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The Deportation of Latin American Germans, 1941-47: Fresh Legs for Mr. Monroe's Doctrine

Commencing with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the State Department aided a dozen Latin American republics in deporting nearly 4,000 of their German nationals to the United States. There, the Justice Department interned them until most could be repatriated to the Fatherland.¹ But at war's end, and as late as 1947, hundreds of unrepatriated deportees remained. Eventually they, their families and descendants, became an integral part of the German American community. Why they found themselves in this position is the subject of this article.

The State Department did not remove the Germans from Latin America primarily for reasons of national security, the official explanation. Rather, the deportation program was a disingenuous plan—in keeping with historic United States objectives in the Western Hemisphere—to replace German economic interests in the region with those of the United States and cooperative republics. Concerned for years prior to the war about German economic and political influence in the Western Hemisphere, policy makers in the State Department capitalized on wartime fears about hemispheric military security to accomplish their scheme. United States diplomats also hoped this wartime opportunity would insure a level of postwar hemispheric cooperation under United States leadership undreamed of by earlier Pan Americanists.

There is abundant evidence of the pursuit of these objectives. As persuasive as any is a remarkably candid diplomatic message of January 1944 that unmasks the State Department's ultimate purpose. In it the American vice consul in Arequipa, Peru, urges the chargé in Lima to speed the deportation of Germans who were "extremely prejudicial to the interests of this country and our own" because they were nullifying "what benefits and security we may hope for in these [hemispheric] markets in the future." And in this the German Peruvians had terrific advantages over the Americans: they outnumbered the Americans by three to one, they came from wealthy families that had been in the country for years, and they had economic connections dating to the First World War. But the American disadvantages in 1944 were not, as one might expect during wartime, matters primarily of military security. For whether "these German

Nazi groups are engaged in actual acts of espionage or physical sabotage," the consul admits, "*is not conclusive or at issue*"² [emphasis added]. No, they were simply Germans with economic leverage in the Western Hemisphere that the United States coveted for itself and cooperative republics. Of course, the vice consul's disingenuousness about any real danger posed by the Germans simply echoed a State Department policy that had taken concrete form immediately after Pearl Harbor.

A United States desire for hemispheric hegemony was, of course, nothing new in 1941. Since 1823 the United States had confronted potential European imperialists with the Monroe Doctrine (then unenforceable), which the United States hoped would insulate the Western Hemisphere from alien European political and economic "systems," and by inference justify a sphere of influence for itself. But few Americans have ever heard of the unique application during World War II of a plan that, in effect, tried aggressively to accomplish Monroe's threat, short of appearing imperialistic to the other republics. Because of the deportation program's secrecy, no United States official explicitly tied the World War II removals to the Monroe Doctrine, but there is evidence that the State Department believed that Monroe's historic pronouncement justified its deportation policy.

Still, a specific deportation program did not materialize out of thin air after December 1941. First came five years of hurried psychological and logistical preparation.

Prewar Preparations

Hitler welcomed the geo-political possibilities in Latin America. His government established closer political and diplomatic ties with the other American republics, supported local fascist movements, and developed a trade relationship designed to swing the republics' loyalties in Germany's direction. Success must have seemed assured: most Latin American *Reichsdeutsche* (German citizens) had maintained an identity with the Fatherland through schools, newspapers, radio, and social organizations, and Nazi party membership in some of the republics, which was controlled by the *Auslands Organisation (AO)*, was the highest outside of Germany itself. But ominously for Nazi strategists, little acculturation had occurred.³

The potential for espionage in Latin America also interested Berlin; there the Nazis hoped to glean vital information about American ship movements and war preparations. But experts on the espionage war argue persuasively that the German intelligence apparatus was too "hastily built and poorly developed," and would not withstand a determined Anglo-American counterintelligence campaign. Moreover, the governments of the republics eventually reacted against German intrigue and reversed their friendly policies toward Germany.⁴ Official Washington, however, did not appreciate the seriousness of these difficulties, and chose instead a more apocalyptic interpretation of Germany's

solicitation of the republics. At first the State Department, the military, and President Franklin Roosevelt believed that the Germans intended an outright invasion of South America, but by mid-1940 this view changed to one that emphasized the danger within.

In late 1936 Secretary of State Cordell Hull began to worry seriously about an Axis threat to the Monroe Doctrine. He believed that local German leaders, led by the *AO*, were indeed organizing what he guessed to be the nearly 1.5 million *Reichsdeutsche* into "regiments of the Nazi party," and that the Third Reich had converted many American republics into virtual economic appendages. He came to fear, as did the president, that one or more of these German "colonies" would eventually threaten a local friendly government and provide a "fifth column" ready to assist a full-scale invasion.⁵

The State Department's first serious effort to counter German influence and to redirect loyalties in the republics toward the hemisphere took place at the Buenos Aires conference in December 1936, where the department tried but failed to get (due to Argentine objections) a unified commitment to what amounted to a conversion of the Monroe Doctrine into a formal defensive alliance.⁶

Then, beginning in 1938-39, and lasting until most of the Western Hemisphere entered the war officially in December 1941, the southern half of the hemisphere became rife with talk of Nazi plots against various Latin governments. In Washington in late 1938 officials believed that by themselves the republics would or could not resist the combined political, economic, and military threat from Germany. So again, this time at the Lima conference in December 1938, the State Department tried to squeeze a commitment to mutual hemispheric action (which would have permitted American intervention) from the reluctant delegates, only to be rebuffed once more by Argentina.⁷

In 1938 the War and Navy departments had agreed to a new "hemisphere defense" mission and began to work with the State Department to implement it. Early in 1939 the United States Army War College revived a secret commission to plan military support for Brazil and Venezuela, and President Roosevelt announced that the United States intended to match "force with force" to defend the hemisphere. It appeared that Germany might establish itself militarily on the bulge of Brazil, and from there reach out to the Panama Canal and the United States proper. To prevent that possibility, in October 1939, a month after the start of the war in Europe, FDR approved an Army-Navy plan to defend South America as far as one hundred miles south of Recife, Brazil.⁸

With the onset of war in Europe in September 1939, and the subsequent disaster in France in June 1940, the republics became more willing to bend to Washington's wishes than they had been at Buenos Aires and Lima. News of the collapse of the Allies in Western Europe presented the likelihood of a German invasion of Brazil and German-led coups d'état in Chile and other republics.

President Roosevelt originally thought that a German attempt at conquest of the United States would come from Nazi-dominated, contiguous territories.

But his growing certainty that German plans for the Western Hemisphere consisted of "fifth column" subversion rather than a direct military assault led in 1939 to a policy of fighting "secrecy with secrecy." He dispatched the FBI to many of the republics, sent military missions to compete with and eventually replace German ones, and encouraged a commitment to mutual hemispheric defense. The new hemispheric partners also began the process of undermining German-controlled businesses, their first target being the airline industry (see below). Two scholars of this "shadow war" conclude that, "rarely have United States security interests and business opportunity so perfectly coalesced" with little or no complaint from Latin America.⁹

Perhaps the most important conclusion to be drawn from German military successes in Europe in summer 1940 was that "fifth columns" had made possible the fantastic gains. Events in Europe left no doubt in the War and State departments and the White House that the greatest danger to the Western Hemisphere now lay within the other republics among a sympathetic, determined, and well-organized Axis "fifth column." By late summer the idea of the "fifth column" had attained "colossal proportions in the American psyche." FDR told Congress that Americans must "recast their thinking about national protection." The consensus in FDR's cabinet was that "we will have to go whole hog on the Monroe Doctrine," or else. And the Military Intelligence Division (MID), or G-2, went so far as to assert that even the victims of Nazi oppression—the Jews—could not be trusted, either in the United States or in Latin America.¹⁰

How did the United States attempt to prevent a repeat of Europe in the Western Hemisphere? To begin, the War and Navy departments secretly dispatched several officers to nineteen Latin republics to negotiate bilateral agreements for hemisphere defense. Then, the foreign ministers of the republics, meeting at Havana in July 1940, pledged their governments to the eradication of anti-democratic doctrines in the hemisphere (a central purpose of the Monroe Doctrine), support for the Monroe Doctrine's "no-transfer" principle, a collective response to aggression anywhere in the hemisphere, opposition to "fifth column" subversion, and, ominously, the creation of emergency penal systems. Secretary of State Cordell Hull tried unsuccessfully to get the German government to respect the doctrine. But the *Führer's* men believed the United States was using Monroe's initiative to establish United States hegemony and coercive trading practices in the hemisphere, and contrary to United States emphasis it interpreted the original doctrine as an American pledge to stay out of European affairs.¹¹

Roosevelt, too, reacted more energetically than in 1939, in part with measures aimed at detaching the Latin economies from the German grip. He also expanded the FBI's intelligence role to include the entire Western Hemisphere.¹²

Having devoted so much of its energy to achieving Pan American unity at Havana, the State Department had no internal plan to counter Axis subversion

in Latin America prior to the appearance of a document drafted by Adolf Berle in September 1940: "German Inroads and Plans in the Other American Republics." Berle concluded that the Nazis planned to seize control of the Americas by subversion, and he urged that the department do something to determine the actual extent of the "fifth column" threat. As ever more reports of the danger of German influence in Latin America flowed into Washington, Berle authored another paper in February 1941 titled, "The Pattern of Nazi Organization and Their Activities in the Other American Republics," which indicted German commercial firms as disseminators of anti-United States propaganda, and asserted that "virtually all the [*Reichsdeutsche*] in Latin America are sincere supporters of the Nazi regime." The department sent copies of this provocative document—its impact on the subsequent deportation program is obvious—to all its embassies and consulates in the region, instructing them to supply any information about individuals and businesses that might support Berle's view of the danger. Unfortunately, much of what came back proved "wholly incorrect," and Secretary of State James Byrnes would reluctantly admit in 1945 that innocent people had been deported.¹³

From 1936 to 1941 the State Department, the military, and the president had set out to re-energize the Monroe Doctrine. On 7 December 1941, the Japanese seemed to have provided them with a justification for more severe measures that few would challenge.

