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The German Ethnic Group in Brazil: The Ordeal of World War I¹

In April, 1917, shortly after Brazil broke off diplomatic relations with Germany, Brazilians of German origin or descent were victims of numerous, destructive riots. Although death and personal injury were minimal, property damage was enormous as hundreds of residences, business houses, factories, and warehouses were damaged or destroyed by mobs gone out of control. Porto Alegre was the scene of the worst riots, but disturbances occurred almost simultaneously in São Paulo, Pelotas, and other cities of the South, where large numbers of German Brazilians lived. Six months later, following Brazil's declaration of war against the German Empire, another series of riots resulted in more destruction in the German districts of Rio de Janeiro, Petrópolis, Curitiba, and elsewhere.²

Like most riots, these outbursts of violence may be attributed to immediate causes. In this case, intergroup tension was intensified by genuine dismay and anger over Germany's having torpedoed Brazilian merchant vessels, by virulent anti-German propaganda, and by the rhetorical excesses of pro-Ally politicians. But that is like saying that World War I itself was caused in 1914 by the Serbian nationalist who assassinated the Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo. The anti-German riots in Brazil are better understood within a larger context of ethnic history: The behavior of the dominant Luso-Brazilians (persons of Portuguese language and culture) and the minority Teuto-Brazilians (as the Germans were often called) may be best interpreted if examined historically in terms of ethnic group relations, perceptions, and images.³

Germans were among the earliest and most numerous of non-Portuguese Europeans to settle in Brazil. Beginning in the 1820s, a small stream of Germans entered the country, largely as a consequence of vigorous recruitment efforts sponsored by the Brazilian government. The number of German immigrants seldom exceeded two thousand in a single year. Yet after nearly a century they had multiplied and pros-

pered until they numbered approximately 400,000 persons, mostly Brazilian-born and German-speaking.⁴

Although colonies of German immigrants developed in several of the large cities and seaports in Brazil, the majority sought new homes in rural regions that had been ignored or bypassed by earlier Portuguese or Azorean settlers. Locating chiefly in the southern states of Rio Grande do Sul and Santa Catarina and to a lesser extent in Paraná, they built a new society, different from what they had known in Germany and different as well from that of the receiving Luso-Brazilian society. The Teuto-Brazilians adapted their agricultural practices to subtropical realities, raised large families, and built churches, schools, and towns. They were the dominant group in some provincial cities, notably São Leopoldo, Blumenau, and Joinville, and became an influential minority in such major cities as Porto Alegre, São Paulo, and Rio de Janeiro.⁵

Because of the accidents of time and place, the Germans in Brazil had been allowed to develop their own society without much interference. By the 1880s, the last years of the Brazilian Empire, they had become a society within a society—a large, diverse, and structured community with its own values, attitudes, language, and folkways. In general, they were well received, respected, and valued for the contributions they were making to Brazilian economy and culture.⁶

With the advent of the republic in 1889, however, attitudes toward the Teuto-Brazilians began to change. The difference was partly a matter of confidence: The republic had to demonstrate its authority and its ability to govern, a task made more difficult by the diffusion of political power among the states and the development of political parties on a state basis. The abolition of slavery had its own repercussions as many thousands of new immigrants were recruited in Italy, Spain, and Portugal to supplement the labor supply. At the same time, the modernization of the economic structure of Brazil was under way, especially in the South. With the expansion of industry in relation to the production of agricultural commodities came economic and social dislocations that were new to Brazilian experience. As the world has witnessed so often in the twentieth century, modernization produced new social problems and tensions, especially in the cities. Some Brazilians, doubting the capacity of their society to absorb the flood of immigrants, demanded that the newcomers learn to conform to Brazilian ways.⁷

A measure of nativism also invaded Brazilian thought and attitude. Nativism was consonant with the doctrines of the Comtean positivism to which many of the new republican leaders subscribed. The commitment of the Brazilian positivists was not merely to *progress*, but also to *order*, which they understood to include a harmony among the classes, races, ethnic groups, and sexes. They could applaud the diverse origins of Brazilian society and culture and yet insist that a new unity—a distinctively Brazilian unity—had to be achieved, by force of dictatorship, if necessary.⁸

During the decade before the outbreak of World War I, many Brazilians in all levels of society, but especially among the ruling classes,

began to perceive the Germans as a problem—an element that threatened the equilibrium of Brazilian society.⁹ The Germans seemed rich and powerful, socially exclusive, and unwilling to be assimilated. To the more suspicious, they were eager accomplices in a vast Pan-Germanic plot to extend the power of the German Empire and with it German language and culture to all parts of the world, especially the southern states of Brazil.¹⁰

The Brazilian image of the Germans, like most stereotypes, rested on insufficient and distorted information, rhetorical exaggeration, and myths.¹¹ There was little comprehension of the diversity within the group, such as the differences that divided Catholics from Protestants or the disparate values and behaviors that separated rural farmers from urban workers and businessmen, or Teuto-Brazilians from *Reichsdeutsche*. Perceptions were drawn primarily from the behavior of the ethnic elite—the articulate, educated clergy, journalists, and businessmen who perpetuated immigrant culture because it served their economic interests and satisfied their psychological needs.

