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### **The Reaction of Eastern Pennsylvania's German Press to the Secession Crisis: Compromise or Conflict?**

On 23 January 1861 an editorial appeared in the Allentown *Unabhängige Republikaner*, the local Democratic organ for German-speakers, which rhetorically asked what choice the North intended to make: regain the trust of their Southern brothers before more states joined South Carolina in destroying the Union, or continue sticking by the hard-line Republican banner. Despite its name, the *Republikaner* was far from Republican; its editor, Benjamin F. Trexler, catered to a vocal, Democratic electorate which had strongly supported the Buchanan administration and voted against Lincoln the past November.<sup>1</sup> Yet the current message of the newspaper was the preservation of the Union, through whatever means possible. Since the Republicans were perceived as anticompromise, they would receive the blame if secession spread and war resulted. According to the *Republikaner*, "two methods are suggested to curb the secession movement—one is peaceful, the other forceful." As the Democrats had repeatedly suggested, "a so-called Compromise—a coming-to-terms with our differences in a brotherly spirit"—was the "peaceful way to preserve the Union and overwhelmingly in the spirit in which it was created." A compromise would avoid war, prevent bloodshed, and restore brotherhood and peace between the North and South.<sup>2</sup> But "the other method for preserving the Union consists of the need of strong arguments—physical force, cannons and bullets, bloodshed and brutality. The lost trust of the Southern states in the Union should be restored on the tip of the bayonet and at the cannon's mouth." This was the method of the Republican Party, argued Trexler. The citizens of the South should be "treated like enemies" and "forced through hard blows" back into the arms of the Union.<sup>3</sup> Yet the result of the "second method" would be the secession of the rest of the Southern states and a terrible war, the editor warned: "No one will be so foolish to believe that the Union may be restored through force. In such a struggle victory would be equally as bad as defeat."<sup>4</sup> Compromise was necessary to stem the secessionist impulse and the war which would result from it if

coercionist policies prevailed. The *Republikaner* was certainly not in favor of ruthlessly suppressing South Carolina's secession.

While no scholar has yet specifically examined the Pennsylvania-German press and its reaction to secession, the *Republikaner's* comments challenge a trend in the extant secondary literature, which argues that German-Americans in the North almost all supported an unyielding, Republican stance during the secession crisis. Few historians have even addressed the subject of the Pennsylvania Germans' reactions to the secession crisis, but those who have touched upon it, such as Bruce Levine and William Burton, have assumed that Pennsylvania Germans behaved in a similar fashion to Germans in the Midwest and New York. Bruce Levine, in *The Spirit of 1848: German Immigrants, Labor Conflict, and the Coming of the Civil War*, focuses mainly on the history of the Forty-Eighters and their radical constituents, but still observes that German-American sentiment for compromise during the winter of 1860-61 was "drowned out by the chorus of German Republicans vehemently opposed to conceding anything in their party's 1860 platform."<sup>5</sup> Ken Fones-Wolf and Elliott Shore draw upon Levine's work and arrive at similar conclusions in their essay in *The German-American Radical Press: The Shaping of a Left Political Culture, 1850-1940*. The earlier, traditional interpretation of German-Americans during the era of the Civil War, promulgated by authors such as Carl Wittke and Adolf Zucker, has long supported the assumption that nearly all German-Americans immediately rallied behind the Republican banner once secession of Southern states commenced.<sup>6</sup> Considering the large numbers of German-Americans who did support Lincoln—if not as bona fide Republicans in November, 1860 then as rapid converts to Republican free-labor and Unionist principles in the following months—such a view is not entirely unreasonable. In the last several decades, however, scholars adhering to the "ethnocultural" interpretation of nineteenth-century ethnic politics have substantially revised the traditional interpretation of pan-German Republicanism. Arguing that religious denomination strongly influenced political affiliation (i.e., Catholics and Lutherans voted mainly Democratic while "free thinkers" and Reformed congregations tended to vote Republican), the ethnoculturalists maintain that socio-economic and cultural variables determined German political loyalty more than other factors. They strongly believe that German-Americans were politically divided before the Civil War.<sup>7</sup>

This essay will argue that an ethnocultural interpretation of the reaction of eastern Pennsylvania Germans to secession is appropriate, but that the political turmoil between Democrats and Republicans was more bitter, and longer-lasting than ethnocultural explanations would have us believe. Democratic and Republican newspapers battled for public opinion throughout 1860 and in the early months of 1861, and even after the deep South seceded—indeed, until Fort Sumter was fired upon—the eastern Pennsylvania German press was irreconcilably divided. While few diaries or personal letters survive to help illuminate the thoughts and actions of these people, German-language newspapers from Allentown,



Pennsburg, Skippackville, Reading, and Lancaster provide brief windows on their world during the critical years leading up to the Civil War. The reaction of the Pennsylvania-German press to the secession crisis is thus the best historical means whereby we may gain an understanding of what it meant to be ethnically German in the eastern half of Pennsylvania on the eve of national catastrophe. How great a role ethnicity played (if any) in the decisions of these German-Americans to support or not support Lincoln and the new Republican administration is an important consideration in this analysis and will perhaps shed some light on the relation of cultural background and ethnicity to American decision-making in the late antebellum period. It is also hoped that an analysis of the eastern Pennsylvania-German press's responses to the crises leading up to and during secession will raise new questions about the experiences of ethnic minorities in general during the antebellum years.

Ella Lonn claims in her book, *Foreigners in the Union Army and Navy*, that in 1860 the German-born population of the United States consisted of 1,301,136 citizens. Of that number, 138,244 resided in Pennsylvania.<sup>8</sup> Beyond this count of first-generation immigrants, Pennsylvania boasted of hundreds of thousands of longer-settled citizens of direct German lineage. Often referred to as the "Pennsylvania Dutch," these second, third, and fourth-generation residents varied greatly in their retention of the German language and folkways. Some had become completely "anglicized" through intermarriage with English-speakers and constant contact with the dominant Anglo-Saxon culture, while others retained the mother language and strong German traditions. Yet by the middle part of the nineteenth century, the eastern Pennsylvania Germans had clearly shed the idea of being "more German" than American. As Robert Billigmeier asserts, they did retain a "well-defined culture and social system" that was separate from the dominant Anglo-Saxon one, and while religious differences existed among them—there were Lutherans, Reformed, Amish, Mennonite, and Schwenkfelder congregations—the Pennsylvania Germans were viewed by their English-speaking compatriots as a compact, "more or less permanent, differentiated subcultural entity" within the broader American population. They saw themselves collectively as Americans, "but as a particular kind of American" with an independent ethnic tradition that was neither all German nor all English.<sup>9</sup> These Pennsylvania "Dutch" Germans, who lived mainly in the Great Valley of Pennsylvania, thus possessed an ethnicity all their own, one that was at once diverse from the newer, foreign-born German immigrants, many of whom had fled the failed democratic revolution of 1848, and the more numerous Anglo-Saxon core population.<sup>10</sup>

Recent scholarship on ethnicity, such as Eric Hobsbawm's and Terence Ranger's, eds., *The Invention of Tradition*, and Kathleen Conzen et al., "The Invention of Ethnicity: A Perspective from the U.S.A.," argues that "traditional" societies, such as ethnic communities, may actually "invent" their customs and cultural practices to form a distinct feeling of uniqueness within a larger population. There may indeed be a direct link to an ancient, ethnic past, but that link



may have been weakened or even severed. To regain the continuity with the past, some ethnic groups may actually create their own practices "of a ritual or symbolic nature" reminiscent of the "old ways" but historically fictitious.<sup>11</sup> It is possible that the Pennsylvania Dutch Germans' ethnic behavior might at least be partially evaluated using this new interpretation of "inventing ethnicity." After almost two centuries of exposure to Anglo-Saxon culture, the Pennsylvania German culture had undoubtedly changed from being purely German, as Billigmeier and Frederic Klees suggest. It was no longer ethnically German, but an amalgamation of the German and Anglo-Saxon cultures—an ethnicity altogether different from that of the Germans who had recently arrived from Europe.<sup>12</sup>

The Pennsylvania Dutch were largely long-settled agrarians, living on family farms passed down through the generations. Towns such as Reading, Lancaster and Allentown developed, not originally as sites of independent manufacture and business, but as foci of trade and education whose existence depended almost solely on constant patronage and interaction with the rural populace. The towns, in other words, existed to serve the farms, even in 1860. Communicating on a daily basis in the "Pennsylvanisch" dialect (a type of German similar to that spoken in the Palatinate in Germany), these people nonetheless printed their newspapers in High German, which was considered the language of law, science, and politics. While the newer German immigrants were sometimes absorbed into the Pennsylvania Dutch communities, they were nonetheless ethnically different enough from their "Pennsylvanisch"-speaking neighbors that the political polarization of the Germans in eastern Pennsylvania on the eve of the Civil War might be partially explained by ethnic diversity among the Germans themselves. The newer immigrants flocked not to the countryside but to the towns (where they found employment in the burgeoning, Anglo-Saxon-owned steel mills and factories), spoke some form of modern High German dissimilar to Pennsylvanisch, and arrived with considerably less capital at their disposal than the longer-established Pennsylvania Dutch.<sup>13</sup> Many also were refugees from the chaos of post-1848 Germany. It follows logically that the more recently-arrived Pennsylvania Germans might adopt political views at variance with the longer-resident Pennsylvania Dutch.

Like the newer immigrants, the Pennsylvania Dutch Germans operated and patronized numerous German-language newspapers throughout the state. The German-language press had had a long history in Pennsylvania up to 1860; evidence of it exists as far back as the early 1700s.<sup>14</sup> By the middle of the nineteenth century most of these papers had ceased publication, the victims of anglicization and the westward migration. A core of them survived, however, near the major metropolitan centers of Pittsburgh and Philadelphia, as well as in Lancaster, Berks, Lecha (Lehigh) and other counties of the so-called Pennsylvania Dutch country. The editorials in these publications expressed the views of the Germans better than any other medium: they were written by Germans and were read by German-literate Pennsylvanians. Like its English-language counterpart,



the German press was a barometer of public opinion in the years before the Civil War, and published letters and articles highly representative of its readership's beliefs. For the modern scholar, these primary historical documents may illuminate the reactions of Pennsylvania-Germans to the most momentous political event of the late antebellum period: the secession crisis of 1860 and 1861.

