

Ehrhard Bahr

Paul Tillich and the Problem of a German Exile Government in the United States*

During the Second World War two organizations occasionally approached the status of a German exile government and were erroneously designated as such, although they never received international recognition. The first organization was the National Committee for a Free Germany (Nationalkomitee Freies Deutschland) in the Soviet Union,¹ the second the Council for a Democratic Germany in the United States. We are sufficiently informed about the Nationalkomitee Freies Deutschland through the monograph by Bodo Scheurig, published in German as well as in English.² But no monograph exists about the Council for a Democratic Germany; only two articles by former members of the Council are available as well as a short chapter in Joachim Radkau's study of German emigration to the United States and its influence on American foreign policy in Europe between 1933 and 1945.³ Radkau dealt in a general way with the problem of exile politics in two further essays in which the Council is also mentioned.⁴ In the pertinent handbooks and introductions to exile literature and exile in the United States, the Council is treated on only a few pages.⁵ This is all the more surprising when one considers that the collected works of Paul Tillich, the chairman of the Council, consist of more than twenty volumes with comprehensive biographical material.⁶ However, in these works barely fifteen pages have been set aside for the printing of Council documents.⁷ In a biographical sketch Tillich mentioned the Council in only two sentences.⁸ In the American Tillich biography by Willhelm and Marion Pauck the Council episode comprises four pages, in the Rowohlt monograph by Gerhard Wehr barely one.⁹ That Tillich sought to suppress this experience because of the failure of the Council is psychologically understandable. There is no reason, however, for historians to neglect this organization and the investigation of its function and meaning. In spite of the proven ineffectiveness of the Council, it serves as a model for the study of the Allies' policies towards Germany and of the legitimization of a German government in exile.

The Council represented a Western alternative to the Nationalkomitee Freies Deutschland, which had been founded in July 1943 by German exiles as well as German prisoners of war in the Soviet Union. The Soviet leadership appears to have used the Nationalkomitee as, among other things, a political tool to bring about an early end to the war if possible, even at the cost of a compromise peace with a German government. In July 1943 the opening of the second front by the Western Allies was still far in the future. In spite of the military successes since the reconquest of Stalingrad, the fascist enemy still stood in the heart of the country, and the Soviets still had to reckon with heavy losses of troops and civilians before the war would end. On the other hand, after the defeat of Stalingrad numerous German prisoners of war had come to realize that Germany could no longer win the war. Therefore, they had formed an organization with the explicit intention to preserve Germany's national existence by overthrowing the Hitler regime. Their determination was reconfirmed by Stalin's famous words of 23 February 1942 that "the Hitlers come and go, but the German people, the German state remains."¹⁰ Since the Soviet Union had not yet won the war and Germany had not yet lost it, the Soviet and German interests could possibly be adjusted to a common denominator.

The Nationalkomitee Freies Deutschland was not conceived as a government in exile but as a representation of German interests recognized by the Soviet Union. This representation offered itself as an interim solution for the formation of a German countergovernment which was capable of negotiating with the Soviet Union. In case the Nationalkomitee were to succeed in convincing the German generals to cease hostilities and to withdraw the army in an orderly fashion to the German borders, a cease fire was assured by the Soviets in return. Germany could achieve a favorable peace if the negotiations were based on the successful overthrow of Hitler. The Soviet Union would then be prepared to conclude a separate peace which would guarantee the German nation its 1937 borders. A prerequisite for this would simply be a civil democratic government which would be allied with the Soviet Union by means of friendship treaties.¹¹ The conclusion of the manifesto to the army and the German people expressed the program clearly: "For the people and the homeland! Against Hitler and his criminal war! For immediate peace! For the salvation of the German people! For a free and independent Germany!"¹²

In answer to its manifesto the Nationalkomitee received numerous sympathetic declarations from the United States, among others from Reinhold Niebuhr and from Germans in exile like Lion Feuchtwanger, Oskar Maria Graf, and Prince Hubertus of Loewenstein. Thomas Mann gave a statement to the Soviet News Agency Tass that termed the manifesto "a legitimate counterpart to the challenge by the western powers to the Italian people to rid themselves of the fascist regime."¹³