To the most ethnocentric among the German elite it seemed obvious that Luso-Brazilian culture was inferior to their own. They found little in it that they deemed worthy of adaptation or imitation. Brazilian culture was thought to be weak, and Luso-Brazilians themselves seemed to combine indolence with ridiculous conceit. As for their Portuguese language, it seemed useful to know but unimportant in terms of world culture. Compared to German, they thought, it offered few literary treasures.¹²

At the same time, however, these same Teuto-Brazilians sought acceptance and recognition. They were eager to be considered an essential element in their adopted country's history and they wanted Brazilians to understand and appreciate how extensive their contributions had been to Brazil's development. Thus, the literature of Teuto-Brazilian filiopiety describes how individual Germans had participated in the exploration of the land, the independence movement, and the preservation of Brazilian territorial integrity through the wars with Argentina and Paraguay. Moreover, they insisted that German leaders had helped to initiate the renewal of national intellectual life through their defense of liberty of conscience. Filiopietists also stressed the role of the Germans in placing new value and dignity on work and in condemning slavery as morally and socially obnoxious; they had contributed significantly to the elevation of moral, cultural, and material standards in Brazil; and they could take credit, at least in part, for the emergence of the middle class in Brazil.¹³

For a substantial proportion of the German subsociety in Brazil, this kind of ethnocentric talk was pointless. Like any other immigrant group, the German included persons who were favorably disposed toward the language and culture of the host society and wanted to become a part of it as quickly and painlessly as possible.¹⁴ Unlike the cultural idealists who insisted that it was their right to maintain their immigrant speech and folkways and who denied the right of the government to demand that they learn the language of the country, such rapid assimilators were

eager to abandon the marks of immigrant status because they had become a source of social and economic deprivation.

Between these two—the cultural chauvinists at one extreme and the rapid assimilators at the other—was the majority, who saw no problem at all. They went about their daily business gradually adapting to their surroundings and rarely giving the problem of assimilation any thought. If their assimilation was unusually slow, it was because they had further to go, culturally speaking, than, for example, the Italians, to whom they were frequently and negatively compared. Because of this cultural distance, they tended to cluster in separate communities. Since they were so numerous, they could create the institutions that maintained their distinctive cultural forms. Yet through daily contacts at work, in school, at church, or at the store, they learned Portuguese more or less automatically. Whether they learned quickly or slowly depended upon individual circumstances and whether it provided good or poor opportunities for interaction with speakers of Portuguese. For most of them, however, the ability to speak Portuguese became the symbol of higher social status; it was the avenue to social and economic progress, especially for the young.¹⁵

When governmental personnel began to object to the exclusiveness of the rural German colonies and the slowness of the Germans to assimilate, as they did in the two decades preceding World War I, they thought first of the extreme cases—the highly isolated districts where there were no Portuguese-language schools and where hundreds of second- and third-generation children could be found whose knowledge of Portuguese was rudimentary at best. Similarly, when they tried to identify typical German attitudes, they naturally paid attention to the most conspicuous persons—the noisy idealists who made speeches and wrote editorials, essays, and letters demanding the right to maintain their cultural separatism.

Thus the Luso-Brazilian majority acquired a distorted image of the Teuto-Brazilians. Some elements of the composite picture were correct, others were out of proportion, and a few were simply wrong. For decades in the nineteenth century, the Luso-Brazilian majority had ignored the question of German assimilation, probably because it had not seemed important enough to demand action. Then, when the failure of the Germans to assimilate began to be perceived as a problem, some Brazilian leaders tended to overreact and to press for extreme or far-reaching measures that were intended to enforce greater conformity.

When national rivalries exploded into world war in 1914, Luso-Brazilian sympathies were strongly with France and her allies and their tolerance for the loyalty Teuto-Brazilians naturally felt for Germany was correspondingly reduced. Influential political and cultural leaders then attacked Brazil's German ethnic group as a menace to national security and recklessly charged them with a full range of subversive activity. The subsequent anti-German riots of 1917 were thus the natural children born of intergroup tensions in conjunction with the accidents of world history.