To accurately analyze the progression of thought of eastern Pennsylvania's German residents during this crisis it is first necessary to examine their beliefs in the last years leading up to Southern secession.<sup>15</sup> The Buchanan administration's handling of the situation in Kansas, where Jayhawkers and Border Ruffians conducted their own mini-Civil War in the late 1850s, outraged many Pennsylvanians. Republican newspapers claimed the "dough face" president (a native Pennsylvanian) had sold out to the "slave power" in his official policies toward the territory, recognizing the pro-slavery Lecompton Constitution of the outnumbered Southern minority over the free-soil interests of the majority of settlers.<sup>16</sup> The Lancaster *Volksfreund und Beobachter* echoed its English-language, Republican brethren by condemning Buchanan, who ironically was a native son of the city. On 5 January 1858, it argued that "the major question in Washington concerning the Kansas issue has become this: how should we satisfy the Southern fire-eaters?" Justice would have to be sacrificed to palliate the angry South, and the "spirit and wisdom of the Nebraska Acts" would be wasted. The free citizens of Kansas wanted to overthrow the corrupt government that the administration and Congress supported, and if the president did not heed their pleas, a "crisis will develop." If he refused to act, the *Volksfreund* predicted that "the bayonets of federal troops" might be needed to restore the state government to its "rightful" free-soil governors. "Without question the disunionists are happy about the present development. The radicals in the South, which expect a league of Southern states, the annexation of Central America, and the renewal of the slave trade to result, are jubilant about the new difficulty." Yet a tinge of sympathy for a beleaguered president suddenly emerged later in the editorial: "How can the president operate in the hands of such men? They are already completely untrue to the Union. If he does what he always does, they will go far to unseat the administration." The South wished to keep the Union in turmoil. Its leaders "search for hot water (trouble), and hope to reach their dreams aided by the same."<sup>17</sup>

Even a Democratic paper, the *Berks County Demokrat*, lamented that Buchanan was betraying the ideals of the "true," Jeffersonian democracy, which it claimed its German constituents demanded. In the one-page English section of its 23 March 1859 issue, the editor asked his readers which leader they would rather follow—"Jefferson, whose heart beat singly and alone with the highest, holiest, wisest love of country," or "Buchanan, who has done more to undo Jefferson's great work than all the other followers in the presidency."<sup>18</sup>

Not all of the German papers attacked Buchanan's actions. The Democratic Pennsburg *Bauern Freund*, located in a more rural area than the more



urbanized Lancaster and Reading papers, lauded the president for his strength of character, strong will, and political acumen. He was a brilliant statesman caught in the maelstrom of a cold-blooded conflict in Kansas, and by 7 July 1858, had proven his mettle: "The difficulties which James Buchanan had to endure were so extraordinary and manifold that they had no equal to any which the earlier presidents of the United States endured." The political battle over Kansas was settled by this time, and Buchanan could justly look back at his accomplishments in the last months with pride. Against multitudinous foes the president had stood firm—"his strength of character and spiritual endurance finally won the victory." Mormons, filibusterers, and even Great Britain all had felt his "power," and all had been vanquished, just like the Kansas problem, which "was out of the Congress to reside where it belongs, in the territory itself." Buchanan "could not be everywhere at once." How dare the opposition claim that the president is to blame for the present national crisis! "This opinion carries on its forehead the symbol of a lie." Importantly, at the end of the article, the author disclosed a more practical reason why he supported Buchanan: "James Buchanan was always the true friend of the worker, and has fought his entire life against the 'swindle-system,' for which we can thank the current crisis."<sup>19</sup> The editor was probably referring here to pervasive Democratic fears that big business was taking over the country and, supported by the Republicans, cheating the honest day laborer of his rightful wages.<sup>20</sup>

The *Reading Adler*, another Democratic organ, likewise defended Buchanan, claiming that while he had bungled by meddling in states' affairs and allowing himself to be strongly influenced by advisors, he was still a Democrat, and much preferable to his "federalist-minded" opponents. Democratic presidents had been responsible for the entrance of most of the new states into the Union, and, as one letter to the editor explained, Buchanan deserved support because "he had been put into power by the Democratic Party." According to this reader, the Democrats could do no wrong.<sup>21</sup>

If the *Volksfreund und Beobachter*, *Berks County Demokrat*, *Reading Adler*, and the *Bauern Freund* may be taken as representative samples of the Pennsylvania-German press in early 1858 and 1859, it is clear that much disagreement existed among their German readers. Each paper catered to a different readership which lived within a day's carriage ride of each other, the Lancaster and Reading publications serving more urbanized populations than their Pennsburg counterpart. The *Volksfreund und Beobachter* was politically Republican, and the *Bauern Freund*, *Demokrat*, and *Adler* Democratic. Though some time had passed between the January issue of the former and the April issue of the latter a year later, their respective opinions about James Buchanan were diverse and at odds with each other. What do these facts reveal about the Pennsylvania-German citizenry two years before secession?

First, the papers strongly suggest that the eastern Pennsylvania Germans were far from united in their opinions of the burgeoning sectional difficulties. Even the Democratic papers disagreed with each other about Buchanan, and



they were certainly at odds with the Republican paper. It is well-known that German-Americans were politically divided in the years prior to 1860. Wilhelm Kaufmann, Albert Faust, Carl Wittke, Ella Lonn, William Burton, Bruce Levine, and the "ethnoculturalist" historians all agree that the Germans were divided among Democrats and Republicans.<sup>22</sup> Traditionally, the Democrats had appealed to conservative German sensitivities about ethnic equality (repudiating the nativist Know-Nothings, for example), economic independence, the Jeffersonian and Jacksonian principles of individual freedom, limited government, and importantly, the preservation of an agrarian democracy. They captured the votes especially of the "Greys," or Germans who had settled in America before the mid-century revolutions in Europe. Democrats also appealed to Germans' desire for stability and the preservation of the status quo, which was viewed as financially beneficial by German farmers and small shopkeepers, many of whom had emigrated to America for economic reasons in the 1830s or earlier and were now generally members of the middle class. It made sense that the Pennsylvania Dutch, long-established in family farms or small shops that served them in the small towns, would vote Democratic. According to Willi Paul Adams, the Republicans were far too radical for "religiously conservative Lutherans" and "represented unacceptable 'puritanical' fundamentalist positions."<sup>23</sup>

The Pennsylvania Dutch concept of freedom—defined by their unique ethnicity which had developed independently of much "pure" German influence from the old country—precluded the inclusion of many free blacks, who were perceived as racial inferiors, or the managers and workers of factories and mines—many of whom were newer German immigrants and employed in the developing towns and cities.<sup>24</sup> The growth of manufacturing signalled the advent of a large urban population, which would develop a culture entirely different and perhaps harmful to the Pennsylvania Dutch *Weltanschauung*. Pennsylvania German Democrats, then, may have feared for the future of their regional, ethnic culture as they watched the growth of the Republican Party, which strongly supported industry and manufacturing. Moreover, the abolitionist tinge of the Republicans left a sour taste in the mouth of German Dutch Democrats, who feared racial amalgamation, and perhaps, economic competition. John Brown's raid on Harpers Ferry in 1859 elicited a strong reaction from the *Reading Adler* which supports this theory. The editor asked how "our dreamers, who happily dream of equality with the blacks, cannot become awake?" The answer: they actually desired the "animalistic misdeeds" of a slave uprising, and were not concerned with the ramifications of black equality, as long as equality was achieved.<sup>25</sup>

The "Greens," or German immigrants who arrived after the failed democratic revolution of 1848, tended to be poorer and more idealistic than their longer-entrenched brethren, and hence were drawn to the Republican ideology of free-soil labor and the non-extension of slavery into the territories. Employed mainly by Anglo-Saxon businessmen, these working-class Germans lived mostly in the Pennsylvania towns and cities, and, as the authors of the *German-American*



*Radical Press* argue, were much more politically radical than the Pennsylvania Dutch. They were attracted to the Republican plank of a high tariff because it would help assure the prosperity of the industries which provided work for them. Among the Greens were many political refugees from Germany, the so-called "Forty-Eighters." These former revolutionaries, immensely popular among more-recently arrived immigrants—mainly artisans, craftsmen, and skilled workers—strongly united behind the Republican banner, and their stature within the German community captured thousands of votes for the Republicans in 1856 and 1860. Fleeing political persecution in the fatherland, these newly-arrived Germans questioned the wisdom of following a political party dominated by slaveholders strongly reminiscent of the aristocrats they had fought against in Europe. While slavery was an evil to the German Republicans, the workers who followed the erstwhile Forty-Eighters feared a threat of economic competition from freed blacks, and mainly supported the free-soil plank of the Republican party because it left the territories free of blacks, not because it damaged the future of the slaveocracy.<sup>26</sup>

The record in the late antebellum, eastern Pennsylvania German press also supports the inference, mentioned by Don Yoder and Willi Paul Adams, that newer German immigrants flocked to the cities for jobs and tended to vote Republican while the older, "Dutch" Germans lived mainly on farms in the countryside and were staunch Democrats.<sup>27</sup> Moreover, the Pennsylvania Dutch ethnicity of the older Germans strongly influenced their political allegiance with the Democrats whereas the stronger German ethnicity and poorer economic situation of the newcomers gravitated them to the Republicans.<sup>28</sup> It would appear, then, that in 1858 and 1859 the eastern Pennsylvania Germans were indeed divided politically, and that their beliefs were likely influenced by ethnic differences between the Pennsylvania Dutch and the newer German immigrants, but might also have been affected by their geographic location and other, issues. Did this trend continue in the months immediately prior to Lincoln's election?

"Every Tariff Resolution. Under this headline the *Lecha Patriot* last week attempted to create capital for its party, so that it could place great weight on the vote of the state legislature about the tariff, since all Republicans voted for it and all Democrats except one against it." This attempt was filled with lies, explained the editor of the rival Allentown *Unabhängige Republikaner* on 8 February 1860, and it was just like the Republican *Patriot* to promote public disturbances and "play the heckler." The Democrats voted against the most recent tariff proposal because it had included a rider stating "false and unfounded allegations against the President and the Democratic Party," and the Republicans refused to drop these scandalous lines. The Republicans were to blame for the resolution's defeat because they were more concerned with building political capital against the Democrats than their constituents' needs.<sup>29</sup> During the early months of 1860, the *Lecha Allentown Patriot*, a zealous Republican organ, and the *Republikaner*, strongly Democratic, battled for the hearts and minds of Allentown's German residents. The two editors despised each other, and fre-



quently quoted (and misquoted) each other in their editorials. In 1860, Allentown was home to a thriving community of both Pennsylvania Dutch and newly-arrived Germans, replete with German schools and businesses which catered specifically to the interests of the highly German population.<sup>30</sup> Outside of the town limits, tidy Dutch German farms dotted the landscape. The classifieds in both newspapers contained copious advertisements for enterprises as diverse as coffin manufacturers and livestock breeders, but both also contained announcements for the formation and drill of various German militia groups. This phenomenon was not confined to Lecha County; indeed, the Skippackville, Reading and Pennsburg papers also contained ads for militia companies. The Germans were obviously aware of the possibility of conflict and were drilling in their own paramilitary organizations, just like the English-speaking population.<sup>31</sup>

