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Cloaks and Gowns: Germanists for the United States War Effort

In contrast to the First World War and its aftermath, when everything German was maligned, if not prohibited by laws, the United States' entry into the Second World War did not provoke widespread anti-German hysteria. By 1942, however, it had become evident that the radical decrease in German language instruction after 1917 had caused a dire shortage of fluent German speakers in the United States—except for the anti-fascist refugees from Central Europe. Hence, the title "Cloaks and Gowns" refers to the fact that the exiled intellectuals' intelligence and other activities for the war effort eventually secured their American citizenship.[1] With regard to the exiled social scientists, Bradley Smith has argued that their successful intelligence activities smoothed their path into the American universities, since, as Jews, most of them would not have had a chance to pursue an academic career. On the contrary, it seems that most universities were even willing to overlook their leftist orientation.[2] To some degree, Bradley's observation also holds true for some refugee Germanists within American academia.

Prompted by the apparent lack of fluent German speakers, the War Department wrote a letter to W. Freeman Twaddell, head of the largest American German department at the University of Wisconsin to request courses which would train young soldiers to become orally proficient in German while simultaneously familiarizing them with German culture. Upon completion of these courses, which were regarded as part of their military training, soldiers were expected to be fluent enough to act as interpreters. Even though the War Department did not propose a concrete curriculum, it did suggest guidelines for German departments all over the country which led Twaddell to publish the letter.[3]

Following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, fifty-five American colleges and universities admitted military personnel to ensure that they receive appropriate linguistic and cultural training. Thus, the "Army Specialized Training Program" (ASTP) and similar military language programs became a sheet anchor for many a language department's dwindling enrollments. Instructors of such diverse subject areas as geography, geology, history, political science, engineering, philosophy, and economics collaborated[4]—in the spirit of

true interdisciplinarity—with their colleagues from the various language departments. Yet, German departments traditionally had not placed great value on turning out fluent speakers. On the contrary, language courses had been frequently regarded as a "necessary evil," a means to train good readers of literature and analysts of linguistic data. Accordingly, Germanists were initially ill-prepared for the onslaught of students in the newly instituted intensive language courses. The refugee Werner Vordtriede, who was later to become a German professor at the University of Wisconsin, described his first lesson for the ASTP in his diary: "I have 26 students in my class and was able to conclude the class period without halting. It will be very exhausting to teach the same people every day for four hours in the same subject, without half boring them to death."[5]

The need arose to develop materials and methods which were guaranteed to educate the interpreters and translators the military had demanded. Two American-born Germanists developed texts for these intensive courses: the linguists Leonard Bloomfield from the University of Chicago and William Moulton from Yale. In fact, Moulton and his wife, Jenni Karding Moulton, had collaborated on *Spoken German*, which was used for basic language instruction—minus the military vocabulary—well into the 1950s. Both patriotism and issues of job security led literary scholars to jump on the bandwagon and invest their energies into compiling adequate materials. Accordingly, Erich Funke, Fritz Fehling and Meno Spann from Iowa State University wrote a highly successful textbook entitled *Kriegsdeutsch*,[6] others studied acquisition theories, proposed courses[7] or developed innovative audio-lingual materials.[8] What distinguished the ASTP courses from regular language courses was the great range of experimentation and the enormous success rate.[9]

The majority of the military language courses utilized methods anthropologists and linguists had developed during the 1920s while observing Native Americans and their predominantly oral cultures. Franz Boas and his student Edward Sapir were especially influential in developing the method of learning an unwritten language with the aid of an "informant," generally a native speaker of the given language.[10] This approach to language teaching proved advantageous for the highly educated refugees, most of whom spoke several European languages fluently. Courses taught with informants ensured that many of them found jobs in departments, where German or other language professors had been drafted. They did not, however, replace American academics. On the contrary, colleges and universities differentiated very clearly between regular department members and temporary instructors for military courses.[11] While *Germanistik* was not completely reduced to language instruction during these years, utilitarian motives frequently dictated that only those aspects of literature were to be emphasized which had a greater applicability and relevance to German culture, geography and history.[12]

That the government and military deemed the academics' work for the ASTP essential for the war effort is gleaned once again from Vordtriede's diary: "In case I don't need to join the military, it seems almost sure that I will be employed for the ASTP," he wrote. The department head of Rutgers University was going to try to have him deferred from active duty, since his work as a language instructor was of equal military importance. Thus, for Vordtriede and many others who did not become soldiers, the ASTP was an opportunity "to do the only useful thing for Europe in this war, to bring these countries, which now seem strange to people, who will soon influence Europe's fate, a little closer to them."[13]