The long neutrality period from 1914 to 1917 was generally a period of incubation for these tensions. Circumstances in Brazil were much like those in the United States. Germans in both countries felt a strong bond of loyalty to the land of their fathers; the host societies leaned toward the Allies. In Brazil, the Portuguese-language press quickly became a vehicle for intensely anti-German atrocity propaganda; the Germans in Brazil vigorously countered with propagandistic efforts of their own. The effect of this verbal conflict was to rejuvenate the German ethnic community and invest it with a new sense of self-esteem, if not strength. The German-language press thrived and voluntary organization experienced new surges of vitality as they shared in the new chauvinism.¹⁶

German ethnic behavior was not, of course, uniform. This was especially true of the churches. The leading Protestant denomination was the Evangelical Church, which was organized in several synods. Especially strong in Rio Grande do Sul, it claimed as members about half of all Teuto-Brazilians. In the nineteenth century the Evangelicals (plus certain Lutheran groups) developed strong institutional ties with the Prussian state church, from which they received most of their clergy in addition to significant financial support. Not surprisingly, it became a central doctrine among Evangelicals that German language and culture were inseparable from religious belief. In the neutrality period, therefore, Evangelical parishes and other institutions became powerful agents for the promotion of pro-Germanism. They raised funds for the German Red Cross, bought German war bonds, sponsored bazaars and rallies to aid German victims of war; special prayer services were held to implore the deity for the success of German arms.¹⁷

In contrast to the Evangelicals, the Lutherans, especially those affiliated with the North American Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod, were much less chauvinistic. Their subsidies came not from Germany but from the United States. Even though this church still used German as its basic language, it believed that a transition to Portuguese was essential to survival. Hence, it never offered a word of defense for Germany or for the preservation of *Deutschtum*. These Lutherans saw the European conflict as a judgment of God upon a sinful people—punishment for wickedness, unbelief, failure to pray, contempt for God's word, and the idolatry of human wisdom as revealed especially in modern science and theological liberalism.¹⁸

The German Catholics in Brazil provided a third pattern of behavior. That Catholicism was the religion of the vast majority of Brazilians made their situation fundamentally different from the Protestants. The German Catholics were nearly as numerous as the Evangelicals but were much less chauvinistic. Because the Catholic church was universal and multiethnic, it tended to unite its German adherents with other Brazilians—persons of Italian, Portuguese, and Spanish origins—rather than to separate or isolate them from the rest of society. Even when a Catholic parish consisted largely of Teuto-Brazilians, it usually was not a ready agency for raising either money or enthusiasm for Germany's cause. Moreover, the preeminent German in the Brazilian Catholic hierarchy, Archbishop João Becker of Porto Alegre, was determined to

align his administration with the dominant attitudes and behaviors of Luso-Brazilian society. Nevertheless, there were individual German Catholics who were outspoken in their partisanship for Germany.¹⁹

In contrast to the churches, secular ethnic societies, especially the umbrella organizations, were more likely to lend themselves consistently to active or vocal pro-Germanism. Brazil had no national organization like the National German-American Alliance in the United States, but early in 1916 a German agent, ostensibly working as a fund-raiser for the German Red Cross, founded the short-lived *Germanischer Bund für Süd-Amerika*. Widely publicized, this organization inevitably generated suspicion and alarm among partisans of the Allies; but even within the German subsociety it also earned much opposition because it represented a challenge to the established ethnic leadership, especially the Evangelical clergy.²⁰

The *Germanischer Bund* unintentionally stimulated the growth of patriotic organizations among Luso-Brazilians, the most important of which was the *Liga pelos aliados* (League for the Allies). Led by the brilliant Brazilian orator and statesman, Ruy Barbosa, this organization bore a striking resemblance to the National Security League in the United States. Both organizations defended the Allies, advocated preparedness, protested alleged German atrocities, raised funds for the British and French Red Cross, and sought to hasten the assimilation of immigrants through educational means—literacy programs, instruction in the language of the host society, and in the promotion of patriotism. A special target of the *Liga pelos aliados* was Brazil's distinguished foreign minister, Lauro Müller, a thoroughly assimilated second-generation Teuto-Brazilian who was finally forced out of office in May, 1917.²¹

Following Germany's decision to resume unrestricted submarine warfare on February 1, 1917, anti-German propaganda was intensified in Brazil. It was repeatedly charged that Germany was plotting to use the Teuto-Brazilian colonies in the southern states as the base for its imperialist designs. Similarly, the German-language newspapers persisted in their intense pro-Germanism, despite many ominous signs that Luso-Brazilian tolerance for such behavior was weakening.²²

The breaking point came on April 5, 1917, when a German submarine torpedoed a small Brazilian freighter, the *Paraná*, off the coast of France. Official confirmation of the sinking came on the same day the United States declared war on Germany.²³ Brazilian newspapers stormily protested the loss and demanded that the government take decisive action; the *Liga pelos aliados* urged an immediate declaration of war and several prominent dailies swelled the chorus.²⁴ Patriotic rallies and demonstrations attracted huge crowds in Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, Porto Alegre, and elsewhere. In several cities these demonstrations were transformed into ugly anti-German affairs. Allegedly impelled by patriotism, crowds of people surged to prominent German business establishments, clubhouses of German societies, and German-language newspapers. Despite genuine efforts of municipal governments to maintain order, several demonstrations degenerated into riots causing enormous losses due to arson and looting.²⁵

