combat transcended ethnic boundaries and in fact welded soldiers together despite cultural or ethnic distinctions. This view, that maintains wide currency, assumes that the war was only one of several steps in the "melting" process by which immigrant groups became Americanized. Because the Civil War exercised a tremendous effect on the process of assimilation of Germans in the North, as well as other immigrant groups, scholars have often used the war as a kind of gauge by which to calibrate the process and to argue that the war expedited and completed the assimilation of those Germans who arrived before the war. Indeed, the war may have engendered emphasis on *Deutschtum* as a surge toward, not away from assimilation. In an effort to illustrate this assimilation argument, these scholars have often sought representative figures who reflect the complete assimilation argument.¹

If Germans "assimilated" during the Civil war, it was not because they saw the war as an opportunity to become more like Americans. Rather, Germans, caught in a kind of identity crisis, found elements of service, combat and politi-

cal life that proved valuable in the self-construction of a German identity by emphasizing their *Deutschtum*—in particular they linked the home front to the battlefield. It was not so much that this emphasis stemmed from communal settlements and institutions that bound group members to one another, but rather from a common cultural maintenance that took shape as those citizens went to war. The war encouraged a “multiculturalist” emphasis on *Deutschtum* and the devices of ethnocultural maintenance. For example, when the German-American press and other publicists stressed the role of German-Americans in the military effort to preserve the Union, they were claiming a bigger slice of the American pie—clearly an assimilationist goal. They wanted to be recognized as Americans, not as immigrants with questionable loyalties. Their accents, both linguistic and behavioral unmistakably identified them as immigrants, as newcomers; they could not escape that. So they made virtue of necessity and argued that their culture and values made them good Americans and maybe even better Americans than many of the native born.²

This essay seeks to identify the American Civil War as a major catalyst in forcing the confluence of assimilation and ethnic maintenance that heightened ethnic consciousness of German-Americans in the Union. By focusing on the link between the home front and the battlefield, I argue that Germans emphasized their *Deutschtum* (common cultural maintenance), which revealed how the German-American community revisualized itself during the war. The internal content and external impression of ethnicity has varied from time to time as a reaction to external pressures or challenges to the group. This expression is also a reaction to the changing conditions within the group itself. Ethnicity, then, can be viewed as a continuing process of re-invention, which suggests why “being German” in America might be something quite different from “being German” in the old country.

This essay attempts to investigate Franz Sigel as a protean ethnic icon. It suggests that the Civil War was a crucible for the formation, reformation, rejection, rejuvenation, and use of this hyphenate general as an ethnic symbol both within and outside the ethnic group. Sigel’s role in the war illustrates this ethnic emphasis argument, since he was successful in linking the home front and battlefield during the conflict. Because Sigel was a symbol of the German community, his role magnified the worth of the German community in American society. Sigel’s wartime experience forced him to recast his own ideological formation and construction as a German. He came to recognize himself as the product the German-American community had created and he was successful in consolidating support for this construction. In mobilizing demonstrations of support in Sigel’s behalf, the German community gave evidence of moving in both directions (towards assimilation and towards constructing an ethnic identity) simultaneously—creating firmer ethnic solidarity, on the one hand, and acting effectively in the public sphere, on the other hand.

No German-American was more the “Damned Dutch” to Americans than Franz Sigel, and yet no other German-American military leader possessed his

enormous, albeit perplexing, popularity. The German-American community would produce numerous outstanding soldiers and commanders, yet none quite measured up to Franz Sigel. Though Carl Schurz was America's most celebrated citizen of German descent in the nineteenth century, Franz Sigel proved to be the most popular German-American leader in the Union army during the Civil War. This popularity endured long after the war; its basis continues to baffle Civil War historians.³

There was nothing particularly distinguished in Sigel's background that suggested he would ultimately be deserving of visibility and renown. He had been among the leaders in the failed 1848 liberal revolutionary uprising in Germany and led the revolutionary forces of Baden in numerous encounters against the Prussians. Sigel migrated to America in 1852 as did other Forty-Eighters, as they came to be known. Because some Germans in the United States supported the 1848 Revolution, and kept abreast of developments in Germany, the name Franz Sigel was a familiar one in major German-American newspapers. Though he had been the military leader of a failed revolution, his reputation as a champion of liberalism and democracy eclipsed his battlefield failures and made him more appealing to German-Americans seeking political leadership in either combating nativism, or simply representing the German-American community's interest. Sigel's role in the military accentuated the German-American community's desire to point to their participation in the Civil War as testimony to their fitness as citizens of a republic.⁴

Sigel arrived in New York City when Germans were concluding that their venture in the New World had not ended their quest for independence and freedom, but only transplanted it. Doctrines and programs formulated in Europe came to be seen as quite applicable to American conditions. Republicanism and constitutionalism were essential German aspirations that were beneficial to America. The 1848 refugees had seen themselves as fighting for republicanism and constitutionalism in Germany, and had actively tried to persuade other Germans to adopt this ideology as their own. They also saw themselves fighting for the American ideals of liberty, equality, free labor and an end to slavery. In the pre-war decade, this rhetoric was often used to counter anti-immigrant complaints that Germans lacked the background in Anglo-Saxon traditions of republicanism to participate in American democracy. Though the failure of 1848 had forced Sigel into exile, his zeal for reform was unshaken. He became an active participant in organizations to help new arrivals make the transition to America. During the 1850s he emerged as a leader in the New York German-American community. He taught at the Feldner School, a German-American institute in New York City, joined the local *Turnverein*, the Fifth New York Militia, and was instrumental in the organization of other German militias. In 1857, Sigel moved to St. Louis to teach in the popular Deutsches Institut. The rise of the Republican Party captured his attention in 1858 and his interests increasingly shifted to politics. Quickly he became respected and popular among St. Louis Germans for his educational, civic and political leadership.⁵

At the outbreak of the Civil War, Sigel's previous military experience and education, combined with his civic role in the second largest German community in the United States, justified his political appointment as an officer of German soldiers. During the early phase of the Civil War in Missouri, he demonstrated proficiency in organizing an army and bravery in combat. He participated in the battles of Carthage and Wilson's Creek in the summer of 1861. Though his performance was undistinguished, he helped to save Missouri for the Union, which ultimately earned him the reputation of being "Hell on retreat." For his role in securing a Union victory at the Battle of Pea Ridge in March of 1862, he was promoted to major general and transferred to the East, where, unfortunately for Sigel, his imperfections as a military commander were reflected in the battles of Second Bull Run in July 1862 and New Market in May 1864. He was sharply criticized by the press and his superiors for delaying in bringing up his men at Second Bull Run and eventually shelved for his ineffectual role in the Shenandoah Valley in the Summer 1864.⁶