At first the Western Allies were completely surprised by the founding of the Nationalkomitee and took a negative stand. In the *New York Times* of 23 July 1943, for example, the founding was evaluated as a clever "chess" move by Stalin to accomplish the second front and

considered this movement dangerous to the anti-Hitler coalition of the Allies.¹⁴ *Der Aufbau*, the leading newspaper of German-Jewish immigrants in New York, took up the phrase of "Stalin's chess move" in its edition of 30 July 1943; on 13 August the *Neue Volkszeitung*, organ of the right wing of the Social Democratic Party in exile, also decisively rejected the Nationalkomitee because of its cooperation with the German generals. Antimilitarism was too strong in both exile groups to allow the Soviet alternative of a military coup. In addition, the SPD in exile refused to cooperate in any way with the Communists.¹⁵

Among the exiled writers on the West Coast the reaction was similar. At the often mentioned meeting of 1 August 1943 held in the home of Berthold Viertel in Santa Monica, they were initially able to agree on an expression of sympathy with the Nationalkomitee. "The proclamation of the German prisoners of war and emigrants in the Soviet Union" was welcome, and the writers acknowledged the necessary distinction "between the Hitler regime . . . on the one hand, and the German people on the other." But already on 2 August 1943 Thomas Mann retracted his signature, because the proclamation was too "patriotic" and would therefore "attack the Allies from the rear." The famous controversy between Thomas Mann and Bertolt Brecht in exile was initiated by the failure of this declaration. Its roots lay deeper, however. While Brecht held fast to the belief that the first people whom Hitler "oppressed" were "the Germans," Thomas Mann turned against the creation of the purposefully optimistic legend of an oppressed nation. Although he acknowledged the internal German resistance movement in his radio messages to Germany, he pointed on the other hand to the support of the regime by the German people who stood "behind the regime" and fought "its battles." Thomas Mann insisted, therefore, that the German people prove themselves morally by freeing themselves of Hitler. Only in the rejection of collective guilt were Brecht and Mann in agreement, although they refused to admit it. Brecht accused the novelist in a poem, unpublished at the time, of advocating a ten-year punishment of the German people.¹⁶

In August and September 1943, a steering committee for the formation of a "Free-Germany-Movement" was founded in New York in order to produce an alternative to the Nationalkomitee Freies Deutschland in the United States. Those involved wanted undoubtedly to forestall a purely Communist initiative through the creation of an organization that stood above party differences. It was to be an independent body and composed of "people who were [closely connected with] different political persuasions, of liberals and the Catholic Center, of Social Democrats and independent Socialists all the way to the Communists."¹⁷

The founders hoped to entice Thomas Mann to take the chairmanship of this organization since his name was politically attractive in the United States and assured that among the bourgeois and Social Democratic exile groups party differences would be overcome. On 27 or 28 October when Thomas Mann was lecturing in New York, "leadership" (*führende Beteiligung*) was offered to Thomas Mann by represen-

tatives of the "Free-Germany-Movement," but he had already decided to become an American citizen and to forgo a political role in post-war Germany.¹⁸ On 2 November 1943, he sarcastically noted in his diary: "In the course of the evening much about my future as *Führer* (*meine Führer-Zukunft*) in Germany, from which may God protect me."¹⁹ On 4 November, Thomas Mann conferred with Paul Tillich, Carl Zuckmayer, Paul Hagen, Siegfried Aufhäuser (SPD), Paul Hertz (SPD) and some others in New York concerning the planned organization. The driving force behind the project was Paul Hagen, actually Karl B. Frank, who could not be considered for the chairmanship because of his membership in the leftist-socialist group "New Beginning." Thomas Mann turned down the leadership offer, but declared his willingness to intervene with the State Department to gain recognition for the Free-Germany-Movement.

Meanwhile, however, military and political developments made it doubtful that exile representative bodies could function in the Soviet Union and Western countries. The collapse of the German summer offensive at Kursk in July 1943 and the failure of the mysterious Soviet peace feelers in Stockholm in September 1943 led to a revision of Soviet policy towards Germany that now aimed at crushing the German army and the *Reich*.²⁰ The agreement of the Western Allies to demand unconditional surrender was decisive for the adoption of this policy.