Despite this commonality, the Germans remained politically divided in 1860. The *Republikaner* supported Breckinridge (later Stephen Douglas) for president in February and predicted on 15 February 1860 that "the plan for a southern convention to discuss separation from the Union is outside of South Carolina hardly a possibility. This means that the South as a whole is still healthy regarding the question of the Union. She is sticking to the Constitution—so long as we uphold this right, the Union is safe."<sup>32</sup> The *Patriot* thought otherwise. Issue after issue clamored against the Southern "slave power," blaming it for inventing grievances where none existed. The South was abusing the sacred Constitution as a means to establish its tyranny over Northern freemen. As the national election approached, both newspapers stepped up their incendiary language and their attacks against each other. Republican Andrew Curtin's October victory in the gubernatorial election was a harbinger of the November contest, argued the *Patriot*; the election had been a contest to determine whether "one will speak in favor of free trade in his Lecha or in favor of slavery's extension, in favor of slave-chains."<sup>33</sup>

The *Republikaner* responded to this news with an ominous heading on its 31 October sheet: "Should our glorious Union be preserved? The Democrats say yes . . . the Republicans say no . . . turmoil and civil war will result if the power of the national government falls into their hands." Underneath this declaration was a section in boldface. "With Stephen A. Douglas the Union is safe! With John C. Breckinridge the Union is safe! With John Bell the Union is safe! No one can deny this—but with Abraham Lincoln the Union is not safe!" The following paragraph explained why Lincoln was the worst choice, mainly because he "contradicts the Constitution" and the doctrines of all the great statesman who preceded him: Washington, Jefferson, Jackson, Clay and Webster. Interestingly, the last and most recent of these men were Whigs; this fact no doubt was overlooked by Trexler, the editor of the *Republikaner*. The remainder of the article warned Allentown readers that the "South will not wait quietly until Lincoln has taken the White House." A Republican election would be equal to declaring war on the Southern states because they believed their Constitutional rights were threatened. In an almost pleading tone, the paper begged



its readers to vote Democratic in November, not just to uphold the "rights of our Southern brothers," but to avoid disunion.<sup>34</sup> To support its hefty claims against the Republican candidate, the *Republikaner* also included a large cartoon on its front page lampooning Lincoln's log-cabin heritage, the Chicago platform, and abolitionism. A log cabin—held up by a flimsy "platform" of Know-Nothingism, Black-equality and tariff-loving rats drinking from a large whiskey barrel—is about to crash down into ruin, trapping all the rats underneath in a "Black-Republican-Union-Destruction Trap." A caption underneath read, "the log cabin is really only an abolitionist trap, but is called 'Abe Lincoln's Grocery,' so that the easily-fooled voters drink from the barrel underneath."<sup>35</sup>

The language of the *Republikaner* and symbolism of its cartoon are revealing. Germans were particularly sensitive to the aristocratic Whig pretensions and Know-Nothing antifoignier roots of the Republican party, and the Democrats used this fact to their advantage, securing thousands of German votes. The *Reading Adler* echoed this theme, strongly insisting that the Know-Nothings had hidden themselves within the folds of the Republicans, and even listed several of them who were prominent Republicans in its 9 October 1860 issue.<sup>36</sup> In addition to antifoignism, the specter of emancipation which the abolitionists preached frightened many Pennsylvania Dutch Germans who feared the potential racial amalgamation that would occur if four million former slaves headed north after being freed. Not only did Pennsylvania Dutch ethnicity frown upon corruptions caused by urban factory workers, but it also adamantly supported the contention of "inherent black inferiority to whites."<sup>37</sup> In addition, a Republican victory would be anathema to them economically. Germans who had succeeded in establishing a solid economic foundation on their farms or as small shopkeepers patronized by farmers would have feared a Republican victory because they perceived the Republicans as the party of big business and thus urbanization, promoting a culture vastly unlike the one the Pennsylvania Dutch had created—or invented—over many generations. The possible financial repercussions of secession and/or civil war must have also been frightening. Located near the bustling ports of Philadelphia and New York, some German farmers and manufacturers in eastern Pennsylvania undoubtedly shipped their crops and goods to merchants in these cities for trade with the South. A national crisis between the sections, especially a state of war, could potentially spell ruin for these Pennsylvania Germans. Finally, Germans of both the "grey" and "green" variety were staunch supporters of the Constitution and the Union, even if their interpretations of both varied. The freedom these two American institutions allowed the Germans to enjoy was precious to them, mainly because most German speakers either directly remembered a distinct lack of it back in Europe (i.e., the Forty-Eighters) or had become accustomed to it over many years in America (the Pennsylvania Dutch).

In the light of these observations, the attitude of the *Republikaner* is understandable. Its political adversary, the *Patriot*, was less concerned with the possibility of war and unrest than with the idea of righteousness—slavery was wrong



and foreign competition with American businesses was wrong, because it threatened German workers' jobs. Further, the Democrats had allowed their Southern members to trample on the Constitution by threatening secession should their wishes not always prevail over the needs of the rest of the country. It is difficult to say with precision what sort of Pennsylvania German supported which paper—but based on ethnic considerations, it can be argued that the Pennsylvania Dutch, who lived mainly outside Allentown on individual farms, voted strongly Democratic, and it is probable that the Republicans were composed mainly of more newly-arrived, town-dwelling Germans. Ethnically divided between the "grey Dutch" and the "green" followers of the Forty-Eighters, the Pennsylvania Germans were just as divided politically in October 1860, if not more so, than in 1858. They also viewed the coming election with vastly different outlooks. For Pennsylvania German Republicans, a time of reckoning was drawing near; for the Democrats, a time of great apprehension and ominous foreboding.<sup>38</sup>

Democratic fears became reality with Lincoln's election. The 28 November edition of the *Republikaner* was replete with editorials asking "who is responsible?" and claiming that a crisis worse than "bleeding Kansas" now beset the land. Regarding Southern complaints that the fugitive slave law was being ignored in Northern states now more than ever, an article reviewing the laws of all the Northern states indignantly exclaimed that "these unconstitutional state laws against constitutionally guaranteed rights must fall, if the South is to be satisfied." The North, strangely enough, was now playing the role of nullifier, just like South Carolina a few decades ago. What hypocrisy for the North to claim nullification—or secession—illegal if it practiced it itself!<sup>39</sup> A mood of "I told you so" permeated the paper. With Lincoln's election, Northern businesses run by faithful members of the Democratic Party would crumble because of a lack of Southern customers. Northern Democrats would find themselves politically isolated because their Southern counterparts blamed them for the Republican victory, and most importantly, the Union was in great jeopardy of permanently splitting open. "The Northern Democrats made it only too clear that the occurrences in the South and their results would be the bitter reality of business stagnation in the North." The *Republikaner* had been prescient, it reminded its readers, in predicting the secession crisis, "but few probably foresaw or predicted the full impact of events that an electoral victory of a sectional party could have on the entire nation and over the all the people."<sup>40</sup>

Since South Carolina had not yet left the Union (but a declaration of secession was expected any day), in the next few weeks the Democratic editor focused the majority of his tirades on the ominous ramifications of the Republican victory on the economic situation of the country. Impending secession would destroy "open trust and good credit, the ruin of which must occur through the interruption of trade and all industry, and fall on the working masses of the nation." The United States had been "on the road to a shining new upswing in business"—a speedy recovery from the crisis of 1857—until Lincoln's triumph,



and now "with one fell swoop everything is broken up, as if exterminated." Rhetorically asking why and how the country had fallen into such a terrible situation, the *Republikaner* openly attacked the Republicans: "in one word the agitation and advent of the Republican Party is the reason for this growing crisis. . . . With such a party the country cannot enjoy internal peace." It was not the fault of the Democrats that the South is so enraged that it threatened to break up the Union.<sup>41</sup>

Republican Germans were overjoyed at Lincoln's election, and the *Lecha Allentown Patriot* rejoiced in the following weeks, printing jabs at its rival and poking fun of doom-croaking Democrats. It also staunchly defended the legitimacy of the election, the merits of the Republican platform, and, not surprisingly, Lincoln's position against the growing secession movement. When South Carolina seceded, however, the *Patriot* suddenly assumed an air of determined seriousness, completely condemning the state's action as unconstitutional and refusing compromise with the secessionists. After all, the Democrats split their party by refusing to compromise over the question of slavery in the territories: "Now, we for our part have no thoughts that the issue can be sidetracked through a change to the Constitution or through any other compromise, because at its convention the Democratic Party itself could not unify because of the eternal Negro." The irreconcilable issue of slavery between the North and South needed to be met now, because compromise would not only delay the inevitable, but would allow Southerners to "bring their slaves here, and we are convinced the Southerners desire this. No, our farmers would see the same as the highest danger."<sup>42</sup> The last comment was evidence that Pennsylvania German Republicans, just like the Democrats, feared blacks locating in the North. It also indicated that at least some German-speaking farmers were Republican by the end of 1861, a reminder that not all agrarians were Democratic.

The answer to the current crisis was simple: "The slave drivers have nothing further to do than accept the decision of the majority of the people—which is their duty—and if they do not wish to do this, then they must be viewed and treated as enemies of their homeland, yes, just like high-traitors." The issue simply ended there, the *Patriot* maintained. The two choices facing the nation were complete opposites, either the upholding of the Constitution or the trampling of the Constitution and destruction of the Union. Flinging a barb at the *Republikaner*, the Republican editor argued that it would not be hard to choose the correct side, because "he who is for the preservation of the Constitution and the laws, for freedom and integrity of the Union is right . . . and he who is against the laws, against the Constitution, against freedom and against our glorious Union, speaks and behaves in favor of the Southern traitors and Tories." The choice for the *Patriot's* readers, again, was simple.<sup>43</sup>

The decisions facing the Pennsylvania German community were not actually as simple as the editor of the *Patriot* wanted his readers to believe. Neither Republicans or Democrats evinced in their November or December papers much hope for an easy solution to the acute crisis afflicting the country, but neither



yet predicted an all-out civil war. Like other Americans at the time, Pennsylvania Germans appeared to believe that solutions would suddenly present themselves, and, as the *Republikaner* insinuated, clear up the problems just as in 1857. Both papers gave hints, though, about Germans' primary concerns at this stage of the secession crisis. Democrats were strongly concerned with the future of the economy. The interruption of free trade was a primary worry because it violated one of the Pennsylvania Dutch societal pillars: freedom of individual action, in this case freedom to conduct trade with Southern customers. While Democratic farmers most likely were only indirectly connected with the Southern economy, they relied on small-town merchants in Reading, Lancaster and Allentown who probably were affected by it. More importantly, Pennsylvania Dutch farmers realized that a precious trust between the North and South had been lost because of Republican heckling. With no trust between the sections, prices would rise for goods such as clothes and fabric made from Southern cotton, pressing the farmer on a slim budget. In essence, the status quo in which the Pennsylvania Dutch community prospered might be irrevocably altered. Any change in the conduct of daily affairs could transform into threats at their ethnic independence: perhaps Northern industry would expand even faster into their small towns and cities as a result of the burgeoning crisis—a hypothesis that was actually borne out in reality. If trade between the North and South slowed down due to distrust, not only would German merchants and farmers be affected; thousands of German workers who depended on their employers for their livelihood might lose their jobs or receive pay cuts. While the German Democrats could probably not count such workers as the bulk of their constituency, no doubt the lines dividing the livelihoods of Republicans and Democrats were blurred enough to permit some factory workers to be counted in the Democratic ranks. Hence the Democrats could claim to fear for the economic well-being of all Pennsylvania Germans.