Judging from diaries, biographical information and letters in the German Literature Archive in Marbach, the refugees' work for the ASTP and similar programs was motivated both by the possibility to earn money and the promise of job security after the war as well as by anti-fascist convictions and the desire for cultural mediation.[14] The case of Arnold Bergstraesser, a social scientist from Heidelberg, however, is not that clear-cut. During the Weimar Republic, he had been a staunch national-conservative. He was forced to leave Germany in 1937 because his family tree had yielded a Jewish grandmother. Yet, even though he was an exile himself, the majority of the refugees suspected him of being a Nazi sympathizer. When the New York based German-Jewish periodical *Aufbau* published an article about Bergstraesser in 1942 accusing him of a pro-Nazi stance, the ensuing uproar in immigrant circles was so intense that the FBI visited the Scripps College campus in Claremont, California, where Bergstraesser was teaching German. Eventually, he was interned on suspicion of "un-American activities."[15] While the FBI continued to doubt Bergstraesser's integrity, he was released on bond a year later, partly because he was acquainted with George N. Shuster, the president of New York's Hunter College. Shuster had become a member of the Enemy Alien Board and knew Bergstraesser from his student days in Heidelberg. Due to his position and influence he was able to secure a position for his friend with the ASTP at the University of Chicago. Despite vocal protests by the faculty and public,[16] Bergstraesser remained in Chicago until he remigrated to Germany in 1954. Together with Shuster, he wrote a book obviously intended for a military instructional program entitled *Germany: A Short History*, which sought to depict Hitler's regime as an aberration of German character.[17]

Bergstraesser's case clearly illustrates how the political climate had changed after the United States' entry into World War II. Before the war, any hint of Nazi leanings would have utterly disqualified a refugee from being employed in a government capacity. Now, someone with a thorough knowledge of Germany's political Right—controversial or not—was indispensable for developing directives aimed at re-educating Germans after the war. Simultaneously, anticommunism which had lost momentum during the first war years steadily gained ground as Hitlerism waned.[18]

An alternative to the ASTP, the "Prisoners of War Special Project Division" (POWSPD), provided Germanists with an alternative platform for aiding the war effort. Originally founded in New York, it was nothing less than a kind of "university" in a prisoner of war camp.[19] William Moulton, who had just completed the ASTP-textbook with his wife, now concentrated his efforts on this re-education program for the approximately 372,000 German POWs on American soil which had been adopted at the urging of Eleanor Roosevelt. In essence, the POWSPD was a massive multimedia effort to change prisoners' attitudes, democratize them, and provide "a vanguard for redirecting postwar Germany" (66). The American government had come to realize that in order to organize the United States zone in occupied Germany after the war efficiently, it would need trained and trustworthy Germans. Therefore, the main goal of this "university" was to train administrative and police personnel from among the POWs. Most of the lecture staff were German refugees employed as interpreters and consultants, like the exiled writer Walter Schoenstedt, but Moulton himself remembered that "there was a big advantage in having an officer like me on display as a native American who could actually speak German." With regards to his first class he recalled: "I came out and started the lecture 'meine Herren.' And apparently this was one of the most effective things I did . . . they hadn't been talked to in that way for years." The lectures were simple, addressed to men of various educational backgrounds and aimed at emphasizing democratic values, the constitution and electoral procedures (147).

At the beginning of the Second World War the United States was the only world power which neither had a secret service nor an international radio broadcasting system. The establishment of the Voice of America not only proved a valuable weapon of psychological warfare but also provided jobs for a sizable staff of "underpaid" exiled authors and academics.[20] Their concrete tasks were to write scripts and broadcast them, as well as analyze press releases and radio transmissions from Germany. In 1942, the United States also founded the Office of War Information (OWI) which provided yet another venue for Central European refugees to offer their expertise. Thus, Rudolf Kayser, Albert Einstein's son-in-law and former editor for Frankfurt's Fischer publishing house, who had become an American German professor out of necessity, provided detailed analyses of all the changes Goebbels had undertaken in German publishing and media. William Gaede and Fritz Karsen, education administrators turned German professors, informed on the changes the educational system had undergone—all essential data for planning directives to rebuild a defeated Germany. American Germanists employed by the OWI, were Henry Lea (later University of Massachusetts) and Paul Whitaker (later University of Kentucky) who became a member of the British-led team which successfully deciphered the Nazi secret code.[21] The most common and probably also most invaluable services the refugees rendered were the innumerable translations of German texts. Hence, Otto Matthjis Jolles, who was a German

instructor for the ASTP at the University of Chicago also translated important historical and military texts for the Military Institute in Virginia.[22]