Despite his undistinguished military endeavors, Sigel was, according to Hans L. Trefousse, "still the darling of the Germans."⁷ From the beginning of the conflict many Germans throughout the North wanted to fight under Sigel because he represented something larger to them. He was the instrument of their solidarity in the war. The phrase "I fights mit Sigel," used by German soldiers throughout the war, represented more than just military allegiance. The loyalty of the soldiers to Sigel was evident in their refusal to answer Union soldiers as to the name of their company. When an American soldier asked Germans their company, they frequently replied "I fights mit Sigel." A Chicago German, Franz Schilling, wrote Sigel that there was a good number of Germans desiring to serve under Sigel and remarked that "if they cannot manage to do this, they will not serve at all." Though not all Germans were of the same opinion with regard to Sigel's representation, many were, and fighting with Sigel became symbolic of their desire to fight together as Germans in solidarity—a solidarity that extended beyond the battlefield to community. Because he was a symbol of their participation in the war, Germans were extremely sensitive about the treatment of their esteemed general. Whenever he was abused by the press or mistreated by superiors, the German community took it personally, since it identified his treatment as a reflection of their treatment in American society. As the *St. Louis Daily Missouri Democrat* put it plainly and simply, Sigel was "the representative of the German element."⁸ Thus, when he resigned from the military on two occasions and when his requests for more significant commands were denied, it injured a community of Germans that transcended the battlefield and linked the battlefield to the home front.

His first resignation in late December 1861, was prompted over what appeared to be a misunderstanding regarding military protocol in the appointment and replacement of commanders. Sigel thought that his replacement by General Samuel Curtis had been an attempt by General Henry W. Halleck, his anti-immigrant superior, to eliminate him from command fearing that Sigel's

prominence among the Germans in the West posed a threat to the Union. Halleck thought that Sigel might utilize his prominence to persuade his German followers to overthrow the Union government. He wrote General George B. McClellan and Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton that there was a plot by the Germans to replace Halleck with Sigel and that the "Damned Dutch" constituted a "very dangerous element in society as well as in the army." Lack of evidence to prove such a plot and President Abraham Lincoln's tactful handling of the affair, including the promotion of Sigel to major general, encouraged the general to withdraw his resignation in January 1862 and satisfied the German community that their interests had been served.¹⁰

Sigel's second resignation in March 1863 was also prompted by his belief that Halleck was trying to eliminate him. Sigel had complained in February and March of 1863 that his Eleventh Corps, widely though inaccurately known as the German Corps, was the smallest in the Army of the Potomac and that in simple justice to himself it should be enlarged. When his superior responded that he "should do the best he can with it," Sigel again hastily resigned from the army.¹¹ At the urging of the German community, Sigel rescinded his resignation and planned to return to his old unit. When he showed up in Washington ready to take command, Halleck had no use for him. After spending several months in 1863 without a command, Sigel was finally sent to an obscure military department in Pennsylvania where he resumed his military duties in the summer. But because neither Sigel nor the German community was satisfied with his position, they both pressured the president politically to give the German leader a more significant command. In February 1864, Lincoln acquiesced and placed Sigel in command of the Department of West Virginia. As he had done in 1862, the president made a judicious decision to promote Sigel's interests, and apparently the perceived interests of the German community, in an election year.¹²

On both occasions Sigel's resignations and his desire to return to a more significant command created an uproar in the German community that swelled into national proportions. "The German community . . . is greatly exercised just now about the resignation . . . [of Sigel]," wrote one perceptive Illinois citizen to Senator Lyman Trumbull. To be sure, many German soldiers were outraged by his treatment. Colonel Nicholas Greusel of the Thirty-Sixth Illinois Volunteer Regiment, for example, perhaps best summed up the opinion of most German soldiers regarding Sigel's first resignation saying "I for one am ready to sheath my sword when you do . . . let the Foraign [sic] population lay down their arms, and what is left [but] an army of officers."¹³

Throughout the West in early 1862 the battle cry of the Germans was "We fight with Sigel!" The failure of Wilson's Creek had not soured "Dutch" enthusiasm for the Missouri hero, and success at Pea Ridge merely intensified the German admiration for Sigel. Part of the reason for Sigel's good fortune was that the German press, not only in New York and Boston, but also in Pittsburgh, Columbus, Indianapolis, Milwaukee, Chicago, Belleville, and St. Louis

joined in his defense. The German-American press played a central role in emphasizing Sigel's worth as a German in linking the home front and battlefield, despite the lack of unanimity among editors regarding Sigel's worth as a commander. Sigel got press because he represented the role of Germans in the war, not because he was a particularly great commander.¹⁴

Germans at home also personalized his affair. His first resignation resulted in the creation of a network of Sigel "Indignation Committees" that sprang up almost overnight in New York and Chicago. These committees sprang from members of the *Turnvereine* and *Arbeitervereine*, and were instrumental in consolidating support for Sigel. They encouraged Germans to actively engage in pressuring newspapers and local politicians to push for Sigel's restoration to command and promotion. German supporters of the general from Missouri to Massachusetts staged "Sigel Festivals" and "Sigel Demonstrations" in several cities, and poems and songs were written in his honor. There were mass meetings objecting to Sigel's resignation throughout the North and the Midwest. Hundreds of soldiers in the Twentieth New York (Turner) Regiment protested against Sigel's treatment by signing a petition asking the army not to accept Sigel's resignation. Franz Grimm, a captain in the Forty-Third Illinois Volunteer Infantry publicly aired his disgust over the affair by writing his home town newspaper the *Belleviller-Zeitung*, denouncing Sigel's treatment and requesting he be reinstated. As divergent as their political interests were, a Milwaukee Copperhead paper nonetheless pointed out that Democratic and Republican Germans in the Wisconsin legislature had cooperated in passing a resolution petitioning the government to re-assign Sigel to a command worthy of his ability. In October 1862, in Milwaukee, the Twenty-Sixth Wisconsin Infantry was quietly mustered in and adopted Franz Sigel as its patron saint. It became popularly known as the "Sigel Regiment," or to Milwaukee residents "Unser Deutsches Regiment." When he returned home to New York City, thousands of Germans would flock to hear him speak. German women's clubs and *Turnverein* members got involved in the effort to see Sigel properly reinstated. Many of these committees used the press as their spokesmen to promote Sigel and to link his case in the military to the case of all Germans fighting in the war and on the home front.¹⁵