Wartime Measures: Economic Warfare

Many, if not most, of the Germans selected for deportation owned or managed property and businesses that local governments and the State Department viewed as threats to the Monroe Doctrine. Thus, some of the steps taken to restore hemispheric insularity and solidarity focused on identifying and vesting those "foreign" economic interests, then deporting their owners and managers.

At the Third Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the American Republics at Rio de Janeiro in January 1942 the delegates laid the foundation for the elimination of German-controlled and dominated businesses. The ministers recommended cessation of all competitive commercial and financial intercourse between the Western Hemisphere and the Axis, a policy that hemispheric officials confirmed in uncompromising language in Washington during June-July 1942: "The businesses of any persons who were acting against the political and economic independence or security of the American republics 'shall be the object of forced transfer or total liquidation.'"¹⁴ In the United States the bureaucratic apparatus to accomplish this was already at hand.

The most important State Department agency involved with Latin America during World War II was the Office of Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (OCIAA), headed by Nelson A. Rockefeller. Established by FDR in August 1940, the OCIAA's principal assignment was to combat Axis commercial and

propaganda efforts. For example, it had primary responsibility for compiling the so-called "blacklist" of Axis-controlled commission houses and agencies, and in persuading American firms not to trade with them.¹⁵ One of Rockefeller's specific goals was to eliminate or supplant all Axis-controlled airlines.

German aviation in Latin America keyed United States worries about the Monroe Doctrine. After 1935 air transport in Latin America experienced rapid growth and technological progress, marked by two trends: expansion of German-owned airlines and the spread of German influence over locally owned companies. Although Pan American Airways had achieved the dominant role in Latin American aviation by 1938, it invariably faced vigorous challenges from airlines subsidized by the German and Italian governments. From 1934 to 1938 the route mileage of German and German-influenced airlines in South America doubled. Moreover, the German-controlled share of the entire South American network increased while that of the United States declined. Although German-controlled airlines were not necessarily a direct military threat, the United States government viewed German personnel and ground facilities as being of "paramount value to an invading German force," a "menace" to United States influence in South America, and an invaluable aid to any attempted coup.¹⁶

After the outbreak of war in 1939 Axis airlines engaged in observation of British and United States merchant shipping over the South Atlantic that officials characterized as "almost openly military." The OCIAA took the lead in removing the Axis-dominated and controlled airlines, and by December 1941 it had supplanted Axis-controlled airlines through the "blacklist" and replacement by local firms. Importantly, Washington officials viewed the consequences of these transfers as setting in motion "strong constructive factors in the postwar fabric of inter-American relations."¹⁷

Not everyone applauded the blacklisting policy. During World War I some Latin republics had objected to a similar procedure, but with the obvious power in 1941-42 of German, Italian, and Japanese interests in various republics, some republics refused to freeze certain companies' assets, totally ignored the list, or only partially complied. In Brazil the American ambassador, Jefferson Caffrey, came under severe criticism from the government and businessmen. On the eve of the Rio foreign ministers conference in January 1942 he wrote Hull that the blacklist had caused him "no end of trouble." Hull, who wanted most of all to be a "good neighbor" to the junior states of the hemisphere, took a more positive view of the blacklist than Caffrey. After the war the secretary proudly reported that, "many Republics took over the Axis business houses which we had placed on our so-called Proclaimed List."¹⁸

Despite the republics and Ambassador Caffrey's objections to the blacklist, most attempts in Latin America to shove aside German interests went America's way. What happened in Mexico typified a successful United States technique. Initially, Mexico had been reluctant to undertake joint anti-subversion efforts. But in June 1940 President Roosevelt received encouraging news from Ambassador Josephus Daniels about a new cooperative attitude that led the

president to conclude that the de-Germanization of business in Mexico was "well in hand." Building on that progress, two years later FDR offered Mexican president Manuel Avila Camacho "all possible assistance" in Mexico's efforts to nationalize the drug and chemical firms that had been seized and were now "controlled" by the United States Alien Property Custodian. By September 1943 the United States had fashioned an arrangement with Mexico to create a Mexican holding company in which the United States would be represented. Mexico also agreed to consolidate its chemical and pharmaceutical companies with the German firms seized in the United States.¹⁹

There were other successes. At the beginning of the war the German community in Guatemala numbered about five to six thousand, mainly Guatemalans of German origin. According to an FBI estimate of July 1944, Nazi influences in the 1930s had attracted nearly every German in Guatemala. In the Department of Alta Verapaz, one of the country's richest coffee producing regions, the Germans' economic and social influence far outdistanced that of the native population. Prior to the war, the Germans owned and exploited most of the coffee *fincas* (properties), exercising absolute control over more than 50 percent of the people of Alta Verapaz; Germans owned 60 percent of the property outright and controlled an additional 20 percent. This relatively small but economically influential group had supported President Jorge Ubico's dictatorship loyally. But the Germans were vulnerable. Assimilation had been only skin deep, and the epidermal layers harbored plenty of native suspicion and resentment. As war neared, a government decree in May 1939 drove the Nazis' public activities underground.²⁰

Other anti-German actions soon followed. On the heels of Guatemala's declaration of war on Germany on 11 December 1941, and at the behest of officials in Washington, Ubico (whom the FBI admitted was possibly "the most absolute dictator in Latin America" and an admirer of the German military machine) took extensive action against "totalitarian forces in Guatemala." Together, the United States and Guatemalan governments struck at German firms that were "important factors in any German plans for domination of Guatemala," primarily banking, coffee exporting, and hardware. The FBI later bragged (discreetly omitting the key role played by the United States) that the actions of the Guatemalan government after 1941 had "rid the Republic of the extensive commercial, economic, and financial control exercised by German nationals."²¹

The deportations (see below) of the Germans who controlled these assets began in January 1942; the United States interned more persons from Guatemala than from any other republic except Peru. By mid-1944 the FBI satisfied itself that the deportation program had seriously eroded German political organization and activity in Guatemala. In one example from hundreds cited by the FBI, Hugo Dröge, a powerful Alta Verapaz coffee grower, who claimed on NBC's *Dateline* ("Roundup") in November 1994 that he had been "kidnapped" as an exchange pawn, was instead deported, according to the FBI, due to his

membership in the German Club in Coban (the focal point of Nazi activity in the district) and the Guatemalan Nazi Party. In June 1944, just before his downfall, Ubico decreed the expropriation of all coffee estates belonging to such Germans.²² Not only had the joint efforts of the two countries succeeded in eliminating German political and economic influence from Guatemala, at least temporarily, the United States received other benefits from its post-Pearl Harbor relations (described by the FBI as "excellent") with that republic: shipments of strategic materials such as quinine, rubber, mica, quartz, chromium, vegetable fiber, and mahogany, as well as "all facilities requested in connection with military installations."²³

Wartime Measures: Internment

Within days of Pearl Harbor all of the Latin American republics except Argentina and Chile broke relations with the Axis and agreed to cooperate with the United States in a program of enemy alien detention; most, but not all, issued war declarations of their own in short order. Under determined American leadership the agreements necessary for a hemispheric detention plan emerged in January 1942 at the Rio conference. A high-ranking official in the State Department wrote on the eve of the meeting that "our objective [should] continue to be the *sterilization*, or, whenever feasible, the *elimination* of Axis financial and economic influences in the hemisphere" [emphasis added]. To accomplish this as cheaply as possible the State Department believed it imperative that the republics establish their own detention programs.²⁴

But due to the political influence of Axis citizens in the other republics, especially the Germans, measures of strict political control by the host countries could not be guaranteed. To face this problem the chief American delegate, Sumner Welles, presented a draft destined to become Resolution 17 of the Rio concord. He urged the ministers to provide for "adequate detention of dangerous Axis nationals and for the deportation of such persons to another American republic [the United States] for detention when adequate local . . . facilities were lacking." The American resolution, which was based on anti-enemy alien practices already in use in the United States, and adopted in Rio "practically in its entirety," also authorized the Governing Board of the Pan American Union to elect a committee (the Emergency Advisory Committee for Political Defense [CPD]) to coordinate hemispheric defense against espionage, sabotage, and subversive propaganda by Axis agents.²⁵

The State Department viewed the CPD as a far-reaching instrument of "political warfare" and a "stabilizing element of the greatest value in the inter-American machinery." At the Justice Department, Lawrence M. Smith, who was instrumental in preparing Resolution 17, shared this view and praised the ministers for moving toward a "post-war reconstruction of world order" in which it had become "indispensable to undertake the immediate study of the

bases for this *new economic and political order*" [emphasis added]. The CPD began regular meetings in Montevideo, Uruguay, in April 1942.²⁶

Throughout the war the CPD authored a total of twenty-nine resolutions on political defense, including the control of dangerous aliens. The CPD took the presence of any Germans in the hemisphere as confirmation of an Axis plan for world domination: Germany controlled a "large and intricate network of subversive agents and organizations . . . assiduously engaged in undermining the democratic institutions of the Continent." Thus the committee's primary goal was a program of detention "to deprive all dangerous Axis agents *and nationals* [emphasis added] of their liberty . . . and of their power to jeopardize the security of the Hemisphere."²⁷

In May 1943 the CPD adopted Resolution 20, its most important regarding subversive activities and internment, and, again, one clearly modeled on domestic American practice in the field of counter subversion. To be classified as "dangerous" one needed only to reveal a "predisposition" to aid the Axis by: (1) affiliation or active support of a pro-Axis organization or group, (2) conduct "giving sufficient grounds" to believe a person had or was likely to engage in espionage and/or sabotage, (3) dissemination of totalitarian propaganda or incitement of others to act for an Axis state, (4) adherence to totalitarian ideology or a pronounced sympathy for it, or (5) "any other conduct" indicating an intention to prejudice the defense and security of any American Republic in the interest of an Axis state.²⁸ Unquestionably, such broad and vague language gave authorities wide latitude in making arrests.