As long as they had not attained American citizenship, exiles were unable to join the military voluntarily. However, they could be drafted, should the government deem it necessary. Camp Ritchie in Maryland trained the majority of refugee Germanists and promoted them to citizens on the eve of their departure for the European war theater. Walter Hasenclever, namesake and nephew of the famous dramatist, likened the camp to the tower of Babel, where everyone spoke at least one foreign language fluently. In addition to the refugees, Navajos were trained there to transmit news, since the likelihood of Germans or Japanese knowing their language was minuscule.[23] Thus, counter intelligence could mean working for the Bureau of Censorship or the Department of State;[24] more often however, working for counter intelligence meant interrogating German POWs in the wake of American army conquests.[25]

Guy Stern, probably the first scholar to describe political activities of Germanists for the war effort, remembers that his superior in the intelligence unit and later colleague at Wayne State University, Erhard Dabringhaus, was an exceptionally skilled interrogator of uncooperative prisoners. Dabringhaus was so convincing that he even fooled a higher American officer who was present during a particular interrogation. Leaning very close, he would whisper menacingly: "Now listen here, boy, my father was a union leader and a socialist in Germany and when you Nazis came, the Gestapo arrived one night and they killed my father. And if you don't answer me in two minutes, something will happen to you. That might not bring my father back, but for a while I'll feel a whole lot better." Such tactics would usually get the prisoners to break down and talk. The senior officer who had witnessed one of these interrogations, conveyed his condolences to Dabringhaus, who answered: "Why? My father is fine. He works in Detroit for Ford."[26] The information the intelligence units gathered was transmitted to the OWI—often via Navajo code—and provided valuable insights into prevailing opinions and moods within various regions of Germany.[27]

Stefan Heym, who had published his first successful novel *Hostages* in English while in the United States, was one of the refugees assigned to counter intelligence. There he met Oskar Seidlin, who was later to become instrumental in the expansion of the German programs at Ohio State and Indiana University. Heym was Seidlin's commanding officer. In his memoirs he described how the Germanist nearly caused their platoon to fail: "On the sixth day after D-Day we received our orders. . . . The ocean was extremely rough and Oskar Seidlin was supposed to climb down the rope netting on the side of the ship into the boat, waiting to take the soldiers to Omaha Beach. He refused. In a mild voice, which precluded any objection, just as if he were speaking from the lectern at his girls' college, he explained that no one, regardless of rank, could force him to climb down that netting."[28] The impressive number of demoralizing handbills Seidlin authored attests to the fact that he did eventually get to shore. These handbills

had to be simple and demonstrate the hopelessness of the enemy's situation: surrounded or confronted by a formidable army with no chance for escape. Once printed, they were stuffed into shell casings and launched in such a way that the paper literally rained down behind enemy lines (292). What made Seidlin's handbills especially effective was that he often used a German proverb or idiom to bridge the friend-foe gap. For example, in one of the handbills, which the former children's book author illustrated himself, he let essential war machinery and soldiers fall through the bottom of a defective pot entitled "front line losses." He derived the title of the handbill from a folk song every German soldier would have known at the time: "But what if the pot has a hole in it?" ("Wenn der Topp aber nu een Loch hat?")[29] Even though Seidlin was one of the most prolific handbill authors, he confessed years later to Guy Stern that he thought penning them was as difficult as writing academic articles and books (99).

Those authors and Germanists who were not on European soil as members of intelligence divisions or soldiers, and did not work for the ASTP, the OWI, the Office of Cencorship or the POWSPD, used their considerable writing talents for the Voice of America and NBC. Several Germanists became commentators and writers for programs designed to reach listeners in Hitler's Reich.[30] Richard Plant, who had been rejected for active duty on health grounds, and had been a successful author of detective stories, children's books and film reviews before his arrival in America, remembered what his job at NBC looked like: he was required to write two news programs, one German commentary, and numerous anti-Nazi propaganda items daily. His work hours from midnight until eight in the morning not only provided him with a regular income but more importantly, gave him an opportunity to fight the regime which had killed his father and led most of his family and friends to perish in the Holocaust.[31] Yet simultaneously the question arises as to how effective the radio programs really were during the war, since Germans who listened to enemy broadcasts faced severe penalties.