Sigel became a martyr in the German and the American press in the summer of 1861 when the Copperhead *Missouri Republican* published a letter describing the battle of Wilson's Creek, in which Sigel was blamed for the Union disaster. Although Sigel was a Republican, even the Copperhead Democrats among the Germans hesitated to criticize him. Only Karl Heinzen, of the Republican German editors, refused to accept Sigel, who was not enough of an abolitionist, as the perfect symbol of German-Americanism. The Copperhead papers such as the Milwaukee *Banner* and the Cincinnati *Volksfreund* enlisted their support for Sigel by publicly denouncing what they believed were nativist attacks against the general's actions at Wilson's Creek. Oswald Ottendorfer, a Democrat and editor of the *New Yorker Staats-Zeitung*, called for the creation of a "German Brigade" to be led by Sigel. German editor Louis Fieser of the Co-

lumbus *Westbote*, argued that if rank and file Germans seemed fit to fight on the battlefield, Sigel was surely fit to be a major general.¹⁶

In February 1862, German editors from Philadelphia to St. Louis made it clear to Know-Nothings that nearly 80,000 Germans had mustered into the Union Army. These editors urged their American counterparts to help Sigel obtain a promotion to major general by informing their readers of his accomplishments and his alleged mistreatment. Rudolph Lexow's New York German journal, *New Yorker Criminal-Zeitung und Belletristisches Journal*, lauded Sigel's battlefield exploits and military skill. Some editors went so far as to characterize Sigel as the "highest representative of Germanism." Of course, critics of Sigel such as Karl Heinzen objected to this disproportionate idolatry of one general, arguing that it overshadowed the widespread discrimination against rank and file Germans. Nonetheless, both German and American editors came to Sigel's rescue. Several German newspapers established a clear link between what was happening to Sigel in the army, and what German citizens had experienced before and during the war and saw both as signs of nativism. The editors of the St. Louis *Westliche Post* perceptively summed up the sentiment toward Sigel in the German communities throughout America saying that "a loyal population of four million citizens of German birth and extraction, in the north, will make the supposed sacrifice of Sigel their own grievance."¹⁷

The German community also pressured its political leaders to make Sigel's affair the affair of all Germans, soldiers and citizens. Sigel's first resignation prompted Illinois Congressman Isaac N. Arnold, leader of a pro-Sigel group in Congress, to send the president a petition in mid-January 1862 demanding that Sigel be made a major general. In a letter to George Schneider, an 1848 German refugee and once editor of the *Illinois Staatszeitung*, Arnold wrote that "I cannot fight 'mit Sigel' now but you may rely upon it, I shall fight for Sigel here."¹⁸ In January 1864, when Sigel's friends were again petitioning the government to place him in a more significant command, Colonel William Boyd wrote Sigel in early January: "You have been treated like an outlaw because your rank and Germanness was never respected . . . foreigners will never be promoted . . . there is existing yet an unjust and infamous system of 'Dark Lanternism' even against foreigners."¹⁹ Still, the Democratic German editors could not understand why Sigel remained loyal to the Lincoln administration after what he had suffered.

Fighting for Sigel on the home front was precisely the kind of solidarity that linked the Germans with the battlefield despite political differences. Germans in the East were unhappy that Sigel was without command and used the press and their political representatives to get Sigel transferred to the East. In April 1862, for example, the German press reported that Germans held more mass meetings in Philadelphia, Cincinnati, Milwaukee, Peoria (Illinois), and Carondelet (Missouri) on Sigel's behalf. The combined propaganda media of the German community influenced the Lincoln administration to transfer Sigel. When Sigel's transfer was approved in May, the general passed through Chicago en route to Washington, and was greeted at the railway station by hundreds of

admirers, who accompanied him to the balcony of the Fremont-House. Addressing the crowd in German, Sigel declared that he was neither a politician nor an orator, but that he would "fight for the Union." When he arrived in Pittsburgh, Sigel was again welcomed by a large demonstrative crowd, and when he reached Washington in late May, another crowd greeted him at Willard's Hotel. His speech to his Washington admirers, echoing his earlier words, was picked up by the German press and widely circulated.²⁰

In early 1864, the German press began beating the drums again for Sigel as commanding general in West Virginia. The president sensed the extreme indignation in the German community over the Sigel affairs on both occasions. Whether or not he considered Sigel a worthy and valuable general, it was the influence of the German community that encouraged him to nominate Sigel for a major general's commission in 1862 and put him in command of the Department of West Virginia in 1864. Lincoln anticipated the political consequences, and considered the larger implications of Sigel's position in the German community. In Lincoln's own words the war was a "people's contest." Perhaps he considered that Sigel's case might have effects beyond the battlefield and politics to the German community and work place. A case of such magnitude might severely affect the enlistment of Germans needed for the front and workers needed at home. Though a few newspapers alleged that Sigel had a habit of making his first priority that of "cultivating his German-American constituency as a means of furthering his own political fortunes," they clearly considered him the instrument of the German community itself. Carl Schurz clearly recognized the connection between Sigel and the German community. In 1864, he referred to Lincoln's placing Sigel in command of the Department of West Virginia as a "very judicious measure in every respect."²¹ It was this kind of favorable treatment of Sigel that gave Germans, according to Gustav Körner, a leader among Illinois Germans and close friend of Lincoln, "unbounded satisfaction."²²

Sigel's return to the military and promotions were closely connected with the ability of German-Americans to mobilize and utilize their ethnicity effectively. The *Anzeiger des Westens* declared that because Sigel was the highest ranking military German, "he has to bear the cross of Germany as well."²³ The Louisville *Daily Journal* added that "his loss from the army would be deeply and universally regretted as a national loss for the German community as a whole."²⁴ Poet William Cullen Bryant recognized Sigel's impact among Germans saying "Sigel's favor among the German population is unanimous." He noted in May 1863 that on the rumor that Sigel would return to the army, "it was the common exclamation that [that] single step was equal to the addition of ten thousand men to the army."²⁵