Significantly, the CPD recommended internment over repatriation as the best defense against enemy agents and nationals. Why provide the Axis with informed and trained agents by returning them to Germany, it reasoned. Exceptions would be made for officials, but by 1943 the Committee concluded that very few of them remained. As for "ordinary citizens," the CPD empathized with Latin Americans in Axis hands, but in its view their detention did not justify "any general program for their exchange."²⁹

In order to promote detention, the State Department cited the successes of United States domestic counter subversion and internment programs. Apparently without the slightest embarrassment, Welles boasted that in the United States "a total of some sixteen thousand organizations and branches . . . are kept under constant surveillance . . . even though they do not appear to be subversive in character." The United States also invited the CPD to send a delegation to Washington during July-August 1943 for a "consultative visit" hosted by the Justice Department. There the delegates participated in technical briefings (how to protect factories, register aliens, maintain internment camps, and so forth) and dutifully took notes as American officials moralized on how the United States had learned "to reconcile the liberal, democratic and republican principles . . . the granite-like foundations of its political organization, with the necessities imposed by the present emergency," and how in the United States the

"needs of collective security [had] always been tempered by high humanitarian considerations [never] brushed aside in that exemplary democracy."³⁰

Part of the rationale, too, was that the internment option in the United States would encourage more vigorous local detention programs, which authorities in Washington viewed as the cheapest solution to the security problem. The highest officials in the American government concurred: the secretaries of war and state, the attorney general, and the president. But before Attorney General Francis Biddle agreed to take responsibility for Latin America's undesirable Germans, he insisted on a direct order from the president, and advised that the deportation-internment policy should be made public.³¹

Eventually, sixteen republics set up local detention centers in their own non-vital areas and negotiated bilateral agreements with the United States to deport enemy aliens to "other Republics." Most of the republics accepted the United States offer of temporary internment until the internees could be repatriated in reciprocal exchanges to their native countries, a United States pledge many of the countries required. Some Caribbean republics and Peru sent their subversive aliens for internment in the United States without limitation concerning their disposition. But Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, and Mexico insisted on explicit guarantees before relinquishing theirs.³²

The State Department's Special War Problems Division (SWPD) handled all the arrangements for moving the Germans to the United States, mostly aboard army transports. Initially, the Americans housed some of the internees in Army and POW camps in the South, but eventually the United States established seven permanent civilian camps in New Mexico, Texas, Idaho, and North Dakota. The United States also incarcerated several hundred Latin American deportees at Ellis Island and other INS detention centers. None of the Germans brought to the United States had the right to remain after the war; by bureaucratic logic they would then be "illegal" immigrants and subject to reverse deportation. Although the State Department initially expected quick repatriation to the internees' home countries, by war's end nearly half of those brought to the United States remained there.³³

Wartime Measures: Deportation and Repatriation

Did the State Department arrange the German deportations in order to provide subjects for exchange, or did officials believe that deportation was essential to the department's long-range objectives in the Western Hemisphere?³⁴ To answer this important question, some background is necessary.

Repatriation planning on the American side had begun in September 1938, and coincidental with the Nazi blitz across the Polish frontier on 1 September 1939, the State Department established the SWPD to carry out orderly transfers.³⁵ The Geneva Prisoners of War Convention of 1929 limited repatriation to POWs and specified "official" civilians, such as diplomats and war correspondents. But with the outbreak of conflict in 1939, the International Red

Cross (IRC) negotiated an informal agreement among the signers of the Geneva Convention to apply the same principles of treatment and repatriation to "non-officials." Cordell Hull very much wanted this expansion of the convention, and successfully urged its acceptance on France, Britain, and Germany for good reason: the war had stranded more than 100,000 Americans in Europe. Remarkably, before the end of September 1939, half the Americans were already repatriated, and when the war resumed in earnest in spring 1940 only about 20,000 remained.³⁶

After the exchange of war declarations between the Axis and the United States in December 1941, Germany and the United States worked out a plan to exchange all stranded nationals, interned or not, with the proviso that either government could selectively withhold whom it wished. Then, technical and logistical difficulties delayed implementation of the exchanges well into 1942. In order to move the negotiations along the United States arranged for the inclusion of stranded nationals of any interested American republic. All of the Latin governments that had initially broken relations with the Axis agreed to participate except Brazil, Uruguay, and Paraguay.³⁷ Predictably, such delicate arrangements with an enemy country in wartime did not go smoothly.

For the first repatriation cycle, which commenced in Europe in April 1942, the United States chartered the Swedish steamship *Drottningholm*. But American officials decided that no one should be repatriated to Germany who might be of assistance to the enemy physically or intellectually. This made it difficult to find enough Germans to send back on the second voyage. Hull explained to Roosevelt in August that negotiations with Germany for future swaps had thus ceased for strategic reasons: "The persons we were receiving were not such as to benefit our war effort," and even though the United States had an obligation to return "some persons" to Germany, "We may . . . send [only] those we desire." The American administration also used the pretext of the German demand that the United States change its port of call (New York) to conform to the strictures of its submarine campaign in the North Atlantic. The next exchange occurred only in 1943.³⁸

The key letter from Secretary of State Hull to President Roosevelt in August 1942 shows that the United States had little interest in repatriating Germans just to retrieve Americans from Europe. Instead, Hull focused almost exclusively—obsessively—on the need to remove "dangerous" Germans from the hemisphere, and to help some American republics repatriate "undesirable" Germans in order to retrieve Latin American nationals in German hands.³⁹

The bulk of Hull's report dealt with the roughly 1,200 Germans still in Latin America—again, a very small number when one considers the total number of Germans in the region—whose "presence there raises very serious questions relating to our continental safety." To its dismay, however, the United States had to admit that the other republics were "neither psychologically nor politically organized" for strict control of enemy aliens.

Beyond the select crop of Germans that the United States still owed Germany, Hull proposed that the administration continue its efforts to get all remaining "dangerous" Germans out of South and Central America (1) in a direct exchange with Germany, if practicable, (2) to the United States for internment if they could not be exchanged directly, or (3) to the United States and then to Germany "if no other way remains of removing them from those countries." If none of those goals could be achieved, Hull suggested that the Germans be interned in the republics, "the least promising of complete success."⁴⁰

But moving Axis aliens from Latin America directly to Europe—or first to the United States—encountered obstruction from an unexpected source: Great Britain. The Royal Navy was essential in providing safe conduct for the repatriation transports, but Britain didn't want the Germans returned to Europe where they directly threatened *its* war interests. So, Undersecretary of State Welles wrote to Lord Halifax, the British Foreign Minister, that the United States government could "not break faith with the American republics which have sent enemy aliens to the United States" by not repatriating them. It appeared to Welles that such a breach would discourage some republics from sending their enemy aliens to the United States for internment, including the South American republics, of which none, as yet, was at war with the Axis. Welles warned: "Unless concurrence [for safe passage] is received promptly the whole plan for removal of this menace from the Western Hemisphere will be seriously jeopardized."⁴¹

There were other problems. Not only did Britain balk at providing safe conduct across the Atlantic for its mortal enemies, it also objected—as did some United States investigating agencies (MID and the FBI)—to the removal of specific enemy aliens to Germany directly from South American ports. Adding to the problem, the strapped War Department had no ships for the deportations; the German government became "disinclined" to affirm safe conduct for voyages from New York to Lisbon; and United States officials realized there were more enemy aliens in the Western Hemisphere than there were nationals of the American republics held in Germany. Thus, any new quid-pro-quo exchange would not solve the hemispheric "security" problem. To fix that, one of Long's assistants recommended that in future the United States remove only "really dangerous" aliens and seek consent from the relevant government for internment—not repatriation—of those objected to by British or American investigators. It was understood that this might mean retaliation against hemispheric nationals in Germany and perhaps the discontinuance of the exchange agreement. But an official in the State Department's Division of the American Republics countered that if objections to the transport of certain aliens threatened to overthrow the "whole repatriation effort, then those objections . . . [should] be overruled."⁴²

Yet without the enticement of repatriation the United States could not hope to get some of the republics to agree to the deportations. Direct agreements might have worked, but because the republics south of the Panama

Canal had not yet declared war in mid-1942, some in the State Department reasoned that Germany would never allow those republics to exchange only German nationals selected by the United States.⁴³

Still more complications surfaced. By mid-1942 INS had custody of 1,393 Axis aliens from the other republics, 783 of them German, and all of them likely to remain in the United States indefinitely where they would be the responsibility of the Justice Department. To this, Attorney General Biddle balked; as yet he had no camps for them. Either return them from whence they came, he insisted, or give each a hearing, followed by release, parole, or internment as was the practice for domestic enemy aliens. The State Department did its best to reassure the skittish Biddle that recent and ongoing repatriations would relieve his department of responsibility for most of the enemy aliens. While suggesting to Biddle that of course he could proceed as he saw fit, the State Department official also reminded the attorney general that a majority of the detainees had been expelled from the other republics as "objectional enemy aliens," and to return them would diminish United States prestige in the other American republics and re-establish Axis agents in the "very place where the Axis governments wished them." Thus was Francis Biddle warned that his objections might jeopardize hemispheric security and long-range United States interests.⁴⁴ As more of the South American republics adopted war declarations in early fall 1942, the widening war forced Biddle's hand: his office now conceded that internment was the "preferable objective," and repatriation via the United States more to his liking than repatriation directly.