On Saturday, April 14, and continuing through to Tuesday, April 17, Porto Alegre experienced the worst of these riots, as much of its German district was burned. Mobs consisting largely of waterfront riffraff, enlivened by alcoholic drink, pillaged the district. At the end of three days of riot, nearly three hundred buildings lay in various stages of ruin. Factories, warehouses, restaurants, schools, newspaper offices, plus many private residences were damaged or destroyed.²⁶

Riots plagued other cities in Rio Grande do Sul, most notably Pelotas, located near the southern tip of Brazil. Although the heavily German state of Santa Catarina was mostly spared, other cities from Curitiba in Paraná to Pernambuco far to the north experienced disturbances. Governments on all levels attempted to cope with the problem of civil disorder as efficiently as possible, yet in the weeks that followed, superpatriots continued their intolerant and inflammatory rhetoric. The press also continued to print, as it had before the riots, the wildest of rumors, including one that an army of 80,000 armed Germans were gathering in Santa Catarina, where the governor was Felipe Schmidt, another Brazilian-born German, a cousin of Lauro Müller, the foreign minister.²⁷

The range of reaction among the Germans of Brazil following the April riots was as varied as the people themselves. A few fled to the exclusive German colonies in the interior, but most were willing to accommodate their behavior to the newly narrowed standards of patriotic conduct. Some decided that the best course would be to make overt gestures of assimilation. This could be done most obviously by changing German names to something acceptable in Portuguese. Others dropped their memberships in the numerous *Vereine* or withdrew their children from the German schools. The German-language newspapers suspended publication for a couple of weeks, but by the end of April most had resumed publication, with government approval. A sharp division of opinion emerged regarding the proper course to follow. Some die-hard chauvinists were more determined than ever to maintain their ethnicity and to assert the justice of the German cause, but others advised a more moderate course.²⁸ Even though the majority of the ordinary German-speaking Brazilians had been indifferent to the war in Europe, many persons had now been touched by it in a frightfully direct way. Given the unrestrained character of the riots and the hatred they seemed to project, many Teuto-Brazilians wondered what would happen to them if Brazil actually declared war.

That did not occur until another six months had passed. On October 25, 1917, following the news that another Brazilian vessel, the *Macao*, had been torpedoed, the Brazilian president asked Congress to declare war, which it promptly did the following day. Nearly as promptly, Brazil subjected itself to another round of riots. This time Rio Grande do Sul remained relatively free of trouble, although this was not true of the city of Pelotas. Santa Catarina suffered serious disorders in Itajaí and Florianópolis. But the worst excesses occurred in the cities farther north, beginning on October 28 in Curitiba, spreading to Petrópolis, and

climaxing in Rio de Janeiro on November 3. As in April, property damage was extensive but there was no loss of life.²⁹

Government repression of its German ethnic citizens began immediately after the declaration of war. The minister of the interior ordered an end to all publications in the German language, including newspapers, periodicals, and books, even prayer books and textbooks for teaching German speakers to learn Portuguese. Another decree ordered the closing of all German schools in which Portuguese was not the language of instruction. The Brazilian postal service announced that it would no longer handle materials printed in the German language. There were also injunctions against the use of German-language in public meetings, including worship services in the immigrant churches.³⁰

Congress also enacted special wartime legislation, the most significant of which was the *Lei de guerra*, enacted on November 16, 1917. This law chiefly treated economic problems and was aimed directly at the great German-owned banks and coffee-exporting firms. By it the president of the republic was empowered to seize the property of enemy aliens and to sell all goods consigned to them. Superpatriots in the Congress also demanded and received a provision granting the president the authority to declare any part of the country to be under a state of siege. The next day the president announced that Rio de Janeiro and the southern states were in such a state of siege. Martial law was imposed, seven hundred German aliens were interned, and detachments of the Brazilian army were billeted in the German colonies. Inevitably, German aliens were required to register with police; passes with fingerprints and photographs were issued; and mail was censored.³¹

The total prohibition against any publication in the German language was far severer than any wartime restrictions imposed by the United States upon its German-speaking minority. In Brazil economic survival for the publishers was possible only if they switched entirely to Portuguese, which many of them did. Such Portuguese-language substitutes almost always were considered to be temporary expedients but inevitably most newspapers experienced sharp reductions in the number of their subscribers.