The opportunity to return to the army as commanding general in West Virginia turned out to be yet another disappointment for the Union when the Confederates defeated Sigel's forces at New Market, Virginia, on 15 May 1864. "Sigel must do penance even to the Germans," for this disaster, admitted a Demo-

cratic German paper. Again, German papers of both political parties felt that the nativists were unfair to have expected Sigel to halt the Confederates in the Shenandoah Valley that spring. Rudolph Lexow went so far as to claim that Sigel's performance at New Market would indeed rehabilitate the commander in the eyes of Americans. On the contrary, in June, Sigel was removed from command and placed in command of the defenses at Harpers Ferry, West Virginia, some fifty-five miles west of Washington, DC.²⁶

Sigel's great popularity among Germans throughout the war, though puzzling for military scholars, merely underscored the active participation by Germans, particularly the Forty-Eighters, in emphasizing their identity, and in the case of some urban Germans, group solidarity during the Civil War. Not all Germans attempted to stoke the fires of alienation and make the gap between Germans and Americans greater than it was during the war. Of course, for every German who eagerly enlisted to fight with Sigel, there was another who quietly or unobtrusively as possible avoided the draft and hired a substitute. The historical record is replete with examples of those who publicly and privately acknowledged their motivations to fight with Sigel and other German officers. One must assume, however, that there were Germans on farms and in cities who did not care much one way or another; ideology was not important for them. Such persons just wanted to be left alone to meet their familial responsibilities in a difficult world, and such views would not have been found in the press.

Still, the war provided Germans with new ways of expressing ethnic identity both as soldiers and as citizens, since it called for a renegotiation of Germanness with respect to the meaning and its relations to both Americans and other ethnic groups participating in the war. As Jörg Nagler argues, Germans actively stressed their *Deutschtum* and saw the war as an opportunity to reapply a familiar shield of identity to new circumstances. The solidarity produced by witnessing how enormous the involvement of German soldiers aided the Union also had ethnic connotations, since Germans attempted to unite their fragmented ethnic group in a political fight for the Union. Whether intentional or not, Sigel's attempts to enhance his military standing took the form of ethnic construction. Germans who felt unappreciated by Americans employed their Germanness to promote the interests of their leader and giving Americans an opportunity to appreciate them not simply because of what they did, but also because of who they were.²⁷

During the war Sigel became increasingly aware of his position and stature among the Germans, in the army as well as at home. As a soldier and officer he recognized the ethnic significance of German participation in the war and viewed it as an opportunity to redefine the status of Germans. He became aware of the product the German press had created in him. Indeed some contemporaries came to believe as Murray M. Horowitz has argued that Sigel's first priority was "cultivating his German-American constituency as a means of furthering his own political fortunes." True or not, as an intellectual he realized that accep-

tance of Germans by Americans presumed that American society was open to ethnic contributions and to forming a cultural unity based on racial and ethnic plurality and moral superiority. He thought that "mutual assimilation" between Germans and Americans would lead to the more general case for ethnic difference as an acceptable and positive good. "America," he wrote, "was simply the new starting point in the history of the human family—the continuous life of different elements." In his letters to newspaper editors he urged Germans to fight for the Union and maintain an ideological parallel to Americans, while at the same time he encouraged them to fight collectively in companies, regiments and divisions. Oddly enough, the War Department belatedly sought to use his popularity with the Germans in the North. In 1863, he was sent to recruit volunteers among the German farmers, particularly in Pennsylvania. Speaking to a mass meeting of New York Germans while on leave in February 1863, he encouraged them not to forsake their bond to Germany, but "to sustain the government by all means."²⁸

In urging his fellow Germans to support the Union, he spoke of a republicanism that held Americans together politically. He took steps towards a democratized policy of assimilation by insisting on immigrant participation in American institutions and traditions in lieu of drawing up fanciful Marxist-socialist agendas. In a post war essay on the American Republic, he argued that cultural differences were important in the evolution of American culture, but were irrelevant to the political state. Though he urged Germans to embrace American institutions, including political parties, he stressed their freedom to cultivate their own cultural ethnicity and still be Americans. Thus, Sigel believed, as the Civil War posed a threat to the political state, Germans would be seen as contributors to the preservation of the Union, and more acceptable to Americans.²⁹

The eager participation by large numbers of Germans in the Union army laid the foundation for the construction of their ethnicity, since it undoubtedly magnified their place and role as German-Americans, not as Hessians, Bavarians, and Prussians. The number of German soldiers who fought in the Union army has been estimated at between 180,000-230,000, or roughly one-tenth of those who served in the Union army; 36,000 of these soldiers served in all-German units under German commanders. Though the majority of Germans did not fight in all German units, many still saw themselves first as Germans fighting to not only preserve the Union, but also for space and acceptability in the social mainstream of America.³⁰

Many of the Germans who arrived in the North prior to the Civil War were of military age and without jobs and who believed that service life in the army meant full American citizenship, which was attractive since it was financially worthwhile to enlist. Obviously, Germans desired some degree of assimilation, but the German soldiers felt a strong sense of comradeship among themselves, despite religious, economic and political differences. Many Germans who arrived after the Revolution of 1848 were familiar with military life and sought

to advance their military interests. Most of the German units came from the same American cities and neighborhoods and shared the same values, experiences, and historical memories. These shared experiences, coupled with the unifying fervor to preserve the Union, served to strengthen unit cohesion. The *Turnvereine* were instrumental in recruiting and organizing Germans for the army. Many Germans insisted in forming their own companies and regiments and carried the individual flags of their homeland along with the Union flag into battle. Those Germans who wanted to segregate themselves from American soldiers, did so in part because they feared nativist hostility in the ranks, and in part because with their military skill and education, they had contempt for American military officers. Though German soldiers in the Union army wanted to fight to preserve the Union, many wanted to fight under a commander who understood their Germanness. Whatever the case, those who participated in the Union army contributed extensively to the North's victory, though they would ultimately be characterized as the "Damned Dutch."³¹