At the Conference of Casablanca from 14-26 January 1943, the Western Allies had set down the formula for unconditional surrender. At the Moscow Foreign Ministers' Conference, held on 19-20 October 1943, the formula was also accepted by the Soviet Union. This rendered peace negotiations with a German government without Hitler meaningless. The danger of a separate Soviet peace, feared by the Western Allies, was banished. At the same time the significance of German exile organizations in the Soviet Union and in Western countries as well as of the German resistance movement was reduced. Their hope of attaining favorable conditions of peace for Germany through an early end to the war vanished. The demand of unconditional surrender meant that the Allies no longer differentiated between the German people and the Nazi regime and insisted upon the continuation of the war until the final defeat of the German *Reich*.²¹

The Conference of Teheran, at which Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin met from 28 November to 1 December, led to a further coordination of the Allied war goals. The formation of the second front was decided upon and the Soviet Union's western border of late autumn 1939 as well as the territorial compensation of Poland with East Prussia and areas of Pomerania and Silesia were conditionally recognized. The new Soviet policy towards Germany also changed the function of the Nationalkomitee Freies Deutschland; it was no longer used to establish contacts with German generals in command of troops on Soviet territory, but only for front-line propaganda in order to persuade German soldiers to defect. The guarantee of an ordered retreat onto German territory and the promise of a negotiated peace were replaced by the formula of "rescue through defection."²²

In the context of these military and diplomatic decisions, which radically changed the meaning and function of the German exile groups in the Soviet Union and in Western countries, Thomas Mann's intervention with the State Department on behalf of the "Free-Germany-Movement" took place. In a letter dated 18 November 1943 to Adolf A. Berle, Assistant Secretary of State, Thomas Mann outlined the goals of the intended organization. The movement could "influence the people in Germany to support the political war being waged" and could, because of its "knowledge of the German mentality prove useful in advising American administrators."²³ Thomas Mann considered the recognition of the movement by the American government absolutely necessary. The discussion with Berle on 25 November 1943 in Washington, D.C., proceeded to Thomas Mann's relief "with a fortunately negative conclusion," as he noted in his diary. In the development of American foreign policy—the talks took place between the Foreign Ministers' Conference in Moscow and the Three Power Meeting in Teheran—it was not surprising that the State Department took a wait-and-see, if not a negative attitude toward the "Free-Germany-Movement."

On 26 November Thomas Mann reported in New York to Paul Tillich and the advocates of the "Free-Germany-Movement" about his conference with Adolf A. Berle. The diary entry reveals a clearly detached tone: "Gathering of the 'gentlemen' in my room. A fiery affair to inform them of the refusal and to comfort them." On 29 November Thomas Mann defended himself in a letter to the editor of the *New York Times* against rumors concerning his alleged participation in a "Free-Germany-Committee" at the suggestion of the State Department, and he designated the time as unsuitable for the formation of such a committee. His posture prompted the famous letter of Bertolt Brecht, dated 1 December, which Thomas Mann answered by return mail on 10 December 1943 repeating his reservations. Brecht held dogmatically to the two-Germany thesis, as his essay "The Other Germany" from 1943 shows, whereas Thomas Mann developed the view of the final identity of the "one" and of the "other" Germany in his subsequent political speeches as well as in his novel *Doktor Faustus*.²⁴

In May 1944 the founding committee of the Council for a Democratic Germany met without the hoped-for participation of Thomas Mann. Also the former Chancellor Heinrich Brüning, who belonged to the Catholic Center Party, had refused the chairmanship as long as there was no specific request by the American government. But Paul Tillich, whose name was similarly morally attractive as that of Mann in the United States, accepted the position. His political past as a religious socialist had shown Tillich as being above party politics. As a former SPD member he had proven himself as being neither on the extreme left or right, and his opposition to the Nazi regime was well known. The Protestant theologian had been relieved of his professorial duties at the University of Frankfurt in 1933 and had emigrated in the same year to the United States. At the invitation of the American theologian Reinhold Niebuhr, he taught at Union Theological Seminary and at Columbia

University in New York. Since 1936 Tillich had emerged in numerous public speeches on German emigration as the spokesman of political exiles in the United States. From 1942 to 1944 he had written more than a hundred radio speeches directed at Germany for the Office of War Information.²⁵ Tillich possessed valuable contacts to American intellectuals and to the White House, so that he seemed nearly as suited for the office of chairman as Thomas Mann.