Like the newspapers, the German-language schools were shut down immediately—267 in Santa Catarina alone. They were not allowed to open until they could demonstrate that they were staffed with teachers competent in Portuguese and that instructional materials in Portuguese were going to be used.³² In the United States there was nothing comparable to Brazil's nationwide closure of private and parochial German-language schools, although German-language instruction was generally curtailed in the public schools. Even though enforcement was lax in some districts, many schools never reopened. Because public schools had never been established in many areas of German settlement, the regulation meant that thousands of Teuto-Brazilian children were simply deprived of education during the war.

It was also a difficult time for many of the German churches, especially in the larger towns and cities, where superpatriotic pressures

were felt most strongly. Inevitably, the Evangelicals suffered the most because of their insistence on the linkage between religion and German language and culture. A few congregations simply suspended all public functions for several months. Others tried to make the requisite transition to Portuguese. Some that were located in remote rural districts ignored the wartime restrictions entirely and continued undisturbed. Enforcement was thus inconsistent or haphazard. Higher government officials often tended to be tolerant and understanding, but local authorities were sometimes harsh and unyielding. Still other officials enforced the anti-German decrees only when superpatriots in a local community demanded it. Individual preachers and parishes endured harassment, but the most important general consequence of the war for the Evangelicals was that it cut off the source of financial support and the supply of well-trained clergymen. They were thus forced to become more independent, more self-reliant.³³

In contrast to the Evangelicals, the Catholics and the Missouri Synod Lutherans fared reasonably well. Again, individual clergymen and congregations suffered, sometimes deservedly. The Lutherans, because of their connections with the United States, actually prospered during the war, and, by all accounts, suffered no depredations during the riots, even though their congregations included virtually no one who was not German. In the numerically dominant Catholic church, the ranking Brazilian prelate (the archbishop of Rio de Janeiro), issued a pastoral letter urging understanding and tolerance of the Teuto-Brazilians, but the German-born archbishop of Porto Alegre, João Becker, imposed his own prohibition against the use of the German language in his diocese, closed all Catholic schools administered by German priests, and replaced parish priests of German birth. When individual German parishes were attacked in the superpatriotic press, Becker failed to defend them, fearing the wrath of superpatriots within Brazil's ruling class, and earning thereby the contempt of many Teuto-Brazilian Catholics.³⁴

It was relatively easy for the numerous *Vereine* to accommodate to the new restrictions, compared to the churches, schools, and newspapers. Large numbers changed their names to something in Portuguese; some revised and rewrote their governing documents and opened their doors to persons other than Germans. Even so, most such organizations lost many members during the war and some simply voted themselves out of existence.³⁵

Brazil's actual participation in the war was limited. Its navy patrolled a part of the Atlantic but no soldiers were sent to the battlefields of Europe. Agricultural production was greatly stimulated, but the impact of war was almost imperceptible for most persons. Under such conditions, the intense anti-German feelings that prevailed during the fall months of 1917 were bound to dissipate. Some of the severest federal restrictions were relaxed and a few were removed by spring, 1918, although the ban on publication in the German language remained in force through most of 1919. On the state level there was much variation. In Santa Catarina, for example, restrictions against German-language schools remained in force until 1921.³⁶

After the war, the Germans of Brazil quickly returned to their old patterns of cultural chauvinism and self-imposed separation. German-language schools reopened, newspapers resumed publication, German sermons were heard again in the churches, and the *Vereine* resumed their activities as before the war. Teuto-Brazilian businessmen and industrialists prospered. Nevertheless, the forces of assimilation inevitably eroded ethnic consciousness in many persons. It is impossible to determine how many Teuto-Brazilians were absorbed into the Brazilian mainstream because of war-born influences. But in the isolated, rural colonies, bastions of German ethnicity remained intact, if not untouched. The cultural distance between Teuto-Brazilians and the rest of society, enhanced by the strong sense of German cultural superiority, remained much greater in Brazil than in the United States, where the decline of German ethnicity was almost precipitous.³⁷

Even though a general spirit of tolerance prevailed in Brazil in the postwar decade, a residue of bitterness remained. Just as some Luso-Brazilian patriots continued to insist that national unity demanded programs of forced assimilation, there were Teuto-Brazilians who felt more disillusioned and more alienated from political life than ever before.³⁸ Some newspapers, such as the *Germania* of São Paulo, resumed preaching the gospel of ethnic chauvinism immediately upon resumption of publication in 1919. Still, this journal also insisted that Germans owed their Brazilian fatherland love and loyalty and that they had the responsibility to work for its progress and welfare.³⁹ Nevertheless, the sense of resentment remained keen in many Teuto-Brazilian hearts. Their sense of ethnic distinctiveness had been intensified by the war; it was further strengthened by political unrest in the southern states of Brazil during the 1920s, when self-protection against revolutionary bands became necessary in some communities. Taken together, these experiences caused many German Brazilians to be receptive to the siren song of *Volkspolitik*. When the Nazi variations on that theme were played in the 1930s, some Teuto-Brazilians found the music irresistible.⁴⁰ Given this history, it should come as no surprise that the programs of forced assimilation undertaken by the Brazilian government under the Vargas regime and thereafter were more intense and prolonged than anything attempted during World War I.