The German Republicans were concerned more with philosophical issues than economic ones. Like their English-speaking comrades, they viewed compromise with South Carolina after their hard-won victory as anathema because it would repudiate the free-soil, protectionist platform which had attracted Northern (and recently-arrived German) voters to vote for Lincoln in the first place. It would also show weakness at a time when recent political victory had flushed Republicans with both party pride and optimism for a better future. Inspired perhaps by "Forty-Eighter" idealism, German Republicans also viewed "Southern slave-drivers" as tyrannical, aristocratic enemies, depriving freedom from the black man, but potentially from the Northern freeman as well, should compromise prevail. While most Germans probably knew it was highly unlikely that a political compromise would mean the extension of slavery into the North, the possibility of slavery's extension into the territories meant not only further political strife but also strong competition for immigrants (i.e., Germans), who might someday quit the eastern factories and move west in search of a better life.<sup>44</sup> Why should the perennial slavery question continue to plague the



United States when the Republican victory should indicate to all citizens, North and South, that the majority had spoken and the issue was settled? The German Republicans wanted most of all for the South to accept its legal political defeat and come to terms with the new administration on the administration's terms. There was no middle ground because no middle ground needed to exist—one was either a patriot or a traitor.

So far into the secession crisis, the eastern Pennsylvania Germans, at least according to their newspapers, exhibited minor but significant deviations from the overall reaction of Northern Democrats and Republicans. Their ethnic identity was strongly intertwined with political allegiance, however, depending on whether one was a "grey" Dutchman or a "green" factory worker. Would the respective positions of the German Republicans and Democrats change through the tumultuous winter and early spring of 1861? Did German ethnicity affect German action or inaction in the coming months any more than it did before or directly after Lincoln's election? Although it is difficult to determine from newspaper editorials, ethnicity did nonetheless appear to play a role in the Germans' reaction to the later stages of the secession crisis. Moreover, the eastern Pennsylvania Germans were not solidly united against the South after South Carolina seceded. Instead, the growing secession crisis widened gaps between Republicans and Democrats that were only bridged when the national flag was fired upon at Fort Sumter.

On New Year's Day 1861 the Skippackville *Neutralist und Allgemeine Neuigkeits-Bote* printed a large commentary that waxed philosophical about the fate of the nation. Priding itself on taking a "neutral" stance on political issues, the paper lamented the political tragedy which had befallen the Union, but stressed the economic "hard times." Comparing the United States to a mountain climber, the editor argued that easy living and a booming economy had skyrocketed the country to the pinnacle of success, but now, having reached the top too quickly, the nation teetered dangerously toward an equally rapid descent down the other side. The current secession crisis, which was disrupting the delicately-balanced country, was caused by "a minority that wants to rule, or will coerce victory with the sword." Yet "it is no wonder that the South is becoming rebellious and wants to secede; the North wants to deny it its rights." While those rights included the defense and extension of slavery, which the editor insinuated were evil, the resolution of the crisis "is all guesswork" at this point. Only one being knew how the economic and political troubles would end: God. The *Neutralist* betrayed a tinge of German-Calvinistic foreboding near the conclusion of the article. Were the hard times of the secession winter "the result of who won the last election or a punishment of the higher order? The answer: in past times we find that the founders often willingly accepted punishment for their sins and unrighteousness."<sup>45</sup> The implication that the citizens of the Union had sinned and must therefore jointly accept punishment from God indicates a religiously-inspired resignation that what will pass will pass—without recourse. Americans could do little to stop the burgeoning disas-



ter, and should not perhaps even attempt to halt it, according to the *Neutralist*. While such sentiments did not appear prominently in all German newspapers, it is important to note that most Pennsylvania Germans, particularly the "Dutch," were very religious, members of Lutheran, Reformed, Dunker, Mennonite, Schwenkfelder, and Amish congregations. The last four denominations were particularly zealous adherents of their faith, which dictated that bearing arms against "one's neighbor" was sinful. A pacifistic response to the tense political situation might, therefore, have appeared both logical and morally responsible to them.<sup>46</sup>

The Allentown *Patriot* did not exhibit fateful resignation in its 2 January issue. Instead of the more-neutral, religious stance of the *Neutralist*, the editor of the Republican paper launched an all-out attack on its rival, the *Unabhängige Republikaner*, and its Democratic principles. Under headlines labeled "High Treason" and "4 Million Dollars Robbed," Buchanan's lame duck administration was shown to be the assistant and promulgator of Southern Union killers. Not only had Buchanan allowed huge amounts of money to disappear, argued the *Patriot*, it had permitted it literally to go south to the secessionists. The *Unabhängige Republikaner* should be ashamed of promoting such a corrupt party: if the Democrats would not allow a Republican president to be elected unless the breakup of the Union necessarily followed, "why do they not then carry their 'patriotism' to the point of suggesting an amendment to the Constitution, stating that no one shall have a voice unless he goes head over heels for the Democratic Union-Destruction Party?"<sup>47</sup> The Democrats could profit handsomely off of such a deal that robbed freemen of their rights, the editor cynically reported. He then blurted his outrage at the crime he had concocted for the Democrats—"Shame! Shame!! Shame!!!" Reiterating the all or nothing theme, the question before true Union men remained the same as before: self rule by democratic freemen, or a tyranny of "the Southern bank robbers and traitors." The choice was as simple as it had been a few weeks earlier. "In the North we hold true to the old Constitution of our fathers, and are resolved to uphold the same—and whoever opposes the same through force is a traitor and is solely responsible for the consequences." Even the advertisements in the *Patriot* were tinged with Republican sentiment. "The times are hard," stated one shoemaker, "money is scarce—the Union is in danger—and must be preserved, and the only way to preserve the same is to keep the feet warm and the head cool."<sup>48</sup>

The *Republikaner* was not long in responding to the *Patriot's* incendiary attack. In its 9 January issue, the Democratic paper defended the Buchanan presidency (again), the efforts being made for compromise, and asked "what is the best." Correctly stating that the "main problem between the North and South" was the issue of slavery in the territories, the *Republikaner* entreated its readers to decide what the best future course was: "Indeed the simple question is which is better—the Union with a few Negroes in the territories, or separation of the Union without Negroes in the territories?" Following this rhetorical question, a letter to the editor from a recently emigrated Pennsylvania German in Ten-



nessee presented an emotional appeal for compromise. The anonymous author claimed to have voted for Douglas, "who wanted to keep away the present evil times," and lamented that the "fire-eaters now have placed a civil war in the near future." "I fear very much," he wrote; "that it will then go especially berserk against 'foreigners,' who are all seen here by the Americans as abolitionists and 'Black Republicans.'" In a Fitzhugh-esque argument, the author claimed that black slaves were better-off than northern white workers, and that "having lived in the South four years," he knew that it was impossible to cultivate cotton, rice or sugar without slavery. Germans in the South would side with "American" Southerners should war come, and then, sadly, German would fight German. "It would be all to the best if the Northern Germans would not tamper with slavery here in the South," he argued.<sup>49</sup>

"Each hour enlarges the danger of a bloody civil war and the terrible dissolution of the Union, which was created under great sacrifice through the spirit of peace, and may be preserved only through modern hindsight, tolerance, and duty." Appeals such as this one were scattered all over the January and February issues of the *Unabhängige Republikaner*. Peace would be achieved only through compromise, and if Pennsylvania were ever called upon to furnish troops to suppress the secessionists, "we incidentally hope that this army of 100,000 men will be formed from the Republican ranks, who have voiced their support to that which created this civil discord." The Republicans, moreover, were determined to see a war happen, "because their party is more important than the Union," and as a result, pessimistically predicted the *Republikaner*, "the entire South will attempt to separate into a Southern confederacy."<sup>50</sup>

The more apolitical *Neutralist* likewise called for compromise and the avoidance of bloodshed. On 8 January, it carried an appeal from former governor William F. Packer stressing the need for compromise not only to prevent disunion, but also probable civil war. The article advocated the extension of the Missouri Compromise line to the Pacific and a Constitutional amendment guaranteeing slavery's legality underneath 36°30' latitude. The people, not the lawmakers, should decide if national catastrophe was to be averted if the politicians failed to compromise. A 5 February letter to the editor of the *Neutralist* likewise pleaded for compromise enacted by the people, not the politicians. Since the "liberal, upstanding and equalizing" Crittenden Compromise, "which could save our land from disaster," was being rejected by Congress, then the people should take affairs into their own hands. "What do the people want?" asked the author. "Peace and not war. We must view secession for what it really is, and how it is spreading on a daily basis. The Union is as good as dissolved." Therefore, he continued, we must mediate our difficulties and do whatever it takes to restore the nation's integrity. But this could not be accomplished through force: restoration "will occur only through immediate love and friendship, not through force. The advent of force is the end of the Union!" Pennsylvanians needed to raise their voices for compromise and unity.<sup>51</sup>



Another Allentown paper, the non-partisan *Friedens-Bote*, also argued strongly for compromise. Both its 6 and 13 February editions contained long reprints of procompromise speeches delivered by Pennsylvania German congressmen in Harrisburg. Proclaiming slavery "an unquestionable evil," Democrat William G. Lichtenwallner nonetheless contended in the House that "slavery will soon die out in the South," and that the institution existed in the North at the time of the Constitutional Convention. Therefore, while "God will judge the country for its sins," the greater sin of breaking up the Union over slavery was a far worse transgression. Overflowing with biblical allusions (like the parable of a God-defying Jonah swallowed by the whale), Lichtenwallner's address must have struck a chord with religious Germans who feared God's judgment on a wayward nation. Similarly, Senator Jeremiah Schindel proclaimed that "our state [Pennsylvania] has had earlier, and still has great influence with the other states, and if it beckons the Southern states with outstretched hands and decides that all states will have equal rights, then, I believe, the flight of the secessionists will be brought to a halt." The *Reading Adler* offered similar advice to lawmakers. "The ever-true and upstanding friend of the preservation of the Union, untrammelled by shortsighted viewpoints, must feel himself duty-bound to recognize the full legal equality of the Southern states and accept their lawful arguments." Again, compromise was preferable to any other alternative.<sup>52</sup>