On 15 May 1944 the Council for a Democratic Germany turned to the American public with a founding manifesto which was signed not only by German exiles, but also by a group of American citizens who supported the program of the Council. To the first group belonged Elizabeth Bergner, Bertolt Brecht, Oskar Homolka, Peter Lorre and Erwin Piscator, to the second Reinhold Niebuhr and Dorothy Thompson. The American group called itself "American Friends of German Freedom" and consisted of fifty-seven signatories.²⁶ Thomas Mann refused to sign, but never took an official position against the Council, even when challenged to do so by American journalists.²⁷

The first public meeting of the Council was held on 17 July 1944 in New York. Paul Tillich pointed to three problems: the composition of the Council, its organization, and the reaction of the public. He emphasized the "balanced front" of the Council:

We have taken great pain to insure that members of the so-called middle class, personalities who embraced the Center, Social Democracy, the New Beginning Group or Communism, as well as those who belong to no party are represented in suitable proportions on the Council.

The Council was not supposed to represent a "mirror image" of the German exile groups in America, but rather "the forces expected to accomplish a democratic rebuilding in Germany."²⁸ In contrast to the Nationalkomitee Freies Deutschland, active membership in the Council was by invitation only and was under no circumstances to endanger the "balance structure" of the political alignments represented there. The Council's composition was to resemble the distribution of seats in the last parliament of the Weimar Republic.²⁹ Its organizational form implies that at least some of the Council members strove towards the creation of a government in exile.³⁰

Also the Council's bylaws were intended for international legitimation. Whereas the Nationalkomitee Freies Deutschland as a plenum could make decisions with a simple majority, the "balance structure" of the Council demanded the consensus of all parties. No group could exert its will against the opposition of a minority group by means of a vote; every party, however, had veto power and could block the work of the Council; this occurred in the fall of 1945, when Communist opposition prevented the Council from functioning.

Tillich also emphasized public relations. Between September 1944 and May 1945 the Council published in English five issues of its *Bulletin of the Council for a Democratic Germany*; already in the first issue Tillich felt the need to defend the new organization against the charge of nationalism. Members had become refugees because they had fought

against this nationalism, Tillich argued. He tried to bridge the gap between German immigrants who planned to become American citizens and the German exiles who intended to return to Germany after the war. Tillich spoke out clearly for "a quick and complete victory of the Allied armies." The Council was not concerned with "the question of a harsh or soft peace for Germany," but rather with "the question of a peace that is creative and which will give to all European people those human rights and those opportunities for the defense of which this war has been fought."³¹

In September 1944 President Roosevelt submitted the so-called Morgenthau-Plan which envisioned the division of the new Germany into two autonomous states, the dismantling of the Ruhr industry, reparations, and the control of economic development for two decades. The main goal of the Morgenthau-Plan was the elimination of the industrial potential necessary for a future war. Due to the opposition of the State Department, which considered German heavy industry necessary for the rebuilding of Europe, Roosevelt withdrew his approval of the Morgenthau-Plan at the end of September 1944.³² The next month the Council opposed the Morgenthau-Plan in a press release that appeared in the second issue of the *Bulletin*. It labeled the suggested change in the structure of Germany as "only Hitler's plan in reverse."³³

The first crisis in the Council was occasioned by the Yalta Conference held from 3-11 February 1945 at which Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin decided on the occupation, control and reparations of conquered Germany without settling details. Poland was granted territorial gains in the west; however, the final determination of the Polish western border was tabled for a future peace conference. The Crimean Conference, as it was called in the United States, split the Council; Tillich tried to conciliate with the publishing of six different opinion statements. In the fourth issue of the *Bulletin* elements of agreement between the official press releases about the Crimean Conference and the Council were worked out by a majority of the members. With the exception of Paul Hagen, who protested against the projected "semi-colonial status for Germany for an indefinite period, including territorial and industrial dismemberment," the decisions of the conference were considered to be largely in the interest of a future democratic Germany. The different opinions demonstrated a clear majority. They found, for example, the text of the Crimean declaration about "the eradication of the institutions and the spirit of Nazism and militarism . . . surprisingly similar to the wording of [their] own declaration." That no unified declaration could be achieved was termed "catastrophic" in terms of public relations;³⁴ however, the Council weathered the crisis. In the fifth issue of the *Bulletin* of May 1945 the atrocities committed in the German concentration camps were unanimously condemned and emergency measures for the elimination of Nazism and militarism and for democratic reconstruction were developed.