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Notes

¹ This essay was presented at the annual meeting of the American Historical Association, December 29, 1982, in Washington, D.C. The first several paragraphs are taken from the author's article, "A Prelude to Conflict: The German Ethnic Group in Brazilian Society, 1890-1917," *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 6 (January 1983), 1-17, and are reprinted here with the permission of the publisher, Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd., Oxford, United Kingdom.

² Detailed accounts of the riots may be found in various metropolitan newspapers of Brazil, April 16-18, 1917, e.g., see *A Federação* and *Correio do Povo* of Porto Alegre and *Jornal do Commercio* of Rio de Janeiro. For summary accounts in the German-language press, see *Deutsche Post* of São Leopoldo, April 24, 1917, and *Germania* of São Paulo, April 25, 1917; *New York Times* published numerous translations of dispatches from Brazilian newspapers; see similar sources for the later riots, which occurred from October 28 to November 2, 1917.

³ Cf. my account of the impact of World War I on the German ethnic group in the United States, *Bonds of Loyalty: German Americans and World War I* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois Univ. Press, 1974).

⁴ Imre Ferenczi, comp., and Walter F. Willcox, ed., *Statistics*, Vol. I of *International Migrations* (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1929), pp. 695, 700-1.

⁵ The most comprehensive study of Germans in Brazil is by Jean Roche, *La colonisation allemande et la Rio Grande do Sul* (Paris: Institut des Hautes Études de l'Amérique Latine, 1959). A large number of filiopietistic histories have been published in German, the most useful of which is by Karl Fouquet, *Der deutsche Einwanderer und seine Nachkommen in Brasilien: 1808-1824-1974* (São Paulo: Instituto Hans Staden, 1974). The most important English-language writer on the Germans in Brazil is the anthropologist Emílio Willems, who has published a half dozen or more excellent articles in American journals since 1940. Willems is also the author of *A aculturação dos alemães no Brasil: Estudo antropológico dos imigrantes alemães e seus descendentes no Brasil* (São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1946). For examples of recent scholarly, monographic work in Portuguese, see the published proceedings of three symposia, each entitled *Colóquio de estudos teuto-brasileiros* (Porto Alegre, 1963; Pernambuco, 1974; Porto Alegre, 1980).

⁶ Gilberto Freyre, *Order and Progress: Brazil from Monarchy to Republic*, ed. and trans. Rod W. Horton (New York: Knopf, 1970), pp. 56-57, 123-24, and 188-89. Freyre has noted that, of all the immigrant groups, the Italians were the most desired, the most imitated, and the most highly praised by Brazilian leaders who in those years hoped the influx of European immigrants would "whiten" the population. Since Italians were closer than Germans to Luso-Brazilians on a sociocultural distance scale, they were less separatistic and thus more capable of producing the desired genetic effect. See pp. 256-57.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 123 and 197; E. Bradford Burns, *A History of Brazil* (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1970), pp. 250-54.

⁸ Freyre, *Order and Progress*, p. 13; Fernando de Azevedo, *Brazilian Culture* (New York: Knopf, 1950), pp. 159-60 and 414-18.

⁹ Martin Fischer, "O problema da conservação da cultura alemã," in *I. Colóquio de estudos teuto-brasileiros* (Porto Alegre: Centro de Estudos Sociais da Faculdade da Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, 1963), pp. 339-56; Egon Schaden, "Der Deutschbrasilianer—Ein Problem," *Staden-Jahrbuch: Beiträge zur Brasilkunde*, 2 (1954), 181-94.

¹⁰ See, e.g., Sylvio Romero, *O allemanismo no sul do Brasil: Seus perigos e os meios de os conjurar* (Rio de Janeiro: Ribeiro, 1906). A decade later Edgardo de Magalhães wrote a piece for English readers, but it merely repeated typical anti-German propaganda of the war period. See his "Germany and South America: A Brazilian View," *Nineteenth Century and After*, 81 (January 1917), 67-80.

¹¹ Schaden, "Der Deutschbrasilianer," p. 184.

¹² *Deutsche Zeitung* [Porto Alegre], 20 October 1917; Oskar Canstatt, *Brasilien: Land und Leute* (Berlin: Ernst Siegfried Mittler, 1877), pp. 251 and 416; Ernest Tonnelat, *L'expansion allemande hors d'Europe* (Paris: Armand Colin, 1908), pp. 125 and 141; Clarence H. Haring, *The Germans in South America: A Contribution to the Economic History of the World War* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1920), p. 43.