Because Civil War soldiers took into the war a strong sense of community, their war experiences would be linked to the communities from which they came. The war provided Germans an opportunity to mobilize and strengthen their community and sense of ethnicity by serving in the military. What transpired on the battlefield had direct implications for the German American community at home. Editors, politicians, and leaders of the *Turngemeinden* and *Arbeitervereine* attempted to capitalize on the discontent in the ranks by emphasizing the mistreatment and neglect of the German soldiers. As Bruce Catton argued, the fight to end slavery was simultaneously a fight by immigrant soldiers for social acceptability on the part of the Americans. On 19 July 1861 when Adjutant General Lorenzo Thomas issued War Order No. 45, concerning enlistments, the foreign-born press protested. The German community came to perceive the third paragraph as banning the volunteering of men who did not speak English. At once Germans protested and questioned whether or not Sigel and others like him were any less valuable because they spoke broken English. Thus, from the onset the German-American community fought the "People's Contest" on two fronts.³²

According to Bruce Levine, the North's German communities followed their countrymen in arms with "great and touchy pride." Indeed they did. The circulation of German newspapers increased dramatically at a time when the influx of Germans had decreased considerably. Oswald Ottendorfer's *New Yorker Staats-Zeitung's* readership, for example, increased because New York City Germans wanted to follow what was happening in the war. A special German weekly called *Das Archiv*, appeared in the summer of 1861, which provided information on German soldiers and units. Rudolph Lexow's *Criminal-Zeitung und Belletristisches Journal* provided the Germans of New York City a detailed study of the causes of the war and weekly reports of battles and commanders. Karl Heinzen's Boston *Pionier* also increased in readership. Through the press, Sigel emerged as a representative who could be seen in the republican ideal of the

citizen as a sort of Cincinnatus, who emerged from his peaceful pastimes to defend the republic and the constitution. Important questions such as why Sigel had not been given command of the West increased the Germans' demand for answers by the government. Newspaper accounts, soldiers' letters to relatives and friends, and word-of-mouth reports kept Germans at home informed about soldier life. These reports described the positive and negative side of soldiering and frequently, nativism. German soldiers and editors routinely, accused American superiors of treating them unfairly by denying them food and supplies, passing over them for promotion, and blaming them for problems typical of the entire army.³³

Germans at home generally responded by reinforcing their support for the German troops. Local committees organized to press the claims of individual German soldiers and officers or to raise money to aid immigrant units that had been disgracefully neglected. German employers of New York City, for example, encouraged men to join the army and took care of their families while they were away. German soldiers and non-combatants also took up the pen and voiced their concerns and protest of the "alleged" unfair treatment of Sigel to newspaper editors. Efforts such as these won support from the broad social and political spectrum of Germans and emphasized their belief that Lincoln's original definition of the purpose of the war as defending constitutional union. Germans were in the forefront of the movement that opposed Lincoln's re-election from the Left because of his slow pace toward emancipation. At this time, Germans emphasized their idealism—a higher kind of moral virtue that outweighed the petty moralizing of their nativist and temperance detractors and Sabbath-enforcers. Germans also had a positive view of their own military talents, which contributed disciplined and courageous soldiers to the struggle. Whatever the case, German communities were linked to the battlefield, and participated in constructing or perhaps reconstructing their place in American social thought by emphasizing their *Deutschtum*.³⁴

Because he was handicapped by being an ethnic political general and dwarfed by West Pointers, Sigel came to rely on politicians and the German community to come to his rescue when he felt abused or mistreated. But if he used politicians for his own purposes, he also viewed the war as an opportunity to enhance the place of the German-American community in American social thought. Perhaps like most Germans who fought in the Civil War, Sigel believed that while he was battling for the defense of the Union, he was also fighting for the positive acceptance of the German people. It was only natural, many of them contended, that Germans wanted to fight under German leadership. German-Americans had never before shared a common experience that might raise their ethnic consciousness. The Civil War provided that common experience that they could point to as testimony to their fitness as citizens of a republic and their willingness to champion republicanism and constitutionalism. The old particularism which had been a curse to Germany was succeeded by a collective

effort to defend American unity. In the process, Germans seized the opportunity to emphasize a sense of Germanness that transcended older and now archaic divisions of village, principality, dialect and religion.³⁵

Though it may be difficult to understand Sigel's exalted status for what was largely an unsuccessful military role in the war, his role in establishing the link for Germans between the battlefield and the home front at least helps explain that status. If Germans were aware of Sigel's military shortcomings, they were blinded by his ability to elevate them into a collective awareness about their Germanness and their position in American society. He became a symbol irrespective of merit largely because he was more valuable to the German-American elite, editors and publicists as an ethnic symbol than a military commander. Because of his role in the Civil War, Sigel "elevated the German name and gained honors for it," an editor eulogized on Sigel's death. "[T]he ground of the Union was made fertile through German blood . . . [and] this America of the free and the brave will be for a great part the product of Germans like Franz Sigel."³⁶ If in fact the Civil War itself tells us much about the society waging it, then the link between community and battlefield for German Americans is an important one in raising the ethnic consciousness of Germans in the Union. As La Vern Rippley perceptively put it, "the Civil War probably did as much for the Germans in America as the Germans in America did for the Union."³⁷

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I wish to acknowledge and thank Roger Daniels who helped me conceptualize this essay while we both were in Germany on Fulbright fellowships. The anonymous readers on the editorial board of the *Yearbook of German-American Studies* are also to be commended for helping me revise the article, forcing me to rethink some of my conclusions.

Notes

¹Kathleen Neils Conzen, "The Paradox of German-American Assimilation," *Yearbook of German-American Studies* 16 (1981): 153-60; Carl Wittke, *Refugees of Revolution* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1952), 241; Fred Tangwell, "Immigrants in the Civil War: Some American Reactions" (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1962); see also Albert Faust, *The German Element in the United States* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1909); Henry Pratt Fairchild, *Immigration: A World Movement and Its American Significance* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1918); Carl Wittke, *We Who Built America* (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1939); and John A. Hawgood, *The Tragedy of German-America* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1940). This essay does not assume that widespread coverage in the ethnic press represents widespread public sentiment, nor does it assume that immigrant leaders represent sentiments of the entire ethnic group. Finally, it does not assume a unanimity of opinion within the German community as the works of Stanley Nadel, Kathleen Neils Conzen, Jörg Nagler, and Bruce Levine have so effectively demonstrated in their published works.