The Council existed until the fall of 1945, when it failed because of a protest against the agreements reached at the Potsdam Conference which had been convened from 17 July to 2 August 1945 to implement

the Crimean Declaration. New points were added: the Oder-Neiße line as western border of Poland until its regulation by a peace treaty, the allocation of the city of Königsberg and the bordering areas to the Soviet Union as well as the forced transfer of Germans from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary to Germany. Paul Tillich considered the Potsdam Accords to be the end of Germany as *Reich*, and in a private letter to Friedrich Baerwald, the representative of the Center Party in the Council, used the phrase "the liquidation of Germany." For Tillich the economic and territorial regulations of Potsdam represented a "radical acceptance of the Morgenthau-Plan."³⁵ In a draft resolution Tillich opposed, above all, the economic decisions, which he considered intolerable. In his opinion they meant "either the extinction of a considerable portion of the German people or the necessity of nourishing it from outside for an unlimited period of time." He saw thus the creation of a "viable democratic Germany" endangered. Tillich further sought to lodge a protest against "the methods of evacuation, of deportation and of forced labor" as well as against the "often quite favorable attitude of the occupation authorities toward former Nazis and their political allies."³⁶ The Communists and some of the neutral members of the Council, however, refused to agree to a public criticism of the Potsdam Accords. They exploited the "balance structure" of the Council to prevent further critical declarations. The same "balance structure" made it also impossible, however, to bypass Communist objections by means of a vote. As a result withdrawals from the Council were announced from both sides of the aisle. Both Paul Hagen as representative of the left-socialist group "New Beginning" and Friedrich Baerwald as the main representative of the Catholic Center Party refused further cooperation under protest. Thus the fate of the Council was sealed. Its last meeting took place on 15 October 1945.³⁷

At the war's end, Tillich had defined the mission of the Council as forming a "bridge" between the democratic forces in Germany and "those circles in America which were in sympathy with the rebuilding of a democratic Germany." It was to prove that there were inside as well as outside the fatherland representatives of "another Germany" who could initiate its democratic rebuilding.³⁸ That the Communist and neutral members of the Council denied their consent to the draft resolution formulated by Tillich was not caused by the implicit concept of "another Germany"—this view was also held by the Communists—but rather by the anti-Potsdam declaration. The criticism seemed directed first and foremost against the Soviet Union. Although Tillich was also against "the control by the stewards of the atomic bomb . . . for the maintaining of monopoly capitalism," his reservations against the Oder-Neiße border were by far weightier. A private letter to Friedrich Baerwald reveals that Tillich considered the Oder-Neiße line the annulment of "the thousand year history of German eastern settlement" and a concomitant extermination of German Protestantism "with all the cultural forces which it had produced."³⁹ This private statement was in total contradiction to the Council's declaration of September 1944 and was an indication of vestiges of imperialist thinking among German exiles. It is improbable that Tillich was able to hide his private opinion

completely, and it was therefore predictable that the Communist members would deny their assent to an anti-Potsdam declaration of the Council. The continued cooperation in the Council could only be bought at the price of agreement to the Potsdam Accords. Since there were already improvements projected in the discussions of the Allies, it was, as Paul Hagen put it, "simply perverse" to adhere to the current apparently transitional status.⁴⁰

At no time did the Council for a Democratic Germany declare itself a government in exile. Its first public statement of 15 May 1944 declared that its members could not claim "a formal mandate from people now inside Germany." They believed, however, that they typified "some of the forces and tendencies which [would] be vitally needed in the creation of a new Germany within the framework of a free world." They therefore felt that it was their "duty in the interest of the United States and the United Nations to express [their] conviction about the future of Germany at a time when the German people [could not] speak for themselves."⁴¹ In the organization of the Council, options for a designation as an exile government had been left open. The minimum goal of the Council was participation in the formation of the United States' policy towards Germany which was never realized. Although President Roosevelt, members of Congress and of the American press were sympathetic to prominent exiles, and some of them were employed by the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) or the Office of War Information (OWI), the Council failed to influence American policy towards Germany,⁴² although contemporaries as well as historians had perceived the possibility to do so. Historians attributed this failure to the division among German exiles or to the "deficits of political culture."⁴³ The main reason lies, however, in the Allied demand for unconditional surrender, which excluded negotiations with representatives of "another Germany" from the outset. From 1943 on, the State Department opposed, therefore, the formation of a German government in exile. The Nationalkomitee Freies Deutschland in the Soviet Union was similarly used merely for defection propaganda. After the unconditional surrender in May 1945 there was neither a *de jure* nor a *de facto* German representative body with which the Allies could have negotiated.