¹³ Arpad Szilvassy, "Participação dos alemães e seus descendentes na vida política brasileira," in *I. Colóquio de estudos teuto-brasileiros*, pp. 247-61. A classic example of Teuto-Brazilian filiopietism is Karl H. Oberacker, Jr., *Der deutsche Beitrag zum Aufbau der brasilianischen Nation*, 3d ed., rev. and expanded (São Leopoldo: Federação dos Centros Culturais 25 de Julho, 1978). The second edition appeared in the Portuguese language under the title, *A aculturação teuta a formação da nação brasileira* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Prensença, 1968).

¹⁴ Fischer, "O problema da conservação," p. 344.

¹⁵ Schaden, "Die Deutschbrasilianer," pp. 189-93.

¹⁶ These generalizations are based on both the Portuguese- and German-language press of the period, including such representative newspapers as *Jornal do Commercio* [Rio de Janeiro], *A Federação* [Porto Alegre], *Deutsche Zeitung* [Porto Alegre], and *Germania* [São Paulo]. See also Hans Gehse, *Die deutsche Presse in Brasilien von 1852 bis zur Gegenwart* (Münster: Aschendorffsche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1931) and Georg Königk, *Die Politik Brasiliens während des Weltkrieges und die Stellung des brasilianischen Deutschtums* (Hamburg: Hans Christian, 1935).

¹⁷ Joachim Fischer, "Geschichte der Evangelischen Kirche Lutherischen Bekenntnisses," in *Es begann am Rio dos Sinos: Geschichte und Gegenwart der Ev. Kirche Lutherischen Bekenntnisses in Brasilien*, ed. Joachim Fischer and Christoph Jahn (Erlangen: Verlag der Ev.-Lutherischen Mission, 1970), pp. 85-186; Erich Fausel, *Dr. Rotermond: Ein Kampf um Recht und Richtung des Evangelischen Deutschtums in Südbrasilien* (São Leopoldo: Verlag der Rio Grandenser Synode, 1936); *Deutsche Zeitung* [Porto Alegre], August 1914.

¹⁸ *Evangelisch-Lutherisches Kirchenblatt für Süd-Amerika* [Porto Alegre], 15 August 1914; 15 November 1915; *Lutherische Kirche in Brasilien: Festschrift zum 50-jährigen Bestehen der lutherischen Synode* (Joinville: n.p. [1955]).

¹⁹ Roche, *La colonisation allemande*, pp. 517-24; Petrus Sinzig, *Nach dreißig Jahren* (Curitiba: Verlag des Franziskanerprovinzialat, 1922); Hugo Metzler, *Die St. Josefskirche der deutschen Katholiken zu Porto Alegre während des Weltkrieges* (Porto Alegre: n.p., 1918).

²⁰ See the entire run of the *Bund* publication, *Monatsblätter des Germanischen Bundes für Süd-Amerika* [Porto Alegre], 1916-17, in the Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen, Stuttgart, West Germany.

²¹ These generalizations are based on scores of references to *Liga pelos aliados* in *Jornal do Commercio* [Rio de Janeiro] and other newspapers. See also *New York Times*, 4 May 1917; *Germania* [São Paulo], 4 May 1917.

²² See especially *Deutsche Zeitung* [Porto Alegre] and *Germania* [São Paulo] for the period.

²³ *Jornal do Commercio*, 6 April 1917; *New York Times*, 7-9 April 1917.

²⁴ *New York Times*, 8-14 April 1917.

²⁵ *Jornal do Commercio*, 12 April 1917; *New York Times*, 14, 15 April 1917; *Deutsche Zeitung*, 13 April 1917.

²⁶ See note 2.

²⁷ *Correio do Povo* [Porto Alegre], 20 April 1917; *Jornal do Commercio* 23 April 1917; *New York Times* 20, 25 April 1917.

²⁸ *Jornal do Commercio*, 19, 26, 30 April, 3 May 1917; *Correio do Povo*, 25 April 1917; *Fünffzig Jahre Deutscher Verein Germania und Deutschtum in Bahia* (Berlin: Emil Ebering, 1923), p. 153; *Deutsche Post* [São Leopoldo], 24 April 1917.

²⁹ *O Paiz* [Rio de Janeiro], 3, 4 November 1917; *A Federação*, 31 October, 1, 9 November 1917; *Jornal do Commercio*, 4, 5 November 1917; Sinzig, *Nach dreißig Jahren*, pp. 100-03, 143-44; Wilhelm Fugmann, *Die Deutschen in Paraná: Das deutsche Jahrhundert-Buch* (Curitiba: Empresa Editora Olivera, 1929), pp. 87, 121, 127, and 192.