Through the rest of February and March 1861, despite reports in every paper about the secession conventions of the remaining Southern states, Democratic and politically "neutral" newspapers solidly supported some sort of compromise with the South. Their stance differed little from that of November 1860, and, if anything, became more resolved to blame the Republicans for the impending disaster. Economic considerations, especially lamentations about the "present hard times" were still important, but the preservation of the Union now became the primary goal. Regarding the last issue, the Democrats united with their adversaries, but the similarities ended there. Republicans threatened war if secession did not end and the legitimate results of the election of 1860 obeyed. They too, did not stray from their earlier course of "no compromise." Significantly, all the papers examined overtly predicted war if their ideologies were not adopted by the nation's politicians. The two Allentown rivals, the *Patriot* and *Unabhängige Republikaner*, continually printed editorials blaming the other for either instigating the present national crisis or siding with traitors. Both papers still argued that there was a "simple" choice for their readers to make; the two choices were different, however, depending on one's political affiliation. Democrats could choose between compromise and war, and Republicans could choose between Union and probable war and the trampling of Constitutional rights accompanied by the destruction of the Union. Notices for weekly drills of militia companies abounded in both Democratic and Republican papers, however, a sign that Pennsylvania Germans were preparing for the



worst. On 13 April 1861 Fort Sumter was fired upon and their worst fears were realized.<sup>53</sup>

The 17 April issue of the *Unabhängige Republikaner* carried the following headline: "The war has begun. It is our sad duty today to report one of the most tragic events of American history, namely the commencement of actual fighting between different sections of the former United States." The Democratic paper immediately blamed the instigation for the attack on Fort Sumter on the impending arrival of a federal fleet laden with troops from Washington, but did not excuse the bellicose action of the South Carolinians. "On the side of the secessionists lies the responsibility for having fired the first shot." A state of war now existed between the seceded states and the federal government, "a war between brothers, who before had fought on a hundred battlefields side by side for liberty and homeland—and when this war will end, God alone knows." A genuine crestfallen and gloomy tone pervaded the newspaper, and the editor admitted that recent events now "force the law-abiding citizen to take up arms to prevent that all state and societal conditions succumb to the all-encompassing conflict." The entire North was now behind President Lincoln, and as a result "the differences of the parties disappear into nothingness; there is but one question, and that is how to bring the danger of this situation most quickly and safely to an end." However, the *Republikaner* could not help taking one last jab at the Republicans. Reacquainting the readers with the ideals of compromise and Constitutional resolution it had preached up to this point, the editor proclaimed the advent of the war the fault of "a fanatical, unpeaceful spirit" which resided in the hearts of "Northern fanatics . . . which the Southern secessionists have brought full circle." Secessionists existed not only in the South, but "had existed also in the North." Nonetheless, the German Democrats would support the Northern war effort in order to uphold the Union—the status quo—they so cherished.<sup>54</sup>

The tone of the Allentown *Patriot* on the same day was unequivocally enthusiastic for the defense of the flag as well as vindictive against the Democratic "traitors," especially those "poor suckers" who edited and supported the rival *Republikaner*. "We advise them to become somewhat cool, and to consider that they themselves, and not us, are to blame" for the war. Headlines such as "What Does One Think About Such People" bitterly questioned the loyalty and patriotism of Democrats, and several editorials scathingly blamed the Democrats for "the national sickness" which resulted in secession, and consequently, the war. One such "sickness" was the inexcusable emptiness of the national treasury, which was "left over from the Democratic leaders. The Democratic thief-sickness is suddenly cured, however, because all such thieves have given themselves up to the Democratic South." Regarding the possibility of war between brothers, the *Patriot* exhorted, "well, who is human who would not be ashamed if such a result became necessary," but this price was worth the potential cost if it "strengthens and defends our dear liberties . . . and preserves the



Constitution and the Union." Now it was the Republicans' turn to say "I told you so," and the editor spared few pains in explicating this fact, blaming the Democrats for upholding their party above the Union. "How terrible a man can sink once he strays from the path of truth and right—the next thing is that he provides only for the good of his party and becomes so corrupt that he would accomplish the same by going through the ruins of our dear country. O God! Forgive such people their misdeeds! They can not possibly know what they do—and yet know still less what terrible responsibilities they impose through such expressions." German Republicans had triumphed.<sup>55</sup>

It was not until the attack on Fort Sumter—late in the secession crisis—that eastern Pennsylvania Germans finally unified in their opinions about the sectional crisis. Even then, the *Unabhängige Republikaner* exhibited signs of defiance, attempting still to argue for the virtue of its previous positions. Yet the Democrats, however begrudgingly, had been obliged to come over to the Republican view of preserving the Union through whatever means necessary. They were undoubtedly disgusted that war would be that means to the greater end, and feared the economic and possible cultural consequences for their Pennsylvania Dutch culture. Yet they still supported the Lincoln administration's stance against the rebellious states on the grounds that the secessionists had fired on the flag. In this interpretation, the Pennsylvania German Democrats differed little from their English-speaking colleagues. German Republicans likewise acted very similar to their compatriots, never deserting the argument that the constitutionality of Lincoln's election must be upheld and the Union preserved at any cost. The history of the eastern Pennsylvania Germans during the secession crisis—as expressed in their newspapers—was, however, a very divided one, and this fact is significant in light of modern scholarship, which has ignored their responses to this critical event. While most historians, particularly the ethnoculturalists, maintain that German-American political sentiments were divided during the late antebellum period, very few have realized how disunited the eastern Pennsylvania Germans were in the very last stages of the secession crisis—the months immediately preceding Sumter.

Ethnicity unequivocally played a substantial role in determining the political responses of Pennsylvania Germans during this crisis, especially those of the Pennsylvania Dutch. Religious overtones may have contributed to a more pacifistic outlook in some German newspapers, but more importantly, the unique ethnicity that the Pennsylvania Dutch had created—an amalgam of German and Anglo-Saxon culture—influenced them to vote Democratic to protect their ethnic and economic interests, which were intertwined. They responded very differently to secession from the newly-arrived, Forty-Eighter-led German immigrants, who tended to vote Republican for mainly ideological reasons. Hence the Pennsylvania German community was divided ethnically and politically during the secession crisis. These conclusions should not only enlighten the



extant historiography on ethnic minorities during the era of the Civil War, but offer a counterpoint to the assumption that mid-nineteenth-century Americans were well on their way to being melted into the common pot.

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## Notes

<sup>1</sup> Mahlon H. Hellerich, ed., *Allentown, 1762-1987: A 225-Year History* (Allentown, PA: Lehigh County Historical Society, 1987), 1:90-97.

<sup>2</sup> "Die demokratische Partei sagt, dass die Unzufriedenheit mit der Union verursacht wurde durch Verlorengehen des Zutrauens . . . und der einzige Weg zu diesem Ziele [restoration of trust and brotherhood] ist ein sogenanntes Compromiss—eine Ausgleichung unserer Differenzen in einem brüderlichen Geiste. Dieses ist der friedliche Weg, die Union zu erhalten, und ist in Übereinstimmung mit dem Geiste der sie erschaffen hat" (*Allentown Unabhängige Republikaner*, 23 January 1861 [Microfilm, Lehigh County Historical Society, Allentown, PA; hereafter cited as LCHS]).

<sup>3</sup> "Die andere Methode für die Erhaltung der Union besteht in dem Gebrauch von heftigen Argumenten—physischer Gewalt. Kanonen und Kugeln, Blutvergießen und Brutalität. Das verlorene Vertrauen der südlichen Staaten in die Union soll an der Spitze des Bayonets und der Kanonen Mündung wiederhergestellt werden. Der Süden soll durch Schläge gezwungen werden, die Union zu lieben!" (ibid.).

<sup>4</sup> ". . . kein intelligenter Mensch wird so verblendet sein, zu glauben, dass die Union durch Zwang erhalten werden könne. In einem solchen Kampf wäre Sieg eben so schlimm für die Union, als Niederlage" (ibid.).

<sup>5</sup> Bruce Levine, *The Spirit of 1848: German Immigrants, Labor Conflict, and the Coming of the Civil War* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1992), 254. Levine's is the most recent scholarly work that even addresses this subject. His emphasis is on the 1850s, but he does examine the secession crisis. Levine, to his credit, does allude to the disparity in partisan sentiment among the Pennsylvania Germans before the secession crisis, but says little about this subject after the election of Lincoln. Burton, whose *Melting Pot Soldiers: The Union's Ethnic Regiments* (Ames, IA: Iowa State University Press, 1988) is the only modern publication dealing with German-American soldiers who fought for the North, treats the Germans' reactions to the 1860 election in Philadelphia, but, like Levine, says very little about the secession crisis which followed (see pp. 28-29).

<sup>6</sup> Ken Fones-Wolf and Elliott Shore, "The German Press and Working Class Politics in Gilded-Age Philadelphia," in *The German-American Radical Press: The Shaping of a Left Political Culture, 1850-1940* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1992), 65. This essay treats the Philadelphia German Press in postwar Philadelphia, but states that "from the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act through the conclusion of the Civil War, German immigrants' 'equal rights' ideas attached them to a political culture galvanizing Northern workingmen around the Union cause." See Carl Wittke's two publications, *The German Language Press in America* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1957) and *Refugees of Revolution: The German Forty-Eighters in America* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1952) and Adolf E. Zucker, *The Forty-Eighters: Political Refugees of the German Revolution of 1848* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1950), for the traditional interpretation of German-American affiliation with the Republican party during the Civil War era. Concentrating on the Forty-Eighter revolutionaries who fled Germany after their democratic revolution failed, it is understandable that these authors would focus on German-American activity in the Republican party.

<sup>7</sup> Prominent among scholars of the "ethnoculturalist school" of thinking are Frederick Luebke, ed., *Ethnic Voters and the Election of Lincoln* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1971); Paul Kleppner, *The Cross of Culture: A Social Analysis of Midwestern Politics, 1850-1900* (New York: The Free Press, 1970); Ronald P. Formisano, *The Birth of Mass Political Parties: Michigan, 1827-1861* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1971); Michael F. Holt, *Forging a Majority: The Forma-*



tion of the Republican Party in Pittsburgh, 1848-1860 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1969); and Walter Kamphoefner, "German-Americans and Civil War Politics: A Reconsideration of the Ethnocultural Thesis," *Civil War History* 37,3 (1991): 226-40. While Kamphoefner takes issue with explaining ethnic politics solely through ethnocultural lenses, he still subscribes to the thesis as a critical interpretive tool.

<sup>8</sup> Ella Lonn, *Foreigners in the Union Army and Navy* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1951), 663-64. Lonn wrote that her statistics are drawn from the national census of 1860.