Another, though minor reason for the failure of the Council was the personality of its chairman. Born in a small village east of the Oder-Neiße line and raised in a Lutheran pastor's family for a career in the ministry, Tillich could not suppress his heritage, when confronted with the results of World War II, as manifested in the Potsdam Accords. Some members of the right wing of the Social Democratic Party in exile showed similar tendencies, when they became aware of the dissolution of Germany as a *Reich*. There prevailed a strong German *Reich* ideology among German political exiles of all factions. They were never able to solve the dilemma of their fight, on the one hand, against Hitler and, on the other, for the preservation of Germany as a *Reich*. The division of Germany was not only repugnant to them, but also incompatible with the reconstruction of a new democratic Germany.⁴⁴

The international legal consequences of the unconditional surrender

were never clearly understood either by the exiles or by modern historians. Until October 1945 Tillich still thought that he could speak "from the standpoint of Germany," a position that lacked any international legitimation after May 1945. Thus the Council was properly dissolved. When Tillich placed the blame on the East-West division, that was only superficially accurate.⁴⁵ Subconsciously he was aware, as the letter to Baerwald shows, that it made no more political sense to speak "from the standpoint of Germany," at most to speak only "in a humanitarian way for fifty million Germans and their minimal life necessities."⁴⁶

University of California
Los Angeles, California

Notes

* This is an authorized translation by Arnold Krammer, Texas A & M University, revised and enlarged by the author.

¹ There were actually two organizations founded in the Soviet Union in 1943, the Nationalkomitee Freies Deutschland and the League of German Officers (Bund Deutscher Offiziere); the latter, however, soon merged with the Nationalkomitee. There were also other important exile organizations beyond the Nationalkomitee and the Council for a Democratic Germany in the United States. In the Soviet Union, the Communist Party (KPD) in exile was represented by Wilhelm Pieck and Walter Ulbricht. In Prague and then in London, the Social Democratic Party (SPD) in exile maintained an active organization in the 1930s and 1940s. But these were party organizations, not semi-representative bodies, as the Nationalkomitee and the Council, striving for the kind of legitimation and influence usually accorded to governments in exile. This article is to dispel, among other things, the common notion that the Council in the United States was run principally by artists, and not by politicians, and that its lack of legitimacy was due to the absence of politicians on the Council. There were about ten politicians of the various Weimar parties on the Council, including Horst W. Bärensprung, Kurt Glaser, Albert C. Grzesinski, Paul Hertz and Hans I. Hirschfeld of the Social Democratic Party (SPD), Friedrich Baerwald of the Center Party (Zentrum), and Albert H. Schreiner of the Communist Party (KPD). In addition, there was Jakob Walcher of the Socialist Workers' Party (SAP), and Paul Hagen of the leftist-socialist group "New Beginning" (Neu Beginnen).

² Bodo Scheurig, *Freies Deutschland: Das Nationalkomitee und der Bund deutscher Offiziere in der Sowjetunion 1943-1945*, 2nd rev. & enl. ed. (München: Nymphenburger Verlagshandlung, 1961), Engl. transl. Herbert Arnold (Middletown: Wesleyan Univ. Pr., 1969). See also Walther von Seydlitz, *Stalingrad—Konflikt und Konsequenz: Erinnerungen* (Oldenburg: Stalling, 1977); Erich Weinert, *Das Nationalkomitee Freies Deutschland 1943-1945: Bericht über seine Tätigkeit und seine Auswirkung* (Berlin: Rütten & Loening, 1957); Willy Wolff, *An der Seite der Roten Armee: Zum Wirken des Nationalkomitees Freies Deutschland an der sowjetischen Front 1943-1945* (Berlin: Militärverlag, 1973).