Most refugee Germanists not actively fighting aided the war effort in some way or other. One of them, a Southern German aristocrat, became a spy during the war. Eitel Dobert Count Prebentow's assignments led him across enemy lines into Germany and were shrouded in secrecy—as Guy Stern remembers. After the war, Dobert became a peaceful expert for German language and literature at the University of Maryland. Just like Bergstraesser's, Dobert's path had not been a straight one. Before his emigration, he had been a firm believer in Nazism. He had, however, become disenchanted with Nazi ideology soon after Hitler became chancellor and had subsequently published a fervent prodemocratic declaration which instantly branded him an enemy of the Third Reich. Due to his past political affiliation, his applications for American citizenship were denied repeatedly. Only after Dobert started working for the military as a spy, in a clearly defined anti-Nazi capacity, did immigration

consider a motion brought forward by his division's general and finally award him citizenship.[32]

Many of the former refugees returned from the war as American citizens, decorated with bronze stars. They established themselves successfully in German departments all over the country. As Bradley Smith has already pointed out with regard to the social scientists, American universities seemed willing to overlook that some of the academics had been outspoken leftists before they were exiled. To apply Bradley's assessment blindly to former leftist, exiled Germanists like Oskar Seidlin, Bernhard Blume, Ernst Erich Noth and Richard Plant however, does not take into consideration that many of them had already been very careful during the war to join their American colleagues in promoting the humanism of authors like Goethe and Thomas Mann vis-à-vis Nazi aberrations in order to prevent another wave of anti-German hysteria. They not only vehemently abdicated their earlier beliefs in order to pursue a more apolitical form of literary scholarship in the age of New Criticism, but many had changed their names to obscure their Jewish origins[33] and went to great pains to hide their sexual orientation during the ensuing Cold War, when the merest hint "otherness" could be branded "un-American."[34]

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Notes

[1] I was inspired by Robin Winks' book entitled, *Cloak and Gown: 1939-1961: Scholars in the Secret War* (New York: Morrow, 1984) which describes academic intelligence activities in general but does not specifically mention Germanists.

[2] Bradley F. Smith, *The Shadow Warriors. O.S.S. and the Origins of the C.I.A.* (New York: Basic Books, 1983), 379.

[3] "Letter from the War Department," *Monatshefte* 34 (1942): 290.

[4] Robert John Matthew, *Language and Area Studies in the Armed Services, Their Future Significance* (Washington, D.C.: American Council on Education, 1947), 3-7.

[5] Translated into English from: Werner Vordtriede, *Das verlassene Haus: Tagebuch aus dem amerikanischen Exil, 1938-1947* (München: Carl Hanser, 1975), 205.

[6] Which was very favorably reviewed in *Monatshefte* 36 (1944): 62.

[7] Even the most cursory glance at *Monatshefte*, *German Quarterly* and *Modern Language Journal* between 1943 and 1945 will attest to the Germanists' zeal.

[8] Helmut Rehder and W. Freeman Twaddell began their fruitful collaboration on audiolingual methods of language instruction, which was referred to as "pioneering work." See: "Introduction," *Vistas and Vectors: Essays Honoring the Memory of Helmut Rehder*, edited by Lee B. Jennings and George Schulz-Behrend (Austin: University of Texas at Austin, 1979), 7.

[9] Louis E. Keefer, *Scholars in Foxholes: The Story of the Army Specialized Training Program in World War II* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 1988), 112. Edwin Zeydel (University of Cincinnati) referred to the ASTP and related courses as the most dynamic period in the history of foreign language instruction in America: "The Teaching of German in the United States from Colonial Times through World War," *Teaching German in America: Prolegomena to a History*, edited by David P. Benseler et. al. (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988), 16.

[10] Matthew, *Language and Area Studies*, xii.

[11] "Personalia 1943-44," *Monatshefte* 36 (1944): 48-56.