<sup>9</sup> Robert Henry Billigmeier, "The Pennsylvania Germans from the American Revolution to the First World War," in *Americans from Germany: A Study in Cultural Diversity*, Minorities in American Life Series (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company, Inc., 1974), 110-12. Billigmeier states that the "Great Valley" of Pennsylvania was strongly populated by the Pennsylvania Dutch Germans, and that the counties of Berks, Bucks, Carbon, Dauphin, Lebanon, Lehigh, Lancaster, Montgomery, Northampton, Northumberland, Schuylkill, Snyder, and York were the core "Pennsylvania German territory." Gustav Koerner, the German-American politico and war-leader, observes in his book, *Das Deutsche Element in den Vereinigten Staaten von Nordamerika, 1818-1848* (Cincinnati, 1880), that the Pennsylvania state legislature was publishing the governor's addresses in a German translation by 1837, and German instruction in the schools was sanctioned by law. A quick glance at the rosters of state legislators in the antebellum period reveals hundreds of German-sounding surnames. Koerner also mentions a legislative movement to establish a German teacher's college and a German university. Hence it appears that the Pennsylvania Germans were attempting to protect their unique ethnicity through the preservation of the German language within the framework of state education and politics (Koerner, chap. 2).

<sup>10</sup> Don Yoder has studied the Pennsylvania "Dutch" Germans for several decades, and in his essay in Frank Trommler and Joseph McVeigh, eds., *America and the Germans: An Assessment of a Three-Hundred-Year History*, vol. 1 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1985), he claims that the Forty-Eighters "puzzled the Pennsylvanians—they were Germans, they spoke the German language, but they were radically different in cultural and political outlook. The Pennsylvania Dutch Germans had several names for them—'New Germans' or 'European Germans' or simply *Deutschblenner*, *Deutschländer* or Germany-Germans. . . . They considered immigrant Germans foreigners" while believing themselves to be American (see pp. 51-53 of his essay, "The Pennsylvania Germans").

<sup>11</sup> Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds., *The Invention of Tradition* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 1-14, and Kathleen Conzen, David A. Gerber et al., "The Invention of Ethnicity: A Perspective from the U.S.A.," *Journal of American Ethnic History* 12,1 (Fall 1992): 3-32.

<sup>12</sup> Don Yoder agrees with this contention. He argues that the Pennsylvania Germans in the nineteenth century had so broken with their own German ethnicity through generations of residence among English speakers, that the influx of new immigrants from Germany in the middle decades of the century was primarily responsible for the "Germanizing movement" among the "Dutch" Germans, such as the drive to legalize German language instruction in schools. While the two groups did not coalesce into a common cultural and political union, it took the influence of direct German immigration to spur on certain aspects of the "invented" ethnic identity of the longer-settled "Dutch" Germans (see his essay in Trommler and McVeigh, eds., *America and the Germans*, 50-51).

<sup>13</sup> Mahlon H. Hellerich, ed., *Allentown, 1762-1987: A 225-Year History*, 1:91-96; Robert H. Billigmeier, "The Pennsylvania Germans from the American Revolution to the First World War," 110-15; and Frederic Klees, *The Pennsylvania Dutch* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1950). Don Yoder calls these immigrants "largely an urban phenomenon," who "settled in the Pennsylvania German cities," and "attempted in part to recreate for themselves in America a German bourgeois atmosphere in their urban neighborhoods, churches, and lodges" (*America and the Germans*, 51).

<sup>14</sup> See Winifred Gregory, ed., *American Newspapers, 1821-1936: A Union List of Files Available in the United States* (Washington, 1939), under "Pennsylvania."

<sup>15</sup> The author chose to examine the German press of the eastern portion of the state only because of time and space constraints, not because of insignificance of sources from the western counties. Likewise, the reader will discover few references to Philadelphia papers here. These pub-



lications, certainly rich in information, were inaccessible during the time of research because of the temporary closure of the two primary repositories: The Historical Society of Pennsylvania and the German Society of Pennsylvania. For an excellent study of the German-language press in antebellum Philadelphia, see Lesley Ann Kawaguchi, "The Making of Philadelphia's German-America: Ethnic Group and Community Development, 1830-1883 (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Los Angeles, 1983). It should also be noted that German-language newspapers are much harder to locate than regular English ones. The scarcity of these documents prevents a blow-by-blow, week-by-week narrative about the various papers which may be possible with other, English-language papers; instead, the author has attempted to provide a chronological analysis of thought within the papers he did discover. If large chronological gaps seem to yawn inexplicably, the author cheerfully accepts it with the caveat that it could not necessarily be helped.

<sup>16</sup> "Dough face" was a derogatory term used by Republicans to describe Northern Democrats who sided with their Southern colleagues on slavery-related issues. It was a metaphor for someone easily "pushed around."

<sup>17</sup> "Die Hauptfrage in Washington, wann [sic] die Kansasfrage aufs Tapet gebracht wurde, ist stets gewesen: Wie sollen wir die südlichen Feuerfresser zufrieden stellen? Nicht: Wie sollen wir den Einwohnern von Kansas Gerechtigkeit widerfahren lassen, dadurch dass wir dafür sorgen, dass es ihnen erlaubt wird ihre Institutionen zu bilden nach dem Geist und der Absicht der Nebraska Akte . . . das Land in Streit verwickeln und die übrigen Jahre seines Amtertermins mit der größten Unruhe anfüllen wird . . .

Ohne Zweifel sind die Disunionisten erfreut über die gegenwärtige Verwicklung. Die Radikalen im Süden, welche einem südlichen Staatenbund, dem Anschluss von Central-America und der Erneuerung des Sklavenhandels entgegen sehen, freuen sich über diese neue Schwierigkeit. Wie kann der President in die Hände solcher Männer spielen? Sie sind bereits der Union völlig ungetreu. Mag er thun, was er immer will, werden sie fortfahren die Administration zu beunruhigen. Sie wünschen nicht, dass die Regierung ruhig und friedlich fortschreiten soll. Sie suchen heißes Wasser, und hoffen vermittelst desselben ihre Absicht zu erreichen." (Lancaster *Volksfreund und Beobachter*, 5 January 1858 [copy available at the Lancaster County Historical Society, Lancaster, PA.]

<sup>18</sup> *Berks County Democrat*, 23 March 1859 (The Historical Society of Berks County, Reading, PA [hereafter cited as HSBC]).

<sup>19</sup> "Die Schwierigkeiten nämlich, welche James Buchanan zu überwinden hatte, waren so außerordentlich und mannigfaltig, wie sie selten in der Geschichte eines der früheren Präsidenten der Ver. Staaten vorgekommen sind.

Wie zahlreich auch die Opposition war, wie groß und talentvoll die Männer, welche ihm gegenüber standen—seine Charakterfestigkeit und geistige Überlegenheit trugen endlich den Sieg davon. Der Kansas Streit ist aus dem Congress entfernt, dahin verlegt, wohin er gehört, in das Territorium selber.

Für Kinder braucht er nicht zu sorgen, denn er hat keine. Sein Vaterland ist sein nächster Verwandter.

Diese Behauptung trägt das Zeichen der Lüge an der Stirn. . . . James Buchanan war immer der wahre Freund des Arbeiters, und hat sein Leben lang das Schwindel-System bekämpft, welchem wir die Krisis verdanken." (Pennsburg *Bauern Freund* 7 July 1858 [copy available at the Schwenkfelder Library, Pennsburg, PA; hereafter cited as SFL].)

<sup>20</sup> At first glance, this may sound ironic considering the Republican doctrine of free labor, but Democrats attempted to pair the Republican party with corrupt big business, which in their view was cheating laborers of all sorts—rural and urban.

<sup>21</sup> "Was Haben Die Demokraten Vollbracht?" Title of the article describing the various acts of land acquisition accomplished by Democratic presidents. ". . . alle demokratischen Präsidenten, von Jefferson's Zeit bis auf diesen Tag, mochten sie noch so viel Gutes für unser Land thun, von den föderalistischen Zeitungen mit derselben Bitterkeit und Bosheit angefallen wurden, mit welcher dieselben heutzutage James Buchanan verfolgen." Also see letter to editor by "B. S. Kerr," explaining, "Ich habe sie [Buchanan] unterstützt, weil sie von den Demokraten in's Amt erhoben wurden." (Reading *Adler*, 26 April 1859 [HSBC].)

<sup>22</sup> These historians, varying greatly in time of publication, are the chief scholars who have dealt with German-Americans during the era of the American Civil War. See Wilhelm Kaufmann, *Die*



*Deutschen im amerikanischen Bürgerkrieg* (Munich: Druck und Verlag von R. Oldenbourg, 1911); Albert Bernhard Faust, *The German Element in the United States: With Special Emphasis to its Political, Moral, Social, and Educational Influence* (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1909); and Wittke, Lonn, Levine, and Burton, previously cited. See note 7 for a brief listing of the works of Luebke, Holt, and other historians who have promulgated the ethnocultural thesis.

<sup>23</sup> Willi Paul Adams, *The German-Americans: An Ethnic Experience*, trans. La Vern J. Rippley and Eberhard Reichmann (Indianapolis: Max Kade German-American Center, 1993), 31. While not adding substantially new interpretations, Adams has logically condensed much of the thought of the various ethnoculturalists in his chapter on politics.

<sup>24</sup> Hellerich, 93; and Willi Paul Adams, 31.

<sup>25</sup> "Wo kommen da unsere Träumer hin, die unsere Gleichheit mit den Negern so toll träumen und nicht wach werden können? Sie mögen sich die Unthaten, die viehischen Unthaten vorlesen lassen, welche bei allen Neger-Aufständen verübt wurden und sie werden wach und nüchtern werden. Sie mögen sie wohl erwägen und sie werden nicht länger eine Verantwortlichkeit auf sich nehmen wollen." (*Reading Adler*, 7 February 1860 [HSBC].)

<sup>26</sup> For a much-more detailed analysis of Forty-Eighter motivation and influence, see Wittke, *Refugees of Revolution*; Levine, *The Spirit of 1848*, and A. E. Zucker, ed., *The Forty-Eighters: Political Refugees of the German Revolution of 1848* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1950); Ken Fones-Wolf and Elliott Shore, "The German Press and Working-Class Politics in Gilded-Age Philadelphia," and John B. Jentz, "The 48ers and the Politics of the German Labor Movement in Chicago during the Civil War Era: Community Formation and the Rise of a Labor Press," both in *The German-American Radical Press*.

<sup>27</sup> See the earlier citations of Yoder's work, and Willi Paul Adams, *The German-Americans* "... local studies in Iowa ... have shown that the differences between urban and rural constituencies were more indicative of voter behavior than were religious or ethnic components. The rule of thumb is: the more geographically isolated an election district, the more votes cast for the Democrats" (31). My research supports this assumption in general, but argues that ethnicity also played a substantial role in determining voting behavior.