²La Vern Rippley, *The German-Americans* (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1976), 70; on the emphasis of their ethnicity, "Deutschtum," see for example Jörg Nagler, "The Lincoln Frémont Debate and the Forty-Eighters," in Charlotte L. Brancaforte, ed., *The German Forty-Eighters in the United States* (New York: Peter Lang, 1989), 157. In an attempt to bring the Civil War into its proper social context, social historians in the past decade have sought to link home front and battlefield to emphasize the significance of communities at war. See, for example, Phillip Shaw Paludan, "A People's Contest": *The Union and the Civil War* (New York: Harper and Row, 1988); and William L. Burton, *Melting Pot Soldiers: The Union's Ethnic Regiments* (Ames, IA: Iowa State University Press, 1988).

³On Sigel's career see Stephen D. Engle, *Yankee Dutchman: The Life of Franz Sigel* (Fayetteville, AR: The University of Arkansas Press, 1993) and on Schurz see Hans L. Trefousse, *Carl Schurz: A Biography* (Knoxville, TN: The University of Tennessee Press, 1982); for a brief overview of a German who distinguished himself militarily see Earl J. Hess, "Osterhaus in Missouri: A Study in German-American Loyalty," *Missouri Historical Review* 77 (1984): 144-67. For a good overview of American ethnicity see, for example, David Steven Cohen, "Reflections on American Ethnicity," *New York History* 72 (July 1991): 319-36; on Germans and ethnicity see Kathleen Neils Conzen, "German Americans and the Invention of Ethnicity," in *America and the Germans: An Assessment of a Three-Hundred Year History*, ed. Frank Trommler and Frank McVeigh (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1985.), 132-47.

In an article published in the *Journal of American Ethnic History* 12 (Fall 1992): 3-41 entitled "The Invention of Ethnicity: A Perspective from the U.S.A." authors Kathleen Neils Conzen, David A. Gerber, Ewa Morawska, George E. Pozzetta, and Rudolph J. Vecoli argue that "ethnicity is a process of construction or invention which incorporates, adapts, and amplifies preexisting communal solidarities, cultural attributes, and historical memories" (4-5). Seen in this light Germans during the 1850s were busy inventing or rather constructing their ethnicity in America as evidenced by the active participation in the work place, community, education and politics to foster a sense of group identity. Though each contingent of German newcomers had to negotiate its particular place in the American social order, most Germans successfully adapted to their new surroundings. Still, according to Roger Daniels in *Coming to America* (New York: Harper Collins, 1990), many aspects of high German culture flourished in America "since many of the immigrants who came before the Civil War were middle-class largely urban types, many of them products of German gymnasiums and universities, who provided leadership and the stimulus for culture" (163). "German Americans developed a great deal of cultural arrogance about the superiority of their culture over and against general American or Yankee culture which of course helped produce considerable tensions between Germans and Americans" (163).

During the nineteenth century Germans were active participants in maintaining their group identity and solidarity. An expression of this ethnic identity could be seen even before the Civil War as Germans developed into America's first of the great urban foreign-language communities that mushroomed in American cities by the end of the nineteenth century. The works of Stanley Nadel, David Gerber, Bruce Levine, James Bergquist, and Kathleen Neils Conzen focusing on the development of the German-American community during the mid-nineteenth century, all argue, for example, that Germans contributed significantly to the development of the urban environment during this period. Thus, even during a period of profound change for Americans, Germans managed to permeate society without being stripped entirely of their cultural norms.

⁴On Sigel's role in the German Revolution of 1848 see, for example, Charles W. Dahlinger, *The German Revolution of 1849* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1903); Franz Sigel, *Denkwürdigkeiten des Generals Franz Sigel aus den Jahren 1848 und 1849* (Mannheim: Verlag von J. Bensheimer, 1902); and Veit Valentini, *1848: Chapters of German History* (Hampden, CT: Archon Books, 1965); on the Forty-Eighters see Wittke, *Refugees of Revolution*; and Adolf E. Zucker, ed., *The Forty-Eighters: Political Refugees of the German Revolution of 1848* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1950).

⁵New York Historical Society, New York City [hereinafter cited as NYHS], Records of the 5th New York Militia, 1854-56; see also Gustav Scholar Collection, Records of the New York City Turnverein, Letters and Journals, July 1855; on Sigel's political views see Franz Sigel Papers, "Autobiographical," Western Reserve Historical Society, Cleveland, OH [hereinafter cited as WRHS, Franz Sigel Papers, "Autobiographical"]; Alfred F. Kierschner, "New York Turn-Verein 100th Anniver-

sary," *American German Review* 16 (August 1950): 8-10; Robert Wild, "Chapters in the History of the Turners," *Wisconsin Magazine of History* 9 (December 1925): 131; Engle, "Yankee Dutchman: The Early Life of Franz Sigel," *Yearbook of German-American Studies* 26 (1991): 43-62;

⁶For a short sketch of Sigel's Civil War career see Lawrence E. Griffen, "The Strange Story of Major General Franz Sigel: Leader and Retreater," *Missouri Historical Review* 84 (July 1990): 404-27. For a more in-depth analysis of his military role in each of the battles he fought see for example Hans Christian Adamson, *Rebellion in Missouri* (New York: Chilton, Co., 1961) for the Battle of Wilson's Creek; Engle, "Franz Sigel at Pea Ridge," *The Arkansas Historical Quarterly* 50 (Autumn 1991): 249-70; and William L. Shea and Earl J. Hess, *Pea Ridge: Civil War Campaign in the West* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992) for the Battle of Pea Ridge; and William C. Davis, *The Battle of New Market* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Co., 1975) for the Battle of New Market.

⁷Trefousse, *Carl Schurz: A Biography*, 124.