[12] George Heberton Evans Jr., *Recollections of the Johns Hopkins University, 1916-1970* (Baltimore: Evans, 1977), 71-72: Ernst Feise from the German Department at Johns Hopkins University reorganized the German courses in such a manner that literature was given equal emphasis with geography, history and culture studies. At West Point, solely those aspects were emphasized in literary texts: Craig W. Nickisch, "German and National Policy: The West Point Experience," *Teaching German in America*, 80.

[13] Translated from Vordtriede, *Das verlassene Haus*, 240.

[14] For example, it appears from a letter by exiled historian, writer and Germanist Dieter Cunz, that his agreement to work for the ASTP at the University of Maryland led to his integration into the department: "Wir haben . . . vom War Department 125 'Area Students' zugewiesen bekommen, die für Deutschland und Frankreich trainiert werden sollen. Natürlich brauchen sie da gerade jemand wie mich besonders notwendig. . . . Sie wollten mich mit 2500 im Jahr zum Assistant Professor machen, . . . und diese Promotion ist für unsere Verhältnisse hier durchaus ungewöhnlich. . . . So habe ich, wenn der Krieg vorbei ist, sofort wieder meinen Job, und bin dann nicht, wenn nach dem Krieg die wilde Jagd nach Jobs beginnt, im Gewühl." Letter by Dieter Cunz to Herbert Steiner, 5 July 1943 [Marbach, 74.2853]. Some of the refugees working for the ASTP were the philologists Konstantin Reichadt, Ernst Alfred Philippson and Arno Schirokauer, the literary scholars Richard Alewyn, Matthijs O. Jolles, Melitta Gerhard, Hedda Korsch, and Wolfgang Paulsen, the archeologist Erich Gottfried Budde, former law student and journalist Marianne Bonwit, the lawyer Conrad Paul Homberger, the historian and writer Dieter Cunz, and the French literature scholar Liselotte Dieckmann. With the exception of Richard Alewyn, who returned to Germany after the war, the ASTP provided these refugees with an inroad into American academe and they were to remain active as American Germanists.

[15] Claus-Dieter Krohn, "Der Fall Bergstraesser in Amerika," *Exilforschung* 4 (München: Edition und Text, 1986), 254-75.

[16] "University of Chicago Dean Defends Professor in Ouster Plea," *Chicago Herald-American*, 21 January 1944.

[17] According to the book review by Daniel Coogan in *Monatshefte* 37 (1945): 121.

[18] The example of Cornell University's Russian ASTP courses bears witness to the changing political climate, where a Russian-born professor was accused of communist propaganda in the classroom and lost his job. That his dismissal had more to do with "red-baiting" than a real communist threat became evident when the Russian's successor, an American, was also accused of being a communist solely because he was teaching Russian. This time, the president of the university, stood up for his faculty member, despite the uproar in the local press ("Cornell to Retain Red as Teacher for the Army," *New York World-Telegram*, 29 Dec. 1943).

[19] Judith M. Gansberg, *Stalag USA: The Remarkable Story of German POWs in America* (New York: Thomas Cromwell, 1977), 1-2.

[20] Holly Cowan Shulman, *The Voice of America: Propaganda and Democracy, 1941-1945* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1990), 3.

[21] Guy Stern, "Deutsch-jüdische Exilanten bei der amerikanischen Aufklärung—mit einem Exkurs über den Beitrag zukünftiger Germanisten," *Modernisierung oder Überfremdung: Zur Wirkung deutscher Exilanten in der Germanistik ihrer Aufnahmeländer*, edited by Walter Schmitz (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1994), 100-3. An English version of this paper was printed for the Leo Baeck Institute: "In the Service of American Intelligence. German-Jewish Exiles in the War Against Hitler," *Leo Baeck Institute Yearbook* (1992): 461-477.

[22] For example, Jolles's translation of Carl von Clausewitz's writings: *On War* (1943).

[23] Walter Hasenclever, *Ihr werdet Deutschland nicht wiedererkennen: Erinnerungen* (Berlin: Kiepenhauer & Witsch, 1975), 40-42. Because of the camp they were trained in, the refugee intelligence officers were frequently referred to as the "Ritchie Boys."

[24] The exiled Germanists Thomas Otto Brandt, Henry Remak, Rudolf Kayser, Ludwig Werner Kahn, and Franz Heinrich Mautner worked for these branches of intelligence.

[25] Gerhard Loose, Bernard Rechtschaffen, Peter Salm, Oskar Seidlin, and Guy Stern joined interrogation units.