Then, in November 1942, the State Department reached an even more expansive conclusion; namely, that "*all German nationals* [in the other Republics] . . . and more individuals than might be expected among the political and racial refugees from Central Europe are . . . dangerous [agents] and should be removed from their present sphere of activity as rapidly as possible" [emphasis added]. Moreover, it was "particularly desirable that the repatriation of inherently harmless Axis nationals [wives and children] . . . be used to the greatest possible extent" in exchange for nationals of the other American republics.⁴⁵

The latter recommendation may have been prompted by the possibility that the repatriation program could now serve to rescue Jews from Nazi-occupied Europe. Jewish refugee groups had been pressuring the War Refugee Board (WRB) to use German nationals in the Western Hemisphere for this purpose, but in 1942 the State Department had rejected the idea on the ground that European governments-in-exile would likely protest that it favored Jews over non-Jews. Nonetheless, by May 1944 the CPD transmitted to the other American republics a modification of its policy favoring internment over exchange. The CPD had received information that Germany held approximately 2,000 people of "certain European racial or political minority groups" with visas issued by one or more of the American republics, and planned to murder them along with other Jews. The committee implored that urgent action be taken to

prevent their "annihilation." Secretary of State Hull assured the chair of the CPD that the United States would gladly participate in the rescue effort. Thus, 149 prisoners from Bergen-Belsen concentration camp with Latin American passports were among those exchanged in January 1945. Presumably the number of such people rescued would have been larger had more Germans in the Western Hemisphere agreed to be repatriated.⁴⁶

By August 1944 the other American republics had completed the deportation of 4,707 people of enemy ancestry (primarily German, Japanese, and Italian) to the United States. Of these, the United States repatriated 2,584, and kept 2,118 in internment. As there were hundreds of thousands of German nationals in Latin America, these selective deportations left no doubt what its perpetrators intended.⁴⁷

Postwar

The postwar period posed a dilemma for policy makers in the State Department who had struggled with the repatriation issue: their desire thereby to reshape hemispheric political and economic life, versus the wishes of other departments and agencies and many Latin American countries that the Germans not be sent back to Germany. Would victory over the Axis mean the end of the hemispheric "sterilization" program? And, having deposited thousands of Latin Germans in internment camps in the United States, would the State Department now return them to the other republics, repatriate them to Germany, or let them go? The answers to these questions proved extremely vexing in Washington during 1945-46, but to the historian they reveal much about the continuity of fundamental United States interests in the Western Hemisphere, of policymaking where no precedent existed, and the onset of the Cold War.

One month after VE-Day Assistant Secretary of State William L. Clayton explained to the Subcommittee on War Mobilization (Senate Committee on Military Affairs) the need to continue the Latin American elimination program. Indeed, that policy had just been renewed at the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace held at Mexico City during February-March 1945. Its Resolution 7 urged the republics to "intensify their efforts to eradicate the remaining centers of Axis subversive influence" and to take measures to prevent the return to Latin America "of deported persons wherever such return would be prejudicial to the future security of the Americas." The resolution explained that those who had been deported (mostly business entrepreneurs) had "distinguished themselves in aiding the Axis cause" and were "not to have another opportunity of abusing the privilege of residence in this hemisphere."⁴⁸

Clayton milked this theme in his appearance before the subcommittee in June 1945. He told the senators that the destruction of German aggression (which he considered incomplete) mandated "vigorous and simultaneous" action along a number of lines, one being toward "Axis economic penetration of Latin America," and the other, hemispheric solidarity and security: "No testimony of

mine is necessary," he illustrated, "to show the extent to which the United States has profited in obtaining bases and support in . . . the American republics." Clayton implied that department officials believed that the continued removal of the Latin American Germans would assure regional United States economic hegemony. In Latin America, he claimed, German capital still represented a large portion of total business investment in the republics, there being no competitive (replacement) industries capable of serving the essential requirements of the local economies.⁴⁹

Admittedly, Clayton continued, the selection and designation of enemy-controlled firms "to be eliminated" had presented "serious political problems" for the State Department, particularly in republics with strong opposition parties (i.e., democratic countries). Even more problematical, in countries that had not formally declared war on the Axis (i.e., Argentina and Chile) "the constitutional authority . . . to proceed with an elimination [replacement] program was open to serious question." And unfortunately the large numbers of Latin American citizens of German ancestry did not sufficiently appreciate the danger of German businesses and German aliens who had lived there for a long time. Clayton conceded finally that it was difficult to eliminate businesses from a local economy where there were no substitutes. To solve this problem the United States had tried to work with local governments to build up successor (replacement) enterprises and to make sure that they remained in the hands of local nationals. But this required tact: "We have been careful," Clayton persisted disingenuously, "to avoid actions which would afford the slightest justification for an accusation that the United States used economic warfare controls in order to further the economic interests of its nationals." Clayton's final words to the subcommittee manifest the State Department's plan to continue the "sterilization" program into the postwar era: "We naturally expect to . . . press for the elimination of such firms in those countries where the task is not already substantially accomplished." Thus, he confidently predicted, "German economic and political penetration in this hemisphere has, for the most part, been dealt a blow from which it will probably not recover."⁵⁰

What was the fate of the remaining deportees and internees? As the war dragged to its frightful climax, the State Department remained adamant—as Resolution 7 mandated that it should—that the Latin American internees not be sent south. One United States official feared that the intense pressure to do so from relatives and concerned governments would be the "undoing of [all] our labors." "Once back home," he reasoned, the internees would "have no cause to love us and will actively oppose our interests." They had to be returned to Germany for the sake of "*our long-range economic and political interests*"⁵¹ [emphasis added].

The horrific discoveries of the concentration camps in Germany at the end of the war reinforced this assessment. Those atrocities, Acting Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew wrote Stimson, "serve to emphasize the undesirable character . . . [of] Germans who have been unable to accustom themselves to the free and

democratic manner of life which the peoples of the Americas prefer." If they stay here "we may expect them . . . to work continually against us." But the supreme allied commander in Europe, Dwight Eisenhower, demurred, insisting that it was "impossible to accept them at present in view of the disturbed conditions in Germany."⁵²

Much to its dismay as well, the State Department discovered that while the end of the war lessened the danger from the Axis, it also dampened enthusiasm in other Washington departments for repatriation. The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), the custodial arm of the Justice Department, wanted simply to send the internees back to the countries from which they had been removed.⁵³ The INS hesitated to repatriate the Latin Germans because it had no evident legal authority to do so. Some of the Germans had filed habeas corpus suits, forcing the Justice Department to conclude that it could neither force their removal nor keep them in internment. Outright release seemed the only option. When Assistant Attorney General Herbert Wechsler challenged the State Department to justify its authority to remove the Latin internees, it could not. So, unable to reconcile their contrasting objectives, the two departments conspired to get the new president to do it by issuing a proclamation (which they drafted together) authorizing the secretary of state to order the legal removal of aliens sent to the United States from Latin America (now approximately 900 Germans and 1,300 Japanese) "who have no immigration status and are deemed by the Secretary of State to be dangerous to the safety of the nation and the security of the Hemisphere." President Harry Truman signed the proclamation on 8 September.⁵⁴

Meanwhile, some of the republics balked when they realized that former residents might not be coming home. A few of the deported Germans from Costa Rica had married native women, and the embassy in San José warned about "anti-American feelings which would be aroused . . . were we to insist on repatriating them." But Secretary of State James Byrnes reiterated the department's "deep feeling" that the internees not be allowed to remain in the hemisphere: "This Government intends to [repatriate Germans interned in] the United States whose activities prior to and including the war constituted symbols of Pan-Germanism regardless of mitigating circumstances such as family ties." The United States chargé in San José warned Byrnes that the Costa Rican supreme court had already issued a writ of habeas corpus directing its president to produce one of the internees held in the United States, and that other suits were likely. By this time, too, the plight of the Costa Rican Germans had stirred international interest. Pope Pius XII wrote Byrnes that fifteen of the internees and their families had "suffered enough" and ought to be given favorable consideration.⁵⁵

Costa Rica and the Vatican were not alone. Some State Department officials recalled that the government had agreed during its initial campaign to sell the republics on internment in the United States that it would not repatriate the internees without individual consent. The president of Peru was said—likely

for personal reasons—to be critical of his government’s “cooperation” in the wartime deportation program; his sister-in-law had married a German and died in a bombing raid on Hamburg. The Peruvian minister of justice had also married a German, and the minister of public health was the brother-in-law of one of the Class “A” (“dangerous”) internees. If that man were repatriated before the minister found out, some department personnel believed it might result in an embarrassing request for his return from Germany. But Byrnes remained adamant: of the 129 Germans and their families, he countered, 59 had signed petitions for repatriation and 23 refused to state their wishes, “thus indicating [a] desire not to go on record as being disloyal to the fatherland.”⁵⁶

The government of Peru continued to object to Byrnes’s logic, however, which elicited another rebuke from the State Department. Officials now explained that the Germans who the Peruvians had wished to deport during the war were not sent back to Germany at that time—except at the written request of the internee—because of “the personal danger to the internees which existed during wartime.”⁵⁷

Even Secretary Byrnes, however, could not hold out forever against the nearly unanimous objection of his diplomats in Latin America who were under intense local pressure. Thus, the period from fall 1945 through mid-1946 became one of careful review, adjustment, and eventual abandonment of repatriation, lest the State Department jeopardize its carefully cultivated “good neighbor” image, which was also, of course, a critical hemispheric political objective, arguably of higher priority than its economic agenda. To achieve this, however, the department had to forsake its cherished goal of hemispheric “sterilization” under the nominal authority of the Monroe Doctrine.