⁸*St. Louis Daily Missouri Democrat*, 11 January 1862; Franz Schilling to Sigel, 19 June 1861, Sigel Papers, NYHS; James B. Taylor to Sigel, 25 September 1861, Sigel Papers, NYHS; James S. Lapham, "The German-Americans of New York City, 1860-1890" (Ph.D. diss., St. John's University, 1977), 205; John C. Bodger, Jr., "The Immigrant Press and the Union Army" (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1951), 171; Pittsburgh *Freibetsfreund*, 7 February 1862; on Sigel's popularity see for example the *Daily Missouri Democrat*, 30 April 1861; *New York Daily Tribune*, 24 December 1861; *Chicago Tribune*, 21 November 1861; George A. Townsend, *Campaigns of a Non-Combatant During the War* (New York: Blelock and Co., 1866), 232-33; Adamson, *Rebellion in Missouri*, 97-98; Zucker, *The Forty-Eighters*, 186-88; Ella Lonn, *Foreigners in the Union Army and Navy* (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1951), 180; Wilhelm Kaufmann, *Die Deutschen im amerikanischen Bürgerkriege (Sezessionskrieg, 1861-1865)* (Munich: Druck und Verlag von R. Oldenbourg, 1911), 451-66. The very phrase "I fights mit Sigel" served as a passport for Germans entering the military and it originated partly out of the myth that Sigel had fought bravely against the Prussians and had come close to defeating a much superior army. Accounts of his exploits during the revolution could be found in the *Deutsche Schnellpost* and the *New Yorker Staats-Zeitung*; see, for example, the issues for 10 March; 11 April; 20, 29 May; 15, 29 July 1848; 15 July 1849; and 26 March 1850.

⁹Earl J. Hess, "Sigel's Resignation: A Study in German Americans and the Civil War," *Civil War History* 26 (1980): 5-17; *War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1880-1900), series 1, vol. 7:937 and vol. 8:502, 828-29 [hereinafter cited as *O.R.*]; Wilhelm Kaufmann, "Sigel und Halleck," *Deutsch-Amerikanische Geschichtsblätter* 10 (October 1910): 210-16; *Chicago Tribune*, 21 November 1861; *New York Daily Tribune*, 18, 20, 28 January 1862.

¹⁰*O.R.*, series 1, vol. 7:937, vol. 8:828-29; Roy Basler, ed., *The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln* (New Brunswick, NJ: 1953-55), 3:303, 5:101; *New York Tribune*, 23 January 1862; *Anzeiger des Westens*, 13 January 1862; *Cleveland Plain Dealer*, 11, 12 January 1862; *New York Times*, 17 January 1862; *New York Daily Tribune*, 18, 20, 28 January 1862.

¹¹*O.R.*, series 1, vol. 25, part 2:71; Basler, *Collected Works of Lincoln*, 6:93; Kaufmann, "Sigel und Halleck," 210-16.

¹²*O.R.*, series 1, vol. 25, part 2:71, vol. 27, part 3:563; Basler, *Collected Works of Lincoln*, 6:93; National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, DC, Records of the Adjutant General's Office, General's Report of Service, R.G. 94, Sigel's Report of Service [hereinafter cited as Sigel's Report of Service]; WRHS, Sigel Papers, Military Record; NYHS, Sigel Papers, Military Record; *New York Times*, 2 March; 12 April 1863; *Cleveland Plain Dealer*, 17 March; 2 April 1863; 24 February 1864; *Philadelphia Freie Presse*, 18 June 1863.

¹³Adam Klippet to Lyman Trumbull, 13 January 1862, Lyman Trumbull Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, DC; NYHS, Sigel Papers, Nicholas Greusel to Sigel, 1 January 1862; *Westliche Post*, 15 January 1862; *Louisville Daily Journal*, 16 January 1862; *New York Times*, 12, 17, 27 January 1862; *New York Daily Tribune*, 18, 20, 28 January 1862; *Cincinnati Daily Enquirer*, 12, 15 January 1862; *Cincinnati Daily Commercial*, 23 December 1861.

¹⁴Bodger, "The Immigrant Press and the Union Army," 54-57, 171-75; see, for example, *Belleviller-Zeitung*, 9, 16 January 1862; *Columbus Westbote*, 23 January 1862; Pittsburgh *Freibetsfreund*, 31 January 1862.

¹⁵ Bodger, "The Immigrant Press and the Union Army," 171-75; Boston *Pionier*, 16, 23 January 1862; *Belleveiller-Zeitung*, 9, 16 January 1862; Pittsburgh *Freiheitsfreund*, 31 January 1862; James S. Pula, "The Sigel Regiment" *German-American Studies* 8 (1974): 27-52; see also Pula, *The Sigel Regiment: A History of the 26th Wisconsin Volunteer Infantry, 1862-1865* (Campbell, CA: Savas Publishing Company, 1998), 16-36

¹⁶ Bodger, "The Immigrant Press and the Union Army," 54-57, 172-75; St. Louis *Anzeiger des Westens*, 28 August 1861; 12 February 1862; Milwaukee *Banner*, 4 September 1861; Boston *Pionier*, 16, 23 January 1862; Columbus *Westbote*, 30 January 1862; *New Yorker Criminal-Zeitung und Belletristisches Journal*, 28 March 1862.

¹⁷ *Westliche Post*, 15 January 1862; *Louisville Daily Journal*, 9, 16 January 1862; *New York Times*, 27 January 1862; 2 March 1863; *St. Louis Missouri Daily Democrat*, 11 January 1862; Chicago *Tribune*, 11 January 1862; *The Missouri Republican*, 14 January 1862; *Cleveland Plain Dealer*, 11 January 1862; Adam Klippet to Lyman Trumbull, 13 January 1862, Lyman Trumbull Papers; Cincinnati *Daily Commercial*, 23 December 1861; 9 October 1862; Cincinnati *Daily Enquirer*, 3 December 1861; 12, 15 January 1862; Indianapolis *Daily Journal*, 8 January 1862; Wittke, *Refugees of Revolution*, 238-39; Hess, "Sigel's Resignation," *Civil War History*, 10-11; Bodger, "The Immigrant Press and the Union Army," 54-57.

¹⁸ Chicago Historical Society, Chicago, IL, George Schneider Collection, Isaac Arnold to Schneider, 16 January 1862; see also Adam Klippet to Lyman Trumbull, 13 January 1862, Trumbull Papers.

¹⁹ WRHS, Sigel Papers, Miscellaneous Letters and Diaries, letter from Colonel William Boyd to Sigel, 1 January 1864.

²⁰ Bodger, "The Immigrant Press and the Union Army," 171-75; Chicago *Illinois Staats-Zeitung*, 8-10 April; 31 May 1862; Chicago *Times*, 26 May 1862.