³ Karl O. Paetel, "Zum Problem einer deutschen Exilregierung," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 4 (1956): 286-301; Friedrich Baerwald, "Zur politischen Tätigkeit deutscher Emigranten im Council for a Democratic Germany," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 28 (1980): 372-83; Joachim Radkau, *Die deutsche Emigration in den USA: Ihr Einfluß auf die amerikanische Europapolitik 1933-1945*, *Studien zur modernen Geschichte* 2 (Düsseldorf: Bertelsmann, 1971) 193-204.

⁴ Joachim Radkau, "Die Exil-Ideologie vom 'anderen Deutschland' und die Vansittartisten," *Das Parlament* 10 Jan. 1970, Supplement (B 2, 70): 31-48; Joachim Radkau, "Das Elend deutscher Exilpolitik 1933 bis 1945 als Spiegel von Defiziten der politischen Kultur,"

Im Gegenstrom: Für Helmut Hirsch zum Siebzigsten, ed. Horst Schallenberg and Helmut Schrey (Wuppertal: Hammer, 1977) 105-46.

⁵ Eike Middell, *Exil in den USA mit einem Bericht: Schanghai—Eine Emigration am Rande* (Leipzig: Reclam, 1978) 189-94; Alexander Stephan, *Die deutsche Exilliteratur 1933-1945: Eine Einführung* (München: Beck, 1979) 220-21.

⁶ *Gesammelte Werke*, 14 vols. (Stuttgart: Evangelisches Verlagswerk, 1959-73); *Ergänzungs- und Nachlaßbände*, ed. Renate Albrecht, 6 vols. (Frankfurt/Main: Evangelisches Verlagswerk, 1971-83). In addition, there are 3 vols. of *Systematische Theologie* (Stuttgart: Evangelisches Verlagswerk, 1966).

⁷ Tillich, *Gesammelte Werke* 13: 312-23.

⁸ Tillich, *Gesammelte Werke* 12: 75.

⁹ Wilhelm and Marion Pauck, *Paul Tillich: His Life and Thought* (New York, London: Harper & Row, 1976) 201-04; Gerhard Wehr, *Paul Tillich* (Reinbek: Rowohlt, 1979) 90-91. See also Ronald H. Stone, *Paul Tillich's Radical Social Thought* (Atlanta: John Knox Pr., 1980) 107-08.

¹⁰ Scheurig 51-70; Stephan 223.

¹¹ Scheurig 57-58.

¹² *Freies Deutschland* (Mexico), No. 9 (Aug. 1943).

¹³ *Freies Deutschland* (Mexico), No. 12 (Nov. 1943): 16.

¹⁴ Scheurig 71-72.

¹⁵ Hans-Albert Walter, *Deutsche Exilliteratur 1933-1950* (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1978) 4: 647-48; Joachim Radkau, *Die deutsche Emigration in den USA* 157-63.

¹⁶ See Herbert Lehnert, "Bert Brecht und Thomas Mann im Streit über Deutschland," *Deutsche Exilliteratur seit 1933*, ed. John M. Spalek and Joseph Strelka (Bern/München: Francke, 1976) 1: 62-88; Ehrhard Bahr, "Der Schriftstellerkongreß 1943 an der Universität von Kalifornien," Spalek and Strelka 40-61.

¹⁷ "An die Redaktion der Neuen Volkszeitung," 18 Jan. 1945, mimeographed manuscript of the American Association for a Democratic Germany, quoted from Karl O. Paetel 289.

¹⁸ See Lehnert 64-66; Bahr 44-51.

¹⁹ Thomas Mann, *Tagebücher 1940-1943*, ed. Peter de Mendelssohn (Frankfurt/Main: Fischer, 1982) 645.

²⁰ See Wolfgang Leonhard, *Die Revolution entläßt ihre Kinder* (Köln: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1955) 293-95; Scheurig 122-36; Horst Duhnke, *Die KPD von 1933 bis 1945* (Köln: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1972) 383-85; Alexander Fischer, *Sowjetische Deutschlandpolitik im Zweiten Weltkrieg 1941-1945* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1975) 38-45; Stephan 223-24; Heinrich Graf von Einsiedel, "Bridget mit Madame Kollontaj: Suchte Stalin 1943 einen Sonderfrieden mit Hitler: Fragen zu den Stockholmer Gesprächen," *Die Zeit*, Overseas Edition, No. 40 (7 Oct. 1983): 15; Ingeborg Fleischhauer, *Die Chance des Sonderfriedens: Deutsch-sowjetische Geheimgespräche 1941-1945* (Berlin: Siedler, 1986).