In early September 1945 the chief of the Division of Caribbean and Central American Affairs insisted on seeing proof of subversion before agreeing to repatriate Guatemalan citizens of German ancestry with Guatemalan children. Others in the department thought the Justice Department’s method of individual hearing boards might prove a useful compromise, particularly in cases where the strength of the evidence was insufficient to overcome strong political pressure from the interested governments. Besides, without “a continuing program of future controls” the United States could not expect to keep Germans out of the republics forever. Therefore, the revisionists argued, concentrate on a carefully selected group of Germans whose records show them to be “genuine leaders of Nazi activity against whom we have strong evidence,” and let the small fry go.⁵⁸

In October 1945 the State Department established the Alien Enemy Control Section to review the status of the Latin internees on a case by case basis, with individual hearings and a final determination by no less a figure than the assistant secretary for American Republic Affairs. Now, however, the authorities would have to verify the evidence on which the Germans had originally been deported so as to satisfy the fundamental question: “Were they ever dangerous?” But the American ambassador to Nicaragua, Fletcher Warren, strenuously objected to this new proposal, and accused the department of

opening the door to a resurgence of "Pan-Germanism." During the war, he argued, Nicaraguan officials had tried conscientiously to discover who their German enemies were, and arrests and deportations had been carried out by Nicaraguan authorities on the insistence of officials in Washington. Warren revealed that there had been little evidence of their guilt in 1941 and 1942 (or the United States would have found it), and he believed it would be "unrealistic" to expect to discover anything incriminating now.⁵⁹

Secretary of State Byrnes tried to reassure Warren that the department had not lost sight "of the absolute necessity for preventing the resurgence of Nazi influence in this hemisphere," but that the department could realize that goal only by concentrating on leading Nazis, not those who were merely—by reputation—sympathetic. This had been the Justice Department's way of handling domestic German aliens. But the State Department had made mistakes, Byrnes admitted frankly: "During the course of actual hostilities it may well have been necessary to round up and intern Germans and other Axis nationals on the basis of reputation and similar hearsay evidence." Yet, because repatriation might permanently sever families, the department now needed stricter standards of guilt: "There were some cases in which entirely harmless persons and persons with definite anti-Nazi inclinations were sent to this country for internment. . . . Such mistakes . . . must not be perpetuated."⁶⁰

Brushing aside Warren's concerns, the State Department implemented this change. It informed its embassies in the hemisphere that it could not repatriate alien enemies from other American republics "without the full consent and cooperation of the countries from which they came." First, unilateral action by the United States would damage "good neighbor" relations with the other republics; and second, it had suddenly dawned on the department that the Enemy Alien Act (1798), the ultimate statutory basis for internment and deportation, required that aliens be given the opportunity to "depart" voluntarily from the United States before being "removed." But in any case an alien could surely avoid repatriation to Germany after the war simply by obtaining a visa to another country.⁶¹

The State Department's position on repatriation continued to evolve throughout 1946. It asked twelve republics to decide whether they wanted their aliens and citizens back, or if they wanted the United States to decide whom to repatriate. The department agreed to return those who had taken no action on their Nazi sympathies. This approach, reasoned a spokesman, "closely paralleled" Justice Department guidelines in selecting domestic Germans for repatriation.⁶²

Three republics, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru, rejected this offer outright; they claimed never to have given up jurisdiction over the aliens deported to the United States in the first place. Other republics requested the return of some individuals, but did so without challenging the authority of the United States to make the final selection. Trying to find a face-saving accommodation, the department asked for the reaction of the republics to another policy

modification: on request, it would transfer responsibility for determining the disposition of the aliens still in the United States, but the treatment had to be uniform for each republic, and the United States would retain the right to a final determination of "dangerousness." In the meantime, the government would release all citizens of the republics and those aliens not thought dangerous, except to the three republics that had requested the return of all their aliens. Almost immediately the three republics in question, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru, demanded the return of their citizens. That ended the deportation-repatriation program. In March 1947 the State Department agreed to parole all the remaining German deportees.⁶³

Finally, turning to the economic front, the State Department proposed in February 1946 that the Proclaimed List (blacklist) be withdrawn as soon as local control programs had been put in place, perhaps as early as 8 May 1946, in all but Argentina. This latest abandonment of policy canon, like others, did not meet with universal approval among American diplomats to the south. But Britain had already decided to terminate its blacklist as too costly and counterproductive, and the foreign office pressured the Americans to follow suit. Finally, on 9 July the State Department formally announced the withdrawal of its blacklist, ending the effort begun five years earlier as a "weapon in the economic warfare program of the Allied nations."⁶⁴ Still, the department did not immediately lose interest in its "sterilization" project. A glance at the diplomatic correspondence of the United States during 1946 reveals a continuing State Department obsession with German economic power in the hemisphere, and its anxiety that the republics' replacement programs were not succeeding.⁶⁵

The war had presented a tantalizing opportunity to re-energize the Monroe Doctrine without too many questions being asked about traditional "Yankee imperialism," and in so doing to create a basis for the State Department's dream of a new level of postwar, inter-American cooperation. In the end, however, neither the other republics, which proved far less pliable to American will than had been anticipated, nor American officials had the endurance to see the sterilization and elimination plan through. As in Europe, a new threat to America's global interests had begun to convert old enemies into new allies. Among the other republics this meant an end to a war-necessitated solidarity with Washington, and in the State Department a rude awakening from the dream of full cooperation among "good neighbors" in the postwar era.

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Acknowledgments

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Notes

¹ Throughout, "deportation" refers to the transfer of German nationals to the United States; "repatriation" to their return to Germany. As with other wartime casualty figures, determining the number of deported Germans is difficult. An internal State Department document from June 1945 lists 3,116 Germans exchanged; 562 still interned in the United States; and 245 interned-at-large in the United States (National Archives [NA], Record Group [RG] 59, Records of the State Department, Decimal File, 1940-44 [hereafter Dec. File] 740.00115 EW/5-1745, Box 3567). Other reports do not differentiate between Germans, Japanese, and Italians. One of these states that by the end of the war a total of 7,064 Axis citizens had been taken into custody throughout Latin America. Of these, local governments incarcerated 2,172 and deported 5,893. Of those deported, 1,761 (plus their families) were repatriated (NA, RG 59, Records of the State Department, Special War Problems Division [SWPD], Subject Files, 1939-54 [hereafter SWPD Subj. Files], Box 116, German Nationals Repatriated from South and Central America).

² Mr. Dwyre to Jefferson Patterson, 30 Dec. 1943, and Geo. H. Butler (for the Chargé d'Affaires) to Secretary of State, 7 Jan. 1944, SWPD Subj. Files, Box 194, Peru 1945.

³ Donald M. McKale, *The Swastika Outside Germany* (Kent, OH, 1977), ix, 32, 41, 64-66, 86; David G. Haglund, *Latin America and the Transformation of United States Strategic Thought, 1936-1940* (Albuquerque, 1984), 54-55; Victor Andrade, *My Missions for Revolutionary Bolivia, 1944-1962* (Pittsburgh, 1976), 19-21.

⁴ Leslie B. Rout, Jr., and John F. Bratzel, *The Shadow War: German Espionage and United States Counterespionage in Latin America during World War II* (Frederick, MD, 1986), 9-10, 17-19; McKale, *Swastika*, 68, 87-88, 145.

⁵ Mark Skinner Watson, *United States Army in World War II: Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations* (Washington, 1950), 86-87; Cordell Hull, *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull* (New York, 1948), 1:495-96; Saul Friedlander, *Prelude to Downfall: Hitler and the United States, 1939-1941* (New York, 1967), 27-30; McKale, *Swastika*, 64-66, 86; Rout & Bratzel, *Shadow War*, 26-27. Estimates of the number of German nationals in Latin America vary. Louis De Jong, *The German Fifth Column in the Second World War* (New York, 1973), 25-33, says there were "millions" of Germans in Latin America. The Germans themselves claimed over a half-million in Brazil, 80,000-240,000 in Argentina, and 30,000 in Chile (not all of them German nationals). William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, *The Challenge to Isolation, 1937-1940* (New York, 1952), 610-11, claim no fewer than 300,000 native Germans (*Reichsdeutsche*) in Latin America, and an additional 1,250,000 of German descent (*Volksdeutsche*). The American ambassador to Brazil estimated 1.5 persons million of German descent lived there, plus 40,000-50,000 German nationals (Jefferson Caffrey to the Sec. St., 12 July 1940, "Fifth Column Activities in Brazil," Dec. File 832.00-N/169, Box 4466); Graham H. Stuart, "Special War Problems Division: Representation of Foreign Interests," *Dept. of State Bulletin* (6 August 1944), 147 (hereafter *DSB*).