²¹ Library of Congress, Washington, DC, Manuscript Division, Robert Todd Collection, letter from Carl Schurz to Lincoln, 13 March 1864; Basler, *Collected Works of Lincoln*, 5:101, 7:129; *O.R.*, series 1, vol. 8:826-27; Paludan, "A People's Contest", 10; Hess, "Sigel's Resignation," 5-17. A typical example of editorial criticism of Sigel for using the German community to come to his rescue could be found in the *Philadelphia Gazette*, 4 February 1862.

²² Basler, *Collected Works of Lincoln*, 5:101.

²³ *Anzeiger des Westens*, 18 December 1861; Steven Rowan, *Germans for a Free Missouri: Translations from the St. Louis Radical Press, 1847-1862* (Columbia: University of Missouri press, 1983), 296-98.

²⁴ *Louisville Daily Journal*, 9 January 1862; see also Indianapolis *Daily Journal*, 8 January 1862; Cincinnati *Daily Commercial*, 23 December 1861; 9 October 1862; Cincinnati *Daily Enquirer*, 3 December 1861; 12, 15 January 1862.

²⁵ Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Robert Todd Collection, William Cullen Bryant to Lincoln, 11 May 1863; Basler, *Collected Works of Lincoln*, 6:216.

²⁶ Bodger, "The Immigrant Press and the Union Army," 58-59, 351-54; Columbus *Westbote*, 26 May 1864; *New Yorker Criminal-Zeitung und Belletristisches Journal*, 27 May 1864.

²⁷ Conzen, "German-Americans and the Invention of Ethnicity," *America and the Germans*, 133-39; Conzen, et al., "The Invention of Ethnicity," *Journal of American Ethnic History*, 4-17; Hess, "Sigel's Resignation," *Civil War History*, 10-17; Brancaforte, ed., *The German Forty-Eighters*, 158. The fact that Sigel remained in command as long as he did and in the capacity that he did had something to do with his military record, but more to do from his influence in the German community has a whole. He stayed in command longer than could be expected from a similar native-born commander with as much success, because the Republican administration sought continued support from Germans in the ranks and in the work place. This alone suggests that the German community was quite influential, and apparently, used this influence quite effectively. It is my contention that this influence was a result in large measure from the link between the battlefield and the home front which forced Germans to emphasize their *Deutschtum* and in the process heightened their awareness about their ethnicity as something to be preserved.

²⁸ Mary Elizabeth McMorrow, "The Nineteenth Century German Political Immigrant and the Construction of American Culture and Thought" (Ph.D., diss., New School for Social Research, 1982), 105-23; Franz Sigel, "The American Republic," *Atlas Essays* (1878): 61-77; see also WRHS,

Sigel Papers, Miscellaneous Journals and Diaries, NYHS, Sigel Papers, Miscellaneous Journals and Diaries; *New York Times*, 2, 3 March; 3 April 1863; see also Conzen, et al., "The Invention of Ethnicity," *Journal of American Ethnic History*, 4-17; Murray M. Horowitz, "Ethnicity and Command: The Civil War Experience," *Military Affairs* 42 (December 1978): 185; Bodger, "The Immigrant Press and the Union Army," 58-59; Sigel's views regarding assimilation and ethnicity are briefly stated in his postwar work entitled "The American Republic." Though this work is shorter than the original draft of the manuscript it espouses essentially the same view that American culture was the product of differing ethnic elements, thus the differences within America were also its strengths.

²⁹ McMorrow, "The Nineteenth Century German Political Immigrant and the Construction of American Culture and Thought," 105-23; Sigel, "The American Republic," 61-77.

³⁰ The most definitive work on the German contribution to the Union army can be found in Lonn, *Foreigners in the Union Army and Navy*, 52-53, 101-15, 146-47, 487-96, 576-79.

³¹ Lapham, "German-Americans of New York City," 201-7; Paludan, "A People's Contest," 20-22, 280-85; Rippley, *The German Americans*, 58-71; Bruce Levine, *The Spirit of 1848: German Immigrants, Labor Conflict, and the Coming of the Civil War* (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1992), 256; Wittke, *Refugees of Revolution*, 222; see also Cincinnati *Daily Enquirer*, 3 December 1861; 12, 15 January 1862; Cincinnati *Daily Commercial*, 23 December 1861; 9 October 1862; see also Audrey L. Olson, *St. Louis Germans, 1850-1920: The Nature of an Immigrant Community and Its Relations to the Assimilation Process* (New York: Arno Press, 1980).

³² Paludan, "A People's Contest," 10-12; Rippley, *The German Americans*, 65; Bruce Catton, *The Glory Road* (New York: Doubleday, 1952), 193.

³³ Lapham, "The German-Americans of New York City, 1860-1890," 205-8; *New Yorker Criminal-Zeitung und Belletristisches Journal*, 7 June 1861; Levine, *The Spirit of 1848*, 257-630.

³⁴ Stanley Nadel, "The Forty-Eighters and the Politics of Class in New York City," in Brancaforte, ed., *The German Forty-Eighters*, 60; Levine, *The Spirit of 1848*, 257-63; Nadel, *Little Germany: Ethnicity, Religion, and Class in New York City, 1845-80* (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1990), 149; Lapham, "German-Americans of New York City," 202-6, 217-20; Rippley, *The German Americans*, 61-71; Kevin J. Weddle, "Ethnic Discrimination in Minnesota Volunteer Regiments During the Civil War," *Civil War History* 35 (September 1989): 239-59. In Chicago, for example, the *Turnverein* and *Arbeiterverein* organized benefits in behalf of Friedrich Hecker's "Hecker Regiment"; see also the Michigan *Staats Zeitung*, 4 November 1861, as cited in Cincinnati *Daily Enquirer*, 10 November 1861; *New Yorker Criminal-Zeitung und Belletristisches Journal*, 7 June 1861.

³⁵ Lonn, *Foreigners in the Union Army and Navy*, 658-59; Bodger, "The Immigrant Press and the Union Army," 54-58, 171-75; Lapham, "The German-Americans of New York City, 1860-1890," 205-8.

³⁶ *Northside News*, 30 August 1902, NYHS, Sigel Papers, newspaper clippings.

³⁷ Rippley, *The German Americans*, 70; Lonn, *Foreigners in the Union Army and Navy*, 658-59; Kaufmann, *Die Deutschen im amerikanischen Bürgerkriege*, 449-66.