<sup>28</sup> Much scholarship, particularly that of the ethnoculturalists, supports such a conclusion, and it probably is historically accurate. Voting records for the Pennsylvania counties in question, compared with the national census, would provide verification of this thesis, but such records for Lehigh County, my focus of interest, were not available either in Allentown or at the Pennsylvania State Archives at the time of my research. Such a distinct political polarity, however, betrays a practical consideration which Andreas Dorpalen has correctly asserted: "From the earliest colonial times the German element in this country had shown itself particularly susceptible to environmental pressure. It adopted, and accepted conditions as it found them." Andreas Dorpalen, "The German Element and the Issues of the Civil War," in *Ethnic Voters and the Election of Lincoln*, Frederick C. Luebke, ed. (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1971), 69. It could very well be that the Germans who settled in rural Pennsburg (located about halfway between Allentown and Philadelphia) were longer-settled and more agrarian than their Lancaster cousins, but it is also possible that Pennsburg had a stronger Democratic presence among all of its citizens, English and German-speaking, than the more cosmopolitan town of Lancaster, where loyalties were more evenly divided. William Burton supports this contention in *Melting Pot Soldiers: The Union's Ethnic Regiments* (Ames, IA: Iowa State University Press, 1988), 17. He argues that "immigrants disagreed with each other and could not be counted on to follow ethnic leaders slavishly. ... Like the native American, the foreign-born voter cast his ballot on the basis of complex motivation, with local issues like temperance and ethnic rivalries, along with state and national issues of many kinds, influencing his decision." While I do not think these caveats contradict my research, it is important to keep them in mind.

<sup>29</sup> "JENE TARIFF-BESCHLÜSSE. Unter dieser Überschrift sucht der 'Lecha Patriot' von letzter Woche Capital für seine Partei zu machen, indem er auf die Abstimmung über die Tariffbeschlüsse in der Staatsgesetzgebung hinweist und großes Gewicht darauf legt, dass alle Republikaner für und alle Demokraten bis auf 1 dagegen gestimmt haben. ... Aber es scheint, der Patriot muss immer den Heuchler spielen. ... falschen, ungegründeten Verleumdungen gegen den Präsidenten und die demokratische Partei." (*Unabhängige Republikaner*, 8 February 1860 [LCHS].)



<sup>30</sup> The Allentown *Friedens-Bote*, another German weekly from that city, contained an article on 3 April 1860 listing the numbers of Pennsylvania students being taught in German in 1860. Lecha County, which later became Lehigh County, was ranked second in the state (behind Berks) with 1,145 students (copy available at SFL).

<sup>31</sup> See any of the 1860 editions of the Allentown *Republikaner*, *Patriot*, *Pennsburg Bauern Freund*, *Reading Adler*, or Skippackville *Neutralist und Allgemeine Neuigkeits-Bote* (LCHS, SFL, HSBC).

<sup>32</sup> "Der Plan für eine südliche Convention, um eine Ausscheidung aus der Union zu besprechen, findet außerhalb Süd Carolina nirgends nennenswerthen Anklang. Das zeigt, dass der Süden im Ganzen noch gesund in der Unionsfrage ist. Er hält zur Constitution—so lang wir diese aufrecht erhalten, ist unsere Union sicher" (*Unabhängige Republikaner*, 15 February 1860 [LCHS]). The *Reading Adler* also supported Breckinridge, mainly to preserve party unity. Douglas really did not want the nomination of the Northern Democrats, asserted the editor of the *Adler*, only his "hardnosed friends." They were responsible for the split in the party, not him (*Reading Adler*, 3 July 1860 [HSBC]).

<sup>33</sup> See the various issues of the *Lecha Allentown Patriot* for February, March and April 1860, and especially the October issues. Pennsylvania was a key state in antebellum presidential elections, not only because of its electoral votes, but also since the gubernatorial election, seen as a harbinger of future political allegiance, occurred in October—one month before the presidential election. Regarding the October election: "Ja, es soll sich daraus ergeben, ob man sich in sein Lech zu gunsten von freiem Handel oder zu gunsten der Erweiterung der Sklaverei—und zu gunsten von Sklavenketten ausdrückt oder nicht" (*Patriot*, 3 October 1860 [LCHS]).

<sup>34</sup> "Soll unsere glorreiche Union erhalten werden? . . . Die Demokraten sagen ja, sie soll bleiben mit der Constitution und gleichen Rechten der Staaten. Die Republikaner sagen nein . . . Unruhe und Bürgerkrieg zu befürchten, wenn die Partei die National Regierung in die Hände bekommt. Mit Stephen A. Douglas ist die Union sicher! Mit John C. Breckinridge ist die Union sicher! Mit John Bell ist die Union sicher! Kein Mensch kann dem widersprechen—aber mit Abraham Lincoln ist die Union nicht sicher! weil er der Candidat einer Partei und Repräsentant von Grundfragen ist, die im Widerspruch leben mit unserer Constitution und vor denen die Väter und größten Staatsmänner unseres Landes als Washington, Jefferson, Jackson, Clay, Webster, und andere.

Man glaube nicht, dass der Süden gewillt ist, ruhig abzuwarten bis Lincoln im weißen Haus Platz genommen hat." (Allentown *Unabhängige Republikaner*, 31 October 1860 [LCHS].)

<sup>35</sup> "SCHWARZ-REPUBLIKANISCHE UNIONS-ZERSTÖRUNGS-FALLE . . . Die Blockhütte ist in Wahrheit nur eine Abolitionisten-Falle, aber bezeichnet als 'Abe Lincoln's Grocery,' um die leichtgläubigen Stimmgeber an das große Fass unten zu trinken" (*ibid.*).

<sup>36</sup> "Wo sind die KNOW NOTHINGS? Antwort: In der republikanischen Partei." The editorial then proceeds to list prominent Republicans who were known Know-Nothings: Banks, Putnam, Henry Winter Davis, Bates, etc. (*Reading Adler*, 9 October 1860 [HSBC]).

<sup>37</sup> Hellerich, 93: "Implicit in the Democratic position was the assumption of inherited black inferiority to whites and the further assumption that any workable system of race relations rested upon the legal subordination of blacks to whites."

<sup>38</sup> Bruce Levine notes that "nowhere did nativists exercise more power within Republican ranks than in Pennsylvania" (*The Spirit of 1848*, 241). He also argues, "despite both ethnic and class qualms, most organized German craftworkers and other radical democratic organizations evidently supported Lincoln in 1860. The Democratic Party, on the other hand, found strong German support among rural voters generally and those urban dwellers (such as unskilled laborers) less identified with social and political radicalism and more closely tied to the Catholic and conservative Protestant clergy" (250). Levine's last point about the general conservatism of staunch German Protestants may be supported by papers such as the Allentown *Friedens-Bote*, which continually referred contemporary political events to biblical parallels.

<sup>39</sup> "Diese unconstitutionellen Staatsgesetze gegen constitutionell garantierte Rechte müssen fallen, wenn der Süden zufriedengestellt werden soll. . . . Alle Nullification und Sezession im Süden ist nur das Echo solcher Maßregeln im Norden, welche zufolge der Wahl Lincolns dem Süden noch gefahrdrohender erscheinen müssen als früher" (*Unabhängige Republikaner*, 28 November 1860 [LCHS]).

<sup>40</sup> "Die nördlichen Demokraten hielten oder ausgaben, nur allzu klar, dass die Vorgänge im Süden und dass die Resultate davon die Störung aller Geschäfte im Norden der bitterste Ernst sind.



Wenige nur haben wahrscheinlich den vollen Umfang des Urtheils vorausgesehen oder nur vorausgeahnt, das zufolge eines Wahlsieges einer rein sektionellen Partei über das gesamte Land und über das ganze Volk kommen kann." (*Unabhängige Republikaner*, 28 November 1860, and subsequent issues for November and December 1860 [LCHS]; also see the *Reading Adler* for these months for concurring opinions [HSBC].)

<sup>41</sup> "—vor der daraus hervorgehenden Störung des öffentlichen Vertrauens, des Credits und vor dem Ruin welcher dadurch über allen Verkehr und alle Industrie und über die Arbeitermassen des ganzen Landes hereinbrechen müsste.

Alles war auf dem besten Weg zu einem neuen glänzenden Geschäftsaufschwung—da mit einem Schlag ist Alles wie abgebrochen, wie vernichtet.

Mit einem Wort die Agitation und das Auftreten der republikanischen Partei ist der Grund dieser drohenden Krisis. . . . Mit einer solchen Partei kann das Land nicht den inneren Frieden genießen." (Ibid., and subsequent issues for November and December 1860.)

<sup>42</sup> The originals of these quotations appear in the next note.

<sup>43</sup> "Nun, wir für unser Theil haben keinen Gedanken, dass die Sache je durch eine Veränderung der Constitution oder durch irgend andere Compromisse beseitigt werden kann, denn selbst die demokratische Partei konnte bei ihrer Convention sich ja nicht wegen dem ewigen Neger einigen.

. . . Nie wird der Norden einwilligen, dass es den südlichen Negerzüchtern erlaubt wird, ihre Sklaven hierher zu bringen, und dass wir dieselbe dann beschützen sollen, wie dies die Südländer begehren. Nein, unsere Bauern würden sich vor denselben sicher in der höchsten Gefahr glauben.

Die Sklavenzüchter haben daher weiter nichts zu tun, als sich der Entscheidung der Mehrheit des Volkes—dem Grundpfeiler worauf unsere Regierungsform ruht—zu fügen, wie dies ihre Pflicht ist—wollen sie dies aber nicht, so müssen sie also Feinde ihres Vaterlandes—ja geradezu als Hochverräter betrachtet und behandelt werden.

. . . Wer für die Aufrechthaltung der Constitution und der Gesetze, für Freiheit und für den Fortbestand der Union ist, der tadelt mit Recht, das Verfahren der südlichen Unionzerstörer oder Hochverräter—und wer gegen die Gesetze, gegen die Constitution, gegen die Freiheit und gegen unsere glorreiche Union ist, der spricht und handelt zu Gunsten der südlichen Landsverräter und Tories." (*Lecha Allentown Patriot*, 30 December 1860 [copy, LCHS]; also see 9, 16 and 23 December 1860.)

<sup>44</sup> Under the 1862 Homestead Act, which promised cheap land in the western territories to new settlers, this possibility moved closer to reality.

<sup>45</sup> "Die Minderheit will herrschen, oder den Sieg mit dem Schwert erringen.

Es möchte vielleicht ein lieber Leser einwenden und hierauf antworten, kein Wunder, dass der Süden nun rebellisch wird und sich trennen will; der Norden will ja dem Süden seine Rechte bestreiten.