⁶ The Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace (Rout and Bratzel, *Shadow War*, 25-26).

⁷ Haglund, *Transformation of United States Strategic Thought*, 16; Stetson Conn and Byron Fairchild, *United States Army in World War II: The Western Hemisphere: The Framework of Hemisphere Defense* (Washington, 1960), 5-6; De Jong, *German Fifth Column*, 25-27; William E. Kinsella, Jr., *Leadership in Isolation: FDR and the Origins of the Second World War* (Cambridge MA, 1978), 125-26; Breckenridge Long to The President, 18 Nov. 1938, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library (hereafter *FDRL*), PSF 50, Diplomatic Correspondence, South and Central America; Rout & Bratzel, *Shadow War*, 26.

⁸ Watson, *Prewar Plans and Preparations*, 88-90; Rout and Bratzel, *Shadow War*, 27, 30-31; Conn and Fairchild, *Framework*, 5-6. The Colombian government made a similar request in May 1939 (Welles to FDR, 29 May 1939, OF, Panama Canal, 25-I, 1938-39); Welles to FDR, 10 Dec. 1938, *FDRL*, OF, Box 11. Welles and the Secretary of the Treasury, Henry Morgenthau, Jr., discussed the problem of budgeting for this assistance force on 19 July 1939 (Telephone conversation, Morgenthau and Welles, "The Morgenthau Diaries," *FDRL*); De Jong, *German Fifth Column*, 25-27. FDR had decided early in 1939 that Germany's ultimate aim in controlling Europe was to position itself to dictate economic terms, and thereafter political terms, to Latin America. Hitler, he warned the cabinet, could thus strike a serious blow to the United States without landing a single soldier (Kinsella, *Leadership in Isolation*, 131).

⁹ Langer and Gleason, *Challenge to Isolation*, 607, 614-15; Conn and Fairchild, *Framework*, 5-6, 31-32, 36-37, 173-74; Randolph Harrison, Jr., to Hull, 31 May 1940, "German Activities in Brazil," Dec. File 832.00-N/125, Box 4466; Jefferson Caffrey to Hull, 12 July 1940, "Fifth Column Activities in Brazil," Dec. File 832.00-N/169, Box 4466; Hull, *Memoirs*, 1:602, 813-14, 820; Bowers to The President and the Secretary of State, 14 May 1940, and FDR to Bowers, 24 May 1940, FDRL, PSF: Chile; Rout & Bratzel, *Shadow War*, 27-29, 34-37; Watson, *Prewar Plans and Preparations*, 95-96; Haglund, *Transformation of United States Strategic Thought*, 124-25; Kinsella, *Leadership in Isolation*, 170-75. The Joint Planning Commission (JPC), the planning forum of the Army and Navy, reached much the same conclusion in April 1939: the gravity of the Axis challenge to the Monroe Doctrine was not a direct military assault, but Axis support of subversive activities. See also: Friedlander, *Prelude to Downfall*, 27-30; Gerald K. Haines, "Under the Eagle's Wing: The Franklin Roosevelt Administration Forges an American Hemisphere," *Diplomatic History* 1,4 (Fall 1977): 373, 376; S. Shepard Jones and Denys P. Myers, eds., *Documents on American Foreign Relations, January 1938-June 1939* (Boston, 1939), 61-63; Richard Gid Powers, *Secrecy and Power: The Life of J. Edgar Hoover* (New York, 1987), 251; De Jong, *German Fifth Column*, 25-27.

¹⁰ Haglund, *Transformation of United States Strategic Thought*, 169-70, 172, 182-83; Kinsella, *Leadership in Isolation*, 172; MID report, "Forms of Fifth Column Activity," Sept. 1940, copy in Morgenthau Diary, 24 Sept. 1940, 308: 98-106, FDRL, as cited in Haglund, *Transformation of United States Strategic Thought*, 164-65, 182-83.

¹¹ Rout and Bratzel, *Shadow War*, 29; Haglund, *Transformation of United States Strategic Thought*, 182, 210-14, 218-19; J. Lloyd Meham, *The United States and Inter-American Security, 1889-1960* (Austin, 1961), 207-08, 228. A Joint Congressional resolution warned Germany and Italy not to include any Latin American territory in their European armistice agreements (Hull, *Memoirs*, 1:816-17; 2:1139). The pertinent resolutions of the Havana Conference (July 1940) are 2-3, 5-7, and 15. Represented at Havana: Honduras, Haiti, Costa Rica, Mexico, Argentina, Uruguay, Ecuador, Bolivia, Chile, Brazil, Cuba, Paraguay, Panama, Colombia, Venezuela, El Salvador, Dominican Republic, Peru, Nicaragua, Guatemala, and the United States ("Havana Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs: Final Act and Convention," *DSB*, 24 Aug. 1940, 127-48, esp. 130-34); Langer and Gleason, *Challenge to Isolation*, 614. The resolutions taken by the foreign ministers at Havana against "fifth columns" laid the foundation for the establishment later of the Emergency Advisory Committee for Political Defense [CPD] (Mecham, *Inter-American Security*, 189-90). One expert on German influence in Latin America concludes that Germany had no organized "fifth column" in South America in spring 1940, only "the usual propaganda machinery" (Friedlander, *Prelude to Downfall*, 106). Wayne S. Cole, *Roosevelt & the Isolationists, 1932-1945* (Lincoln, 1983), 358, 362, argues that executive agreements with the other republics gave FDR the ability to outflank his isolationist opponents and to establish collective security as a cornerstone of United States policy first in the Western Hemisphere rather than in Europe.

¹² "Memorandum prepared by Asst. Sec. of State [A.A.] Berle, 24 June 1940"; Att. Gen. Francis Biddle to FDR, "Re: Intelligence work in Western Hemisphere," 22 Dec. 1941; "Memorandum for the President from Francis Biddle, 22 Dec. 1941"; and "Confidential Directive Issued on 23 Dec. 1941, by the President," OF 10B, JD, FBI, 1941-42, Box 11; Hoover to Gen. Edwin M. Watson, Secretary to the President, 25 Oct. 1940, OF 10B, Box 12, JD, FBI Rpts, 1940, "Report from Hoover #408"; "Confidential Memorandum on Internal Conditions and International Relations of Various Latin American Republics," 7 Jan. 1941; and Hoover to Watson, 31 Jan. 1941, FDRL, PSF 50, Diplomatic Correspondence: South and Central America. The 1942 FBI reports are: Hoover to Watson, 6 Mar., 3 & 8 Apr., OF 10B, Box 16, JD, FBI Rpts. #2004, #2071, #2079, and #2191-A (all FDRL); Haglund, *Transformation of United States Strategic Thought*, 210-14, 218-19; Langer and Gleason, *Challenge to Isolation*, 637; Hull, *Memoirs*, 1:816, 821-22, 828; Friedlander, *Prelude to Downfall*, 112, 225-26.

¹³ Rout and Bratzel, *Shadow War*, 31-33; Kinsella, *Leadership in Isolation*, 180-82, 219-20.

¹⁴ "Security Against Renewed German Aggression," *DSB* (1 July 1945): 23.

¹⁵ The State Department took on the blacklisting function in July 1941. Officially known as "The Proclaimed List of Certain Blocked Nationals," and used in conjunction with Canada and Great Britain, the list included "Axis branch companies" and approximately 8,000 individuals whose political views were "antagonistic to the Allied war effort" ("Security Against Renewed German Aggression," 24-25).

¹⁶ William A. M. Burden, *The Struggle for Airways in Latin America* (New York, 1943), 39-40, 46, 67-69.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 69-71. First labeled the Office for Coordinator of Commercial and Cultural Relations Between the American Republics, the OCIAA became the Office of Inter-American Affairs toward the end of the war (Irwin F. Gellman, *Good Neighbor Diplomacy: United States Policies in Latin America, 1933-1945* (Baltimore, 1979), 149, 153, 156-69; Conn and Fairchild, *Framework*, 196, 238, 240-43, 247-49). In June 1940 Pan American, in collaboration with the State Department and Colombian authorities, fired most of its German employees and created a new company owned jointly with Colombia. In turn, the fired German personnel set up a rival line, but it was bought out by the Colombia/Pan American group in 1941, and after the war the state and war departments agreed to reimburse Pan American for the expense of "de-Germanizing" Colombian airlines. The British objected strenuously to having the fired Germans repatriated as they had "more than enough German pilots to deal with already." So Colombian authorities interned the Germans there or sent them to the United States. See also, Claude C. Erb, "Prelude to Point Four: The Institute of Inter-American Affairs," *Diplomatic History* 9,3 (Summer 1985): 250; Burden, *Struggle for Airways*, 63.

¹⁸ Gellman, *Good Neighbor Diplomacy*, 164-65; The Ambassador in Brazil (Caffrey) to the Secretary of State, "Third Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the American Republics, Held at Rio De Janeiro, 15-28 January 1942," *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1942* (Washington, 1962). vol. 5 (hereafter FRUS). See 5:280ff for correspondence about the Proclaimed List. Hull, *Memoirs*, 2:1380, 1423-24.