[26] Translated from the German: Stern, "Deutsch-jüdische Exilanten," 102.

[27] Daniel Lerner, *Psychological Warfare Against Nazi Germany: The Sykewar Campaign, D-Day to VE-Day* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1971), 108.

[28] Translated from the German: Stefan Heym, *Nachruf* (München: Bertelsmann, 1988), 284-86. The girls' college mentioned here is Smith College, where Seidlin taught before becoming an American soldier.

[29] Most of the handbills authored by refugees are reprinted in: Klaus Kirchner, *Flugblatt-propaganda im Zweiten Weltkrieg Europas*, vol. 6: *Flugblätter aus den USA 1943-44* (Erlangen: Verlag für zeitgeschichtliche Dokumente und Curiosa, 1980). Oskar Seidlin's was reprinted in: Stern, "Deutsch-jüdische Exilanten," 104.

[30] Rudolf Kayser, Claude Hill and William Malten worked for the Voice of America, whereas Richard Plant and the exiled writer and later German professor Ernst Erich Noth joined the staff of NBC.

[31] For a detailed biographical essay on Richard Plant, see: Ulrike Rettig, "Richard Plant," *Deutschsprachige Exilliteratur seit 1933/New York*, edited by John M. Spalek and Joseph Strelka (Bern: Franke, 1989), 2:794-802.

[32] About Dobert's becoming a spy, see: Stern, "Deutsch-jüdische Exilanten," 102. About Dobert's fall from the Nazi Party's grace as well as his emigration and repeated denial of his citizenship, see: Eitel Dobert Graf Prebentow, "Statt SA—Emigrantenleben," *Sie flohen vor dem Hakenkreuz: Selbstzeugnisse der Emigranten: Ein Lesebuch für Deutsche*, edited by Walter Zadek (Reinbek: Rowohlt, 1981), 46-53.

[33] Oskar Koplowitz changed his name to Seidlin in American exile; so did Richard Plaut to Plant, Paul Albert Kranz to Ernst Erich Noth, but Werner Vordtriede was known to be proud of his Germanic-sounding name (according to Jost Hermand, who knew Vordtriede at the University of Wisconsin in the early 1960s). In his diary, Vordtriede never refers to his divorced mother by her Jewish maiden name.

[34] The intensity of pressure to conform differed from state to state and even, within states, from institution to institution—see: Erving Beauregard, *History of Academic Freedom in Ohio: Case Studies in Higher Education 1808-1976* (New York: Peter Lang, 1988); Michael O'Brien, *McCarthy and McCarthyism in Wisconsin* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1980); James Truett Selcraig, *The Red Scare in the Midwest, 1945-1955: A State and Local Study* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1982). The fact that only a few Germanists were called to testify before the House Un-American Activities Committee does not mean that they were necessarily all in accordance with their institution's directives. However, it is very clear, that those who did protest and speak out, lost their jobs—as the cases of Harry Slochower (Brooklyn College) and Lyman Bradley (New York University) clearly illustrate. Their case histories can be found in: Ellen W. Schrecker, *No Ivory Tower: McCarthyism and the Universities* (New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 168-71, 128-29, 268-85, 306, 337; as well as: Lionel S. Lewis, *Cold War on Campus: A Study of the Politics of Organizational Control* (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1987), 251-62. Only very recently has research begun to unveil the importance of sexual orientation during McCarthy's witch hunts. In McCarthyian rhetoric, homosexuals were classified as "emotionally unstable" and therefore prone to communist subversion which made them a security risk. See: Robert J. Corber, *In the Name of National Security: Hitchcock, Homophobia, and the Political Construction of Gender in Postwar America* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1993). A closer analysis of newspaper articles and transcripts of HUAC-hearings have revealed that homosexuals were deemed just as detrimental to national security as were communists: Jonathan Neil Katz, *Gay American History: Lesbians and Gay Men in the USA* (New York: Meridian, 1992), 91-109. It was not until the 1960s and 1970s that Richard Plant, Dieter Cunz, Oskar Seidlin, Werner Vordtriede and others openly admitted their sexual orientation. Thus, Richard Plant's book *The Pink Triangle: The Nazi War Against Homosexuals* (New York: Henry Holt, 1986) is as autobiographical as it is documentary—coming to terms with his own past, as a German Jew and a homosexual, a fact, he alludes to in his introduction.