Was ist die Ursache . . . unserer letzten harten Zeit? Ist es die Folge des Sieges unserer letzten Wahl oder ein Strafgericht der hohen Vorsehung? Antwort: in der Geschichte vergangener Zeiten finden wir, dass die Väter oft um ihrer Sünden und Ungerechtigkeiten willen gestraft wurden." (*Skippackville Neutralist und Allgemeine Neuigkeits-Bote*, 1 January 1861 [SFL].)

<sup>46</sup> These denominations all stressed pacifism in the resolution of conflicts. Statements like that which appeared in the *Neutralist* would mesh nicely with their theological doctrines. Later during the Civil War, the Amish and Mennonites contributed high numbers of conscientious objectors to the draft; see Frederic Klees, *The Pennsylvania Dutch* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1950), and William T. Parsons, *The Pennsylvania Dutch: A Persistent Minority* (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1976).

<sup>47</sup> "Wenn die Editoren des "Unabhängigen Republikaners" den Grundsatz etabliren wollen, dass wir kein Recht haben einen Mann als President zu erwählen, gegen den der Süden keine Stimme gibt—und dass wenn wir thun—sie die Union trennen wollen—warum tragen sie dann ihren Patriotismus nicht dahin aus, dass sie einen Anhang zu der Constitution vorschlagen, dass Niemand zu einer Stimme berechtigt sein soll, außer er geht geradezu über Kopf und Ohren für die demokratische Union-Zerstörungs-Partei . . . ? Schande! Schande!! Schande!!!" (*Lecha Allentown Patriot*, 2 January 1861 [LCHS].)

<sup>48</sup> "Wollen wir auf unseren Rechten beharren, oder wollen wir dieselben samt derjenigen unserer Nachkommen an die Füße der gedachten südlichen Kassendieben und Landesverräter hinlegen? . . . . Ja, im Norden halten wir uns an die alte Constitution unserer Väter, und sind



entschlossen dieselbe aufrecht zu erhalten—und wer sich derselben durch Gewalt entgensetzt, der ist ein Landesverrätter, und hat selbst die Folgen für sich . . .

DIE ZEITEN SIND HART, Das Geld ist rar—die Union ist in Gefahr—und muss erhalten werden, und der einzige Weg, dieselbe zu erhalten ist, die Füße warm und die Köpfe kühl zu halten." (Ibid.)

<sup>49</sup> South Carolinian George Fitzhugh was a prominent prewar apologist for Southern slavery. Emphasizing the "positive" benefits of slavery for the slaves, he denounced Northern wage slavery in his incendiary *Cannibals All!*

"Nun ist die einfache Frage: was ist das Beste—die Union mit einigen Neger in den Territorien, oder Trennung der Union ohne Neger in den Territorien?"

. . . Nun haben die 'Feuerfresser' einen Bürgerkrieg in nahe Aussicht gestellt und ich fürchte sehr, dass es dann besonders gegen die 'Ausländer' losgehen wird, die hier von den Amerikanern alle als Abolitionisten und 'Black-Republicans' angesehen werden.

Es wäre am allerbesten, wenn die Deutschen im Norden sich nicht in die Sklaverei hier im Süden mischen würden. Die Neger haben es hier besser als ich und besser als die weißen Arbeiter im Norden. Ich wohne vier Jahre im Süden und weiß, wie es um die Sache beschaffen ist." (*Unabhängige Republikaner*, 9 January 1861 [LCHS].)

<sup>50</sup> "Jede Stunde vergrößert die Gefahr eines blutigen Bürgerkrieges und der gewaltsamen Auflösung einer Union, welche unter schweren Opfern durch den Geist der Friedfertigkeit geschaffen wurde und nur durch gegenseitige Nachsicht.

Übrigens wollen wir hoffen, dass diese Armee von 100,000 Mann aus den republikanischen Reihen aufgemacht wird, die auch das Stimmen gethan haben, wodurch dieser Bürgerzwist verursacht wurde.

. . . Aber leider hat die in Macht stehende Republikanische Partei der letzten Staaten den Willen [zum Compromiss] nicht. Ihre Partei ist ihnen wichtiger als die Union und so wird endlich der ganze Süden in einer abgesonderten südlichen Conföderation suchen müssen." (*Unabhängige Republikaner*, 30 January 1861; see also the February issues for similar sentiments.)

<sup>51</sup> "Sollte der Congress nicht dieses oder ein anderes Amendment zur Constitution sofort vorschlagen, so sollten die Bürger von Pennsylvanien durch Anwendung eines friedlichen Hilfsmittels Gelegenheit haben, die Auflösung der Union zu verhindern." (*Skippackville Neutralist und Allgemeine Neuigkeits-Bote*, 8 January 1861 [SFL].)

"FRIEDE UND KEIN KRIEG! Herr Editor! . . . Wie es scheint, kann oder will der Congress die Verwirrungen nicht lösen, obgleich die Crittenden'schen Beschlüsse so liberal, gerecht und gleichmäßig für alle Sectionen des Landes sind und die Wünsche und Billigung einer großen Mehrheit der Bürger dieser Union für sich haben . . . trotz alledem wird Nichts im Congress gethan, was unser Land vom Untergang retten könnte!

Was will das Volk? Frieden, und keinen Krieg! Wir müssen die Secession für das betrachten, was sie in Wirklichkeit ist und wie sie täglich mehr um sich greift. Die Union ist so gut wie aufgelöst. Wir sollten daher jedes gerechte und ehrbare Mittel ergreifen, um die schwebenden Missheiligkeiten auszugleichen. . . . Aber dieses kann nur durch gegenseitige Liebe und Freundschaft bewerkstelligt werden, nie durch Zwang. Der Anfang des Zwanges ist das Ende der Union!" (Ibid., 5 February 1861.)

<sup>52</sup> ". . . die republikanische Partei [ist] wie der Walfisch, welcher den Jonas verschluckte, nach wenigen Tagen gezwungen war, seine Beute wieder auf das feste Land auszuspeien, und die Demokratie warnt jetzt wie Jonas nach seiner Auslieferung vor den traurigen Dingen, die sich sicherlich ereignen werden, wenn nicht ein anderes Verfahren eingeschlagen wird." (*Allentown Friedens-Bote*, 6 February 1861 [SFL].)

"Unser Staat hatte früher, und hat jetzt noch, großen Einfluss bei den übrigen Staaten, und wenn er jetzt den südlichen Staaten mit ausgestreckten Händen entgegentritt und es als seinen Entschluss verkündet, dass allen Staaten gleiches Recht werde, dann glaube ich, wird der Fluth der Sezession Einhalt gethan." (Ibid., 13 February 1861.)

"Das jeder wahre und aufrichtige Freund der Erhaltung der Union, unbeschadet aller seiner bisherigen Ansichten, sich verpflichtet fühlen muss, die volle Gleichberechtigung der südlichen Staaten anzuerkennen und ihre gerechten Forderungen zu genehmigen." (*Reading Adler*, 15 January 1861 [HSBC].)



<sup>53</sup> See the various issues of the *Lecha Allentown Patriot*, *Unabhängige Republikaner*, *Allentown Friedens-Bote*, the Skippackville *Neutralist* und *Allgemeine Neuigkeits-Bote* and the *Reading Adler* for the months of February and March. For the interests of space, I have condensed their various editorials, letters and articles into the (admittedly) short paragraph above.

<sup>54</sup> "Es ist heute unser traurige Pflicht, einen der betrübendsten Abschnitte der amerikanischen Geschichte anzukündigen, nämlich den Beginn des wirklichen Kampfes zwischen verschiedenen Theilen der früheren Vereinigten Staaten.

... Krieg besteht also—ein Krieg zwischen Brüdern, die hiezuvor auf hundert Schlachtfeldern Seite an Seite gekämpft haben für Freiheit und Vaterland—und wann dieser Krieg wieder enden wird, weiß Gott allein.

... die Verhältnisse des Augenblicks zwingen den gesetzliebenden Bürger die Waffen in die Hand zu nehmen, um zu verhindern, dass alles staatlich und gesellschaftlich Bestehende in dem allgemeinen Konflikte untergehe. Daher ist im gegenwärtigen Augenblicke auch der ganze Norden einstimmig für die Unterstützung der Maßregeln des Präsidenten, daher sinkt der Meinungsstreit der Parteien in Nichts zusammen, vor der einen Frage, wie die dringende Gefahr dieser Lage am schnellsten und sichersten zu beseitigen sei.

Aber ein fanatischer, unverträglicher Geist hat immer mehr überhand genommen und schon vor Jahren sind Bittschriften auf Bittschriften von nördlichen Fanatikern für eine Trennung der Union wegen der Sklaverei eingereicht worden, noch was diesen nicht gelungen ist, haben jetzt die südlichen Secessionisten vollbracht." (*Unabhängige Republikaner*, 17 April 1861 [LCHS]; also see the *Allentown Friedens-Bote*, 23 April 1861 [SFL] for a less editorialized, but equally crestfallen tone of self-resignation in defense of the flag; for a good example of a complete reversal of position in a Democratic paper, see the 23 April 1861 edition of the *Reading Adler*, which was veritably overflowing with patriotic symbols and strong language urging its readers to defend the flag against those who had fired upon it [HSBC].)

<sup>55</sup> "Wir bedauern den armen Schlucker, und müssen ihm rathen die Sache etwas kühl zu nehmen, und zu bedenken, dass er sich selbst, und nicht uns, zu blamiren hat, dass er in seinen 'jetztigen Schuhen steht' . . . .

Er sagt die Regierung in Washington leide an einer ganzen Reihe von Krankheiten. Dies ist zum Theil richtig—denn sie leidet noch an einigen Krankheiten, besonders an der Auszehrung des Geldbeutels, welche Krankheit die demokratischen Leaders zurückgelassen haben. Die demokratische Diebstahls-Krankheit ist aber gänzlich curirt, indem alle jene Diebe sich nach dem demokratischen Süden begeben haben.

... Nun, wo ist noch ein menschliches Wesen, dass sich nicht schämen würde, einen solchen Ausdruck zu gebrauchen, bezüglich darauf, wenn der Vorschlag gemacht wird, dass man sich vorbereite unsere lieben Freiheiten, erkaufte durch das Blut unserer patriotischen Vorväter zu vertheidigen; und die Constitution und die Union aufrecht zu erhalten?

Wie erschrecklich kann doch ein Mensch sinken, wenn er sich einmal von dem Wege der Wahrheit und des Rechts ableiten lässt—denn das Nächste ist, dass er nur für das Wohl seiner Parthei besorgt ist, mag sie auch noch so corrupt sein, und wenn selbst dadurch unsere liebe Union auch in viele Trümmern gehen sollte.—O Herr!—vergib solchen Menschen ihre Missethaten! denn sie können unmöglich wissen, was sie thun—und noch viel weniger wissen, welche schreckliche Verantwortlichkeiten sie sich selbst durch solche Ausdrücke aufladen." (*Lecha Allentown Patriot*, 17 April 1861 [LCHS].)