¹⁹ Daniels to FDR, 28 June 1940, PSF: Mexico; FDR to Daniels, American Ambassador, Mexico, 17 June 1941, PSF, Box 44; Roosevelt to President Camacho, 24 June; Hull to Ambassador Messersmith, 24 June; Hull to Roosevelt, 23 June; "Memorandum for the President from Hull," 28 June; "Memorandum for the Secretary of State," 1 July 1943, PSF, Box 44, Dip. Corresp. Mexico; and Leo T. Crowley [Alien Property Custodian] to the President, 3 Sept. 1943, PSF, Box 44 (all FDRL).

²⁰ FBI, "Totalitarian Activities: Guatemala . . . Today," July 1944, RG 59, 814.00/8-944, Box 4205, 83-84, 92, 138.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 47-48, 88, 161-62. These actions included: control of the coffee plantations, freezing the funds of Proclaimed List Individuals, seizing the assets of German-owned railroads and boat lines, freezing Axis funds, adoption of the United States Proclaimed List of Certain Blocked Nationals, and complete governmental control over Proclaimed List Coffee Plantations (176-79).

²² *Ibid.*, 92, 115, 128, 138, 180-81, 192-93. 9 Jan. 1942: 116 deported for internment in the United States; 6 April 1942: 21 more for internment; June 1942: 777 voluntary repatriates; 16-19 Jan. 1943: 141 more for internment (making a total of 278 deported directly to the United States); 24 Oct. 1943: 68 more deportees, plus 51 wives and family members as voluntary internees (bringing the total number of deportees, including families, to 851). The expropriated estates, which later became a part of the *Fincas Nacionales* (National Property—130 large estates administered by the government), were distributed in 1952 in a land reform decree of President Jacobi Arbenz, himself overthrown in a CIA-led coup in 1954. In a period of eighteen months the Arbenz government gave land to about 500,000 peasants; the former workers on the estates became independent producers. But by July 1957 the post-Arbenz, pro-United States regime had chased all but 200 of these so-called "squatters" off the land (Piero Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944-1954* (Princeton, 1991), 20, 43, 150-51, 159, 381).

²³ *Ibid.*, 191.

²⁴ By 12 December all nine Central American and Caribbean republics had declared war on Japan, and by the New Year they had signed the United Nations Declaration and named Germany and Italy enemies as well. Colombia, Venezuela, and Mexico severed diplomatic relations with the Axis. By the end of 1943 thirteen republics had declared war, and six others had broken diplomatic relations. Argentina alone dissented. (Gellman, *Good Neighbor Diplomacy*, 120-21, 175); Stuart, "Representation of Foreign Interests," 146; United States Department of State, "Memorandum by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of State," Anglo-American Cooperation on Policies and Problems . . . Eastern and Western Hemispheres, 5 Jan., FRUS, 1942, 5:280; "Third Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics," *DSB* (7 Feb. 1942): 128-30.

²⁵ Marjorie M. Whiteman, ed., *Digest of International Law* 8 (Washington, 1967): 632-33 (hereafter *DIL*); "Third Meeting . . . American Republics," 128-30; Stuart, "Representation of Foreign

Interests," 146; The American Representative [Welles] to the Secretary of State, 1 Jan., *FRUS*, 1942, 5:40-41; Smith, "Memorandum for the Attorney General," 7 Feb. 1942, FDRL, Rowe Papers, Box 41, Spec. War Policies; "In Defense of the Americas Against Axis Political Aggression: The Emergency Advisory Committee for Political Defense," *DSB* (7 January 1945): 3.

²⁶ Sumner Welles, Undersecretary of State to Carl B. Spaeth, American Representative to the CPD, 28 May, *FRUS*, 1942, 5:81; Lawrence M.C. Smith, "The Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the American Republics," ca. 7 Feb. 1942, FDRL, Rowe Papers, Box 41, Spec. War Policies; Mecham, *Inter-American Security*, 212-13, 227-28; "In Defense of the Americas," 3.

²⁷ Mecham, *Inter-American Security*, 229-30; *DIL*, 8:628-29.

²⁸ *DIL*, 8:625-27, 631.

²⁹ "Detention and Expulsion of Dangerous Axis Agents and Nationals," 21 May 1943, NA, RG 60, Records of the Department of Justice, Special War Policies Division (SWPD), Records of the Latin American Section, 1942-45, Entry 291, Box 1, Res. XX.

³⁰ Welles to the Chairman of the CPD (Guani), "Third Meeting of the Foreign Ministers," 4 Sept. *FRUS*, 1942, 5:90-92; CPD, "Report of the Delegation of the EACPD . . . 16 June 1944, SWPD Subj. Files, Box 129, To and From Justice Re: Enemy Aliens.

³¹ Stimson to Hull, 29 Dec. 1941, Dec. File 740.00115 EW1939/1646, Box 2819; Meeting, Long and FDR, 28 Jan. 1942, Library of Congress (hereafter LOC), Papers of Breckenridge Long, Box 5; Francis Biddle to Secretary of State, 7 Aug. 1942, Dec. File 740.00115 EW1939/4094, Box 2832; Avra Warren to Breckenridge Long, 19 Mar. 1942, Dec. File 740.00115 EW1939/2439, Box 2822; Fletcher Warren to Avra Warren, 19 Mar. 1942, Dec. File 740.00115 EW1939/2440, Box 2822.

³² *DIL*, 8:630, 632-33. The other republics interned as many as 8,500 enemy aliens, the vast majority of them locally. A State Department report of 10 Sept. 1942, reveals the existence of internment facilities in Argentina, Brazil, Nicaragua, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Haiti, Mexico, and Panama (To Whitney Young, Dept. of State, Div. of the American Republics, Dec. File 740.00115 EW1939/4532, Box 2834); Harvey Strum, "Jewish Internees in the American South, 1942-1945," *American Jewish Archives* 42,1 (Fall/Winter 1990): 30; Stuart, "Representation of Foreign Interests," 147; Hull to Roosevelt, 27 Aug. 1942, FDRL, PSF, Box 9.

³³ Stuart, "Representation of Foreign Interests," 146-47.

³⁴ Some investigators claim that the United States "kidnapped" the alien enemies in order to exchange them for citizens of the republics in Axis hands ("Roundup," *NBC Dateline*, 29 Nov. 1994; John Eric Schmitz, "Democracy Under Stress: The Internment of German-Americans in World War II" [Ph.D. diss., North Carolina State University, 1993], 3, 112-13). See also, Michi Weglyn, *Years of Infamy: The Untold Story of America's Concentration Camps* (1976; Seattle, 1996), 54-66. Weglyn refers to the Latin American Japanese variously as "barter hostages" and "kidnapes," but she also provides evidence that the Peruvian government wanted the Japanese deported for long-standing racial and economic reasons.

³⁵ Graham H. Stuart, "Special War Problems Division," *DSB* (2 July 1944): 6-7.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 8; Graham H. Stuart, "Special War Problems Division: Internees Section," *DSB* (16 July 1944): 63.

³⁷ Stuart, "Representation of Foreign Interests," 143-44, 146-47; *DIL*, 8:641.

³⁸ Stuart, "Representation of Foreign Interests," 144; FDRL, PSF 9, 27 Aug. 1942. In September 1943 the United States and Germany reached agreement on the repatriation of seriously sick and wounded POWs. Exchanges on this basis occurred in October 1943, March and May 1944 (Stuart, "Special War Problems Division: Internees Section," 73).

³⁹ FDRL, PSF 9, 27 Aug. 1942. The countries involved were: Mexico, each of the Central American governments, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia. Hull estimated that the Germans still held 350 "American Republics nationals." Exchange was never more than a secondary consideration in the State Department. The repatriation of Latin American deportees had as much to do with the other republics' desires to get rid of particular Germans as it did a United States plan to get any Americans it could out of Axis hands in return. To acknowledge—as officials at the time frequently did—that the United States pursued a policy of repatriating Axis aliens on an exchange basis, is quite different from asserting that it "kidnapped" them only for that purpose.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴¹ Breckenridge Long to Welles, 30 Mar., Joseph C. Green to Long, 30 and 31 Mar., and Welles to Lord Halifax, 31 Mar., Dec. File 740.00115 EW1939/2549, Box 2822; Mr. Travers, State Dept. Visa Div., to Mr. Long, 23 Dec. 1942, Dec. File 740.00115 EW1939/5644, Box 2840. See also, Memorandum of Conversation[s], "Safe Conduct. . ." 16 Feb., and "British Safe Conduct. . ." 13 April 1942, SWPD Subj. Files Box 72, Exchange Vessels.

⁴² Geo. L. Brandt to Long, 25 June, Philip W. Bonsal to Mr. Green and Long, 26 June 1942, Dec. File 740.00115 EW1939/3683.

⁴³ Joseph C. Green, Special Division to Long, 1 July 1942, Dec. File 740.00115 EW1939/3683.

⁴⁴ Biddle to Hull, 25 June 1942, and Joseph C. Green to Biddle, n.d., Dec. File 740.00115 EW1939/3610.

⁴⁵ Charles Fahy, Acting Attorney General, to Hull, 18 Sept., Dec. File 740.00115 EW1939/4570, Box 2835, and "Removal of Axis Aliens from Other American Republics thru Sept. 1942," SWPD Subj. Files, Box 180.