³⁰ *Correio da Manhã* [Porto Alegre], 27, 28 October 1917; *A Federação*, 30 October, 5 November 1917; Königk, *Die Politik Brasiliens*, p. 52; *O Paiz* [Rio de Janeiro] 5, 6 November 1917; *Jornal do Commercio*, 25 October to 16 November 1917; Percy A. Martin, *Latin America and the War* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1925), p. 81; Percy A. Martin, "Brazil," in *Argentina, Brazil, and Chile since Independence*, ed. A. C. Wilgus (1935; rpt. New York: Russell and Russell, 1963), p. 256; *Fünffzig Jahre Deutscher Verein Germania*, p. 157.

³¹ *Jornal do Commercio*, 17 November 1917; *A Federação*, 17 November 1917; *Hundert Jahre Deutschtum in Rio Grande do Sul, 1824-1924* (Porto Alegre: Typographia do Centro, 1924), p. 384.

³² Martin Braunschweig, "Die rechtliche Stellung des deutschen Schulwesens in Südbrasilien," in *Die Kulturbedeutung der deutschen evangelischen Kirche in Brasilien*, ed. Bruno Geißler (Leipzig: Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung, 1922), p. 50. *A Federação*, 9 November 1917; *O Paiz* [Rio de Janeiro], 9 November 1917.

³³ Wolfgang Ammon, *Chronik von Santa Catharina, 1873-1923* (Joinville: Boehm, 1923), p. 230; *75 Jahre Deutschtum: Santo Angelo-Agudo* (São Leopoldo: Rotermond, 1932), p. 129; *Lutherische Kirche in Brasilien*, pp. 140, 151, and 176; Fritz Wüstner, *Kirchengemeinde Joinville* (Joinville: privately printed, 1951), p. 51; Fausel, *Rotermond*, pp. 148-50, 153, and 154; Fischer, "Geschichte der Evangelischen Kirche Lutherischen

Bekanntnisses," p. 150; Rudolph Becker, *Deutsche Siedler in Rio Grande do Sul* (Ijuhy: Verlag der Serra-Post, 1938), p. 79.

³⁴ Pfarrer Radlach, "Die Einwirkungen des Weltkrieges auf die deutsch-evangelischen Gemeinden in Santa Catharina," in *Die Kulturbedeutung der deutschen evangelischen Kirche in Brasilien*, p. 26; Haring, *The Germans of South America*, p. 48; Roche, *La colonisation allemande*, p. 515; *Der Familienfreund: Katholischer Hauskalender und Wegweiser für das Jahr 1918* (Porto Alegre: Hugo Metzler [1917]), p. 124; Sinzig, *Nach dreißig Jahren*, pp. 100-101 and 144-45; *A Federação*, 9 November 1917; *Correio do Povo*, 27 November 1917; Metzler, *St. Josefs-gemeinde*.

³⁵ Roche, *La colonisation allemande*, p. 539; *Jornal do Commercio*, 6 November 1917; Heinrich Hinden, *Deutsche und deutscher Handel in Rio de Janeiro: Ein hundert-jähriges Kulturbild zur Zentenar-Feier der Gesellschaft 'Germania,' 1821-1921* (Rio de Janeiro: Gesellschaft Germania, 1921), p. 524.

³⁶ Ferdinand Schröder, *Brasilien und Wittenberg: Ursprung und Gestaltung deutschen evangelischen Kirchentums in Brasilien* (Berlin: Verlag Ev. Hauptverein für Deutsche Ansiedler und Auswanderer, 1936), p. 357; Gottfried Entres, ed., *Der Staat Santa Catharina in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des Deutschtums* (Florianopolis: Livraria Central, 1929), p. 223.

³⁷ Koseritz' *Deutscher Volkskalender für Brasilien auf das Jahr 1921* (Porto Alegre: Krahe, 1920), p. 120; Max Dedekind, *Brasilien, das Ziel deutscher Auswanderer und die Deutsche Evangelische Kirche in Brasilien* (Elberfeld: Evangelische Gesellschaft für die protestantischen Deutschen in Südamerika, 1924), p. 25. Cf. Luebke, *Bonds of Loyalty*, pp. 309-31 and "The Germans," in *Ethnic Leadership in America*, ed. John Higham (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1978), pp. 64-90.

³⁸ Fouquet, *Der deutsche Einwanderer*, p. 181; Erwin Buchmann, "Die deutsch-sprachige Presse in Brasilien," *Staden-jahrbuch*, 4 (1956), 221.

³⁹ *Germania*, 19, 22 August 1919; Koseritz' *Volkskalender*, 1921, p. 33.

⁴⁰ Joseph L. Love, *Rio Grande do Sul and Brazilian Regionalism, 1822-1930* (Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 1971), pp. 199-215; Becker, *Deutsche Siedler*, p. 83; Königk, *Die Politik Brasiliens*, p. 66.