²¹ See Günter Moltmann, "Die Genesis der Unconditional-Surrender-Forderung," *Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau* 6 (1956): 105-18, 177-88; Anne Armstrong, *Unconditional Surrender: The Impact of the Casablanca Policy upon World War II* (New Brunswick: Rutgers Univ. Pr., 1961); Michael Balfour, "Another Look at 'Unconditional Surrender,'" *International Affairs* 46 (1970): 719-36.

²² Scheurig 117-23.

²³ *Die Briefe Thomas Manns: Regesten und Register*, ed. Hans Bürgin and Hans-Otto Mayer (Frankfurt/Main: Fischer, 1980) 2: 745.

²⁴ Bahr 50-57.

²⁵ Tillich, *Gesammelte Werke* 13: 185-281.

²⁶ "A Program for a Democratic Germany," *Christianity and Crisis* 4, No. 8 (15 May 1944). German transl. in Tillich, *Gesammelte Werke* 13: 313-18.

²⁷ Lehnert 80-81.

²⁸ Tillich, *Gesammelte Werke* 13: 318-22.

²⁹ Paetel 300.

³⁰ Paetel 287.

³¹ "A Statement," *Bulletin of the Council for a Democratic Germany* 1, No. 1 (1 Sept. 1944): 1, 4. German transl. in Tillich, *Gesammelte Werke* 13: 322-23.

³² Henry Morgenthau, *Germany is Our Problem* (New York/London: Harper, 1945); John M. Blum, *Roosevelt and Morgenthau* (Boston: Houghton & Mifflin, 1970); H. G. Gelber,

"Der Morgenthau-Plan," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 13 (1965): 371-402.

³³ *Bulletin of the Council for a Democratic Germany* 1, No. 2 (23 Oct. 1944): 2.

³⁴ "The Crimea Concept and the Council," *Bulletin of the Council for a Democratic Germany* 1, No. 4 (Feb. 1945). See Paetel 296.

³⁵ Letter to Friedrich Baerwald without date, quoted from Baerwald 378-79.

³⁶ "Entwurf einer Erklärung von Professor Tillich für die Mitglieder des Geschäftsführenden Ausschusses," quoted from Baerwald 381-82.

³⁷ Baerwald 377.

³⁸ Baerwald 382.

³⁹ Letter to Friedrich Baerwald without date, quoted from Baerwald 378-79.

⁴⁰ Paetel 299.

⁴¹ "A Program for a Democratic Germany," *Christianity and Crisis* 4, No. 8 (15 May 1944).

⁴² Anthony J. Nicholls, "American Views of Germany's Future during World War II," *Das Andere Deutschland im Zweiten Weltkrieg: Emigration und Widerstand in internationaler Perspektive*, Veröffentlichungen des Deutschen Historischen Instituts London 2, ed. Lothar Kettenacker (Stuttgart: Klett, 1977) 77-87, 218-47, esp. 86. Cf. Ulrich Borsdorf and Lutz Niethammer, eds., *Zwischen Befreiung und Besatzung: Analysen des US-Geheimdienstes und Strukturen deutscher Politik*, transl. Franz Bruggemeier (Wuppertal: Hammer, 1976) 10-17; Alfons Söllner, ed., *Zur Archäologie der Demokratie in Deutschland: Analysen politischer Emigranten im amerikanischen Geheimdienst* (Frankfurt/Main: Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1982) 1: 7-37.

⁴³ Radkau, "Das Elend deutscher Exilpolitik 1933 bis 1945" 105-46.

⁴⁴ Lewis J. Edinger, *German Exile Politics: The Social Democratic Executive Committee in the Nazi Era* (Berkeley, Los Angeles: Univ. of California Pr., 1956) 231-36; Erich Matthias, ed., *Mit dem Gesicht nach Deutschland: Eine Dokumentation über die sozialdemokratische Emigration* (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1968) 38-42, 153-64, 639-48, 670-82.

⁴⁵ Tillich, *Gesammelte Werke* 12: 75.

⁴⁶ Letter to Friedrich Baerwald without date, quoted from Baerwald 378.

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