⁴⁶ David S. Wyman, *Abandonment of the Jews: America and the Holocaust, 1941-1945* (New York, 1984), 276-77; EACPD, Resolution 24, Concerning the Exchange of Persons Between the American Countries and Germany, 31 May 1944, SWPD Subj. Files, Misc., Box 124; "Proposal for Rescue of Refugees from German Territory," *DSB* (17 June 1944): 566. The new secretary of state, Edward Stettinius, wrote to the embassy in La Paz, Bolivia on 2 Jan. 1945, that repatriation was to be voluntary. Otherwise, he cautioned, it "might cause the Germans to withhold nationals of this hemisphere from the exchange" (Dec. File 740.00115 EW/1-145, Box 3560).

⁴⁷ Letter from Julius C. Holmes, Acting for the Secretary of State, to A.A. Berle, Jr., Am. Amb., Rio de Janeiro, 6 June 1945 (see note 1).

⁴⁸ Thomas C. Mann, "Elimination of Axis Influence in This Hemisphere: Measures Adopted at the Mexico City Conference," *DSB* (20 May 1945): 924-26; "Resolution VII of the Final Act of the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace, 8 March 1945, SWPD Subj. Files, Box 124, Misc. Clayton had been chief of procurement in the Commerce Department during the war (Gellman, *Good Neighbor Diplomacy*, 168).

⁴⁹ "Security Against Renewed German Aggression," 21-22.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 22, 24.

⁵¹ Memorandum, A.E.C.[Clattenberg?] to Amb. Warren, SWPD Subj. Files, Box 181, Removal of Enemy Aliens from Other Am. Republics, April-July 1945; J.[C.] Holmes, for the Acting Sec/St, to Officers in Charge of the American missions in the Other American Republics, ". . . Government Policy Concerning Subsequent Repatriation of Germans from Western Hemisphere," 14 June 1945, Dec. File 740.00115 EW/5-1745, Box 3567. Included were: all known agents, all Nazi and Pan-German propagandists, all research experts and students, all scientifically skilled persons, and all persons qualified to hold superior executive posts in commerce or government.

⁵² Grew to Stimson, 8 May, *FRUS*, 1945, 9:266-267. The final act of the Mexico City conference recommended repatriation of persons left in the hemisphere "prejudicial to the future security or welfare of the Americas" ("Alien Enemy Control Section," *DSB* (4 Nov. 1945): 737-39; Henry Stimson, Secretary of War, to Secretary of State, 22 June, *FRUS*, 1945, 9:268-69. For an extended discussion of Eisenhower's position re repatriates, see Brian L. Villa, "The Political and Diplomatic Context of the POW Camps Tragedy," in Günter Bischof and Stephen E. Ambrose, eds., *Eisenhower and the German POWs: Facts Against Falsehood* (Baton Rouge, 1992), 57-74.

⁵³ Mann, "Elimination of Axis Influence," 925; *FRUS*, 1945, 9:266-85, passim. See also, C. Harvey Gardiner, *Pawns in a Triangle of Hate: The Peruvian Japanese and the United States* (Seattle, 1981), 114-15.

⁵⁴ Memo of Conversation, Mr. Dubois, AECU, Justice Dept., and Mr. Lafoon, SWPD, 8 Mar. 1945, Dec. File 740.115 EW/2-2245, Box 3564. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Special War Problems Division (Clattenberg), "Policy on Enemy Aliens Interned. . ." 30 August, *FRUS*, 1945, 9:278-281. See also, "Disposition of Enemy Aliens from Other American Republics," *DSB* (30 Dec. 1945), 1061. Truman based the proclamation on Sec. 4067, Rev. Stat. of the United States (50 United StatesC. 21); declarations of war; Res. 17, Rio Conf., Jan. 1942; Res. 20, CPD, Montevideo, May 1943; and Res. 7, Inter-American Conf., Mar. 1945 ("Removal of Alien Enemies," *DSB* [9 Sept. 1945]: 361). At the Ft. Lincoln, North Dakota, internment camp two Guatemalan Germans, freed after habeas corpus proceedings, said that the local police in Guatemala told them that United States officials had ordered their arrests; United States officials in turn blamed

Guatemalan authorities. Officials deported one unlucky man simply because police told his group of prisoners to "count off by fours," there not being enough room on the transport for all, and then released every fourth man. In January 1946 a United States judge began the tedious process of hearing 120 habeas corpus suits from among a group of about 1,000 Latin Americans still held at Ft. Lincoln, Ellis Island, and Crystal City, Texas (*The Bismarck Tribune*, 21 Dec., 3; *Chicago Daily Tribune*, 21 Dec., 1, 4; 25 Dec., 5; 27 Dec. 1945, 3; 5 Jan., 3; 10 Jan., 9; 8 Jan. 1946, 5). The National Refugee Service (NRS) fought Truman's deportation edict, and with additional pressure from Catholic groups, the ACLU, and dissidents within the State Department the refugee advocates secured a partial victory: the Jewish refugees interned at Ft. Ontario, New York, would be allowed to stay on as permanent immigrants under existing quotas. Refugees from Latin America, not considered threats to the Western Hemisphere as determined by individual hearings, were assisted either in returning to Latin America or settling permanently in the United States. Of the 81 Latin American Jews originally interned, only two returned home (Strum, "Jewish Refugees," 41-43).

⁵⁵ Johnson, Amb. to Costa Rica, to Secretary of State, 12 Aug., *FRUS*, 1945, 9:271-72; The Secretary of State (Byrnes) to the Chargé in Costa Rica (Gibson), "Policy on Enemy Aliens. . ." 18 Aug., *ibid.*, 274-75. The State Department offered to return the families as a way to get unanimous consent among the republics for repatriation. The Chargé in Costa Rica (Gibson) to the Secretary of State, 30 Aug., 1945, "Policy on Enemy Aliens Interned. . ." 30 Aug., *ibid.*, 277; The Apostolic Delegate (Cicognani) to the Secretary of State, "Policy on Enemy Aliens Interned. . ." 5 Sept., *ibid.*, 281.

⁵⁶ Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of North and West Coast Affairs (Wells) to the Acting Chief of That Division (White), "Policy on Aliens Interned. . ." 14 Aug., *ibid.*, 272-73; The Secretary of State (Byrnes) to the Ambassador in Peru (Pawley), "Policy on Enemy Aliens Interned. . ." 25 Aug., *ibid.*, 276-77.

⁵⁷ James Byrnes, Sec/St. to Am. Embassy, Lima, 25 Aug. 1945, SWPD Subj. Files, Box 194, "Peru 1945, Germans & Japs."

⁵⁸ (Cochran), "Policy on Enemy Aliens Interned. . ." 5 Sept., *FRUS*, 1945, 9:282-83; Chief of the Division of American Republics Analysis and Liaison (Dreier) to Director of the Office of American Republics Affairs (Warren), "Policy on Enemy Aliens Interned. . ." 14 Sept., *ibid.*, 283-85.

⁵⁹ "Alien Enemy Control Section," 737-39; Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Peru (Pawley), "Policy on Enemy Aliens Interned. . ." 2 Nov., *FRUS*, 1945, vol. 9, 287-89; Secretary of State to Ambassador in Nicaragua (Warren), "Policy on Enemy Aliens Interned. . ." 23 Nov., *ibid.*, 293-94.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 295-96; Acting Secretary of State to Ambassador in Ecuador (Scotten), "Policy on Enemy Aliens Interned. . ." 26 Dec., *ibid.*, 301; "Disposition of Enemy Aliens from Other American Republics," 1061; *Chicago Daily Tribune*, 28 Dec., 1945, 5. Well into 1946 the United States continued to insist that it could remove dangerous Latin American Germans under the Enemy Alien Act of 1798 ("Historical Chronology of Events Concerning the Enemy Alien Repatriation Program," SWPD Subj. Files, Box 181, Removal of Enemy Aliens from Other American Republics, April-July 1945).

⁶² Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, and Peru; "Disposition of Enemy Aliens," 33-34.

⁶³ *Ibid.*; "Historical Chronology of Events Concerning the Enemy Alien Repatriation Program."

⁶⁴ Secretary of State to . . . All Diplomatic Representatives in the Western Hemisphere, "The Withdrawal of the Proclaimed List and the Resolution of the Emergency Advisory Committee for Political Defense Concerning Nazi Influences, 11 February, *FRUS*, 1946, 11:76-77. The department eventually rescheduled this for 30 June (Secretary of State to Diplomatic Representatives in the American Republics, 6 June, *ibid.*, 83). The Ambassador in Uruguay (Dawson) to the Secretary of State, 26 April, *ibid.*, 81-82; Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. T.R. Martin of the Division of River Plate Affairs, 3 April, *ibid.*, 78-79; The Acting Secretary of State to President Truman, 21 June, *ibid.*, 83-84 (See also, Presidential Proclamation 2497: "Proclaimed List of Certain Blocked Nationals").

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*: Bolivia, 404-17; Brazil, 462-65; Chile, 575-91; Colombia, 661-66; Ecuador, 865-73; Paraguay, 1193-1200; Peru, 1227-32; Uruguay, 1276-83; and Venezuela, 1322-30. Also, The Acting

Secretary of State to the Embassy in Bolivia, "Continuing Efforts to Eliminate Axis Economic Interests in Bolivia," 28 April, *FRUS*, 1948, 9:346, and Memorandum by Mr. H.H. Barger, Economic Analyst in Bolivia, to the Chargé in Bolivia (Adam), "The Problem of Replacing Former Axis Business Influences with More Desirable Trade Contacts in Bolivia," 12 Mar., *FRUS*, 1946, 11:406-